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Abstract 
This thesis examines some characteristics of the interaction between 
innovation activity of firms, in particular R&D, and economic system. 
The first main chapter analyses a mechanism of interaction between 
R&D and market structure, in a horizontally differentiated market where 
firms invest to increase differentiation among varieties. R&D activity 
declines over time; prices, output and short-run profits of firms 
producing the differentiated product move towards the higher steady-
state values, production of the non-differentiated good falls. The 
increasing specialization improves the overall utility of consumers. The 
comparison with the socially optimal solution shows that firms 
underinvest in R&D. The second main chapter evaluates the effectiveness 
of the incentives to development of innovations provided by the Italian 
Ministry for Economic Development through the Fund for Technological 
Innovation. We analyse the subsidies to firms supplied by the general 
and the special sections of this Fund, using a difference-in-differences 
framework and a regression discontinuity one. We find no hints of effect 
on investments, dimension, labour productivity, labour costs, financial 
structure and profitability. For the general section, the effect on assets is 
positive, suggesting that firms used the subsidy to finance current 
expenditures. The third main chapter examines the relationship between 
R&D and market value of firms. We find high heterogeneity in the 
coefficients of different US manufacturing sectors between 1975 and 1995; 
sometimes the effects of current R&D on market value are very small or 
negative. We develop a model with uncertain R&D, where we decompose 
market value in two components, due to the already concretized assets 
and to work-in-progress R&D. Risk aversion may cause different 
evaluations of these components: when investors are risk-averse and 
managers maximize the long-run firm value, the risk associated with 
work-in-progress R&D reduces the short-run firm value even if its 
expected long-run value grows.  
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1 Introduction
The study of the reasons behind economic growth allows to analyse what
are the main determinants of wealth and wellbeing of countries. Economic
theory found that the main engine behind growth in the long run is the
development of new and more productive technologies. The technological
choices of firms and more in general of economic agents are endogenous and
depend on the characteristics of the economy, first of all the structure of
the markets and the institutional framework. Moreover, they influence and
modify the economic environment and its structure of incentives for other
future innovations. Innovation activity can be defined as the set of all the
actions a firm implements in order to introduce a new technological element
in the production process. Its output is usually either a product with new
or improved characteristics or a more eﬃcient production process for an old
product. The main source of innovation is formal research and development
(R&D) activity.1 The knowledge created by innovation slowly spreads among
the economic agents.
The aim of this thesis is the study of some aspects of this interdependence
between economic system and technological innovation, with a particular
1According to OECD (2002), the definitions of the two components of R&D are the
following: “Research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire
new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts. Devel-
opment is systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge gained from research and/or
practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials, products or devices, to
installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially those already
produced or installed”.
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focus on the internal R&D activity of the firm. The remainder of this work
is divided in three main chapters, followed by the conclusions.
In the chapter entitled "R&D and market structure in a horizontal dif-
ferentiation framework" we introduce a mechanism by which firms can influ-
ence the shape of market competition introducing innovative characteristics
in their products. We analyse how innovation and market structure endoge-
nously interact over time; the relationships between these variables have im-
portant policy implications: on one hand, policy measures to stimulate R&D
indirectly aﬀect competition and, on the other hand, institutional changes to
the market structure influence the incentives to research. In our model, we
consider a horizontally diﬀerentiated framework where firms invest in R&D
to increase diﬀerentiation among varieties of the same product. We can think
of a product as an instrument allowing us to satisfy some needs. In a dif-
ferentiated market, each variety has diﬀerent eﬀectiveness in satisfying each
need. A consumer chooses the bundle of varieties giving him the highest level
of overall satisfaction. Firms are able to modify the characteristics of their
variety through investments in R&D; they may aim towards a more special-
ized profile, increasing the level of horizontal diﬀerentiation. Doing so, they
reduce the degree of substitutability with the other varieties and raise their
market power. In the limit, they tend to cut the reciprocal influence between
varieties and to transform their products in unrelated ones. Moreover, the
movement of a variety towards areas of specialization not well fulfilled by
other varieties raises the overall satisfaction of consumers. The inclusion of
10
our mechanism in a dynamic framework allows us to determine not only the
production and R&D paths, but also the evolution of the market structure
over time. Our most important results are that in this environment firms
find incentives to invest in R&D to increase their specialization; the quantity
of invested resources in research is declining over time, because the returns
from further specialization decrease when the firm is more specialized, while
prices, output and short-run profits of the firms producing a diﬀerentiated
product increase. We compare the decentralized outcome and the socially
optimal solution and we find that there is a suboptimal investment in R&D,
because the socially optimal production is larger than the decentralized one
and more output taking advantage of research implies more incentives to in-
vest in R&D; moreover, the firm does not internalize the benefits of reducing
substitutability with the other varieties on the profits of the other producers.
Afterwards, we examine some empirical evidence using a panel of sectorial
data about European firms. The results of the empirical analysis are coher-
ent with the model. We use the ratio between price and marginal cost as
market power index. We find that R&D investments and the variation of
market power over time are both negatively related to the initial value of
market power. Moreover, the number of firms in each sector is independent
of all the other variables in the model.
In the chapter entitled "The evaluation of the incentives to firms for in-
novation: the case of the Fund for Technological Innovation in Italy" we
empirically study the eﬀectiveness of one policy instrument created by the
11
Italian Ministry of Economic Development to stimulate the innovation activ-
ity of firms: the subsidies supplied by the Fund for Technological Innovation.
An interesting peculiarity is that this Fund, unlike most similar instruments
studied in the previous literature, focuses on the development stage of R&D
activity. The theoretical models on the topic find that the eﬀects of the
incentives to the research and to the development components of R&D are
structurally diﬀerent; but case studies where the policy measures mainly in-
fluence only one component are quite unusual in the empirical literature.
The Fund is composed of two sections: a general purpose one, where appli-
cations from any field of activity and geographical area were accepted and
evaluated one-by-one by merit following the chronological order of submis-
sion without a set deadline; a special purpose one, periodically issuing calls
for applications in specific fields of activity or geographical areas with a set
deadline, whose applications are ranked and whose subsidies are assigned to
the best projects up to the amount of available resources. For both sections,
the policy measures include a concessional loan and a non-refundable grant;
the overall amount of the subsidy is the maximum allowed by the Euro-
pean Union regulations. The regular functioning of the general section of the
Fund was unexpectedly interrupted after about five months due to shortage
of funds; we use this exogenous shock to identify the eﬀect of the policy: we
compare the behaviour of the subsidized firms with that of the firms applying
to the Fund after the shortage of funds, whose application had been neither
assessed nor funded until five years later. The data from the Ministry about
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the Fund are merged with the 1999-2007 balance sheets of the firms filed
at the Centrale dei Bilanci archives. We use two methodologies to evaluate
the eﬃcacy of this section of the Fund: a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach,
complemented by a matching procedure to increase the similarity between
treated and controls, and a regression discontinuity design approach, using
the submission date of the application as the forcing variable. In both cases,
we are not able to detect signals of eﬀectiveness of the policy on the invest-
ment behaviour of firms in the considered treatment period 2001-2007. The
same is true also for sales, capital and employee figures, while there is a posi-
tive eﬀect on assets; the additional liquidity from the subsidy seems probably
to have been used to finance the current expenditure of firms. Neither the
profitability nor the financial structure of the firm seem have been clearly
aﬀected by the policy, apart from a reduction in the share of long-term debts
over assets, when calculated net of the concessional loan from the subsidy, a
result coherent with the hypothesis of lack of eﬀectiveness of the policy. We
also evaluate the eﬃcacy of three calls for applications of the special section
of the Fund; we merged the application data with the balance sheets from
the Cerved archives for the years 2001-2007. We use the regression discon-
tinuity design approach with a normalized ranking of the applying firms as
the forcing variable; the results are similar to those from the general section
for the treatment period 2003-2007.
In the chapter entitled "Dynamics of R&D investments and the value of
the firm" we investigate the relationship between value of firms and their
13
knowledge and conventional capital stocks. We derive some empirical results
using the Compustat dataset for the U.S. manufacturing sectors in the pe-
riod 1975-1995. We see that the version of the relationship used by many
previous studies may have eﬀects in terms of eﬃciency of the estimates; we
find a high level of heterogeneity in the coeﬃcients of diﬀerent sectors, which
could undermine the results of the previous analyses usually postulating the
same relationship in all sectors after controlling for fixed eﬀects. When sep-
arating the current R&D eﬀort from the past one, often the eﬀect of current
R&D is much weaker than that one of past R&D and sometimes is negative.
To explain this fact, we develop a simple model where there is uncertainty
about the results of R&D investments and we explicitly consider the time
dimension. These two aspects are relevant because there is a lag between a
R&D investment and the achievement of its results on the knowledge asset.
The value of a firm takes into account not only the current assets, but also
the expected value of the potential ones. Moreover, since research is a risky
activity, there can be a diﬀerent valuation of the already concretized assets
and of those still at a work-in-progress stage. Risk-averse investors can pe-
nalize the expected returns of the latter in the determination of the market
value of the firm. Therefore, when investors are risk-averse and managers
maximize the long-run value of the firm, the risk associated with work-in-
progress R&D can reduce the short-run firm value even if its expected value
grows in the long run.
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2 R&D and market structure in a horizontal
diﬀerentiation framework
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between technological progress and market structure has
been a recurrent element of discussion among economists. In particular,
many contributions aimed to understand the eﬀects of the diﬀerent degrees
of sectorial market power on the incentives to undertake R&D activity. Less
attention has been given to the opposite relationship, how firms can influence,
through research, the shape of market competition.
In this chapter we examine a mechanism through which this last relation-
ship can come into eﬀect and how R&D and market structure endogenously
interact over time. The relationships between these two variables have im-
portant policy implications: on one hand, policy measures to stimulate R&D
indirectly aﬀect competition and, on the other hand, institutional changes to
the market structure influence the incentives to research.
We consider a horizontally diﬀerentiated framework where firms invest
in R&D to increase diﬀerentiation among varieties of the same product. We
can think of a product as an instrument allowing us to satisfy some needs. In
a diﬀerentiated market, each variety has diﬀerent eﬀectiveness in satisfying
each need. A consumer chooses the bundle of varieties giving him the highest
level of overall satisfaction. Firms are able to modify the characteristics of
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their variety through investments in R&D; they may aim towards a more
specialized profile, increasing the level of horizontal diﬀerentiation. Doing so,
they reduce the degree of substitutability with the other varieties and raise
their market power. In the limit, they tend to cut the reciprocal influence
between varieties and to transform their products in unrelated ones. An
example of this kind of behaviour can be found among food producers: in
the market for biscuits some producers specialized their production over time
in low fat products (e.g. Misura, in the Italian market) and others in sweet
products (e.g. Mulino Bianco).
Moreover, the movement of a variety towards areas of specialization not
well fulfilled by other varieties raises the overall satisfaction of consumers.
Horizontal diﬀerentiation implies a trade-oﬀ between level of competition and
improvement of consumer welfare, which has been well understood by the
antitrust authorities.2 The introduction of new versions of a product whose
characteristics damaged competition with other firms has been justified if the
innovative characteristics implied welfare improvements for consumers. This
has been one of the main discussions around the Kodak vs. Berkey classic
case in the 70s; more recently, when Microsoft has been charged by the
U.S. Department of Justice (1998), it defended its choice of selling together
Windows and Internet Explorer saying that an integrated platform simplifies
the creation of new applications, with advantages for consumers.
2See Baker (1997) and Weiss (1974) for some considerations about product diﬀerenti-
ation and antitrust activity.
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The inclusion of our mechanism in a dynamic framework allows us to
determine not only the production and R&D paths, but also the evolution
of the market structure over time. Our most important results are that in
this environment firms find incentives to invest in R&D to increase their
specialization. The quantity of invested resources in research is declining
over time, because the returns from further specialization decrease when the
firm is more specialized, while prices, output and short-run profits of the
firms producing a diﬀerentiated product increase.
Moreover, we examine the diﬀerence between the previously derived de-
centralized outcome and the socially optimal solution. We find that the
investment in R&D is suboptimal. This is because the socially optimal pro-
duction is bigger than that one in the decentralized solution and a bigger
output taking advantage of research implies the existence of more incentives
to invest in R&D. Moreover, the firm does not internalize the benefits of
reducing substitutability with the other varieties on the profits of the other
producers.
Afterwards, we examine some empirical evidence using a panel of sectorial
data about European firms. The results of the empirical analysis are coherent
with the model. We use the ratio between price and marginal cost as market
power index. We find that R&D investments and the variation of market
power over time are both negatively related to the initial value of market
power. Moreover, the number of firms in each sector is independent of all
the other variables in the model.
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The chapter is organized as follows: in the next Section, we review the
literature on the relationship between research activity and market structure
and we highlight connections and diﬀerences between our work and previous
ones. In Section 2.3, we formalize the framework and explain the theoretical
results. Moreover, we compare the decentralized solution of the model with
the social optimum. In Section 2.4 we examine the eﬀects of exogenous
shocks and economic policy instruments on the dynamics and the steady-
state variables of the model. In Section 2.5, we compare the model predictions
about R&D, market power and number of firms with some empirical evidence.
In Section 2.6, we conclude and summarize the findings of the chapter and
further directions of research.
2.2 Literature review
The first and most influential studies on the relationship between research
and market structure are due to Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962).
Schumpeter argues that R&D activity is driven by the attempt to ap-
propriate the monopolistic rents created by innovation. This intuition is
interpreted by most of the following literature in the sense that a sector
whose structure is a (natural or legal) monopoly is a good ground to nourish
research.
On the other hand, Arrow notices that a competitive market provides
more incentives to invest in R&D, because research allows a firm to create
advantages over the other competitors and therefore to escape the tightness
18
of competition.
These two views define the basic frameworks used by the subsequent
theoretical and empirical literature. It is worthy of note that the two points
of view are not necessarily in conflict, because what really matters is the
diﬀerential gain earned by the innovator whenmoving from the pre-innovative
to the post-innovative situation.3 In fact, on one hand, for a given initial
competitive structure an increase in the final profits of the innovator will
raise the incentives to innovate; on the other hand, more competition (and
therefore a lower rent) in the initial market increases the gain from innovation
for a given final degree of market power.
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) provide another pioneering contribution.
They are the first to take into account the endogenous nature of the rela-
tionship between innovative activity and market structure. They consider
the eﬀects of process R&D that allows reducing the marginal cost of a unit
of produced good in a Cournot oligopoly. The research expenditure becomes
similar to a fixed cost of production and therefore the optimal choices of firms
determine the barriers to entry and the number of competitors.
Even though they notice that the market power is better measured by the
charged markup than by a concentration index, they use the number of firms
as endogenous index of the market structure. Several both theoretical and
empirical related works (e.g. Sutton (1998)) do the same. We will see in our
model that, using a diﬀerent framework from that developed by Dasgupta
3See for example Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2005).
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and Stiglitz, concentration and markup may have diﬀerent behaviours.
Moreover, they use a static framework to simplify the analysis, where
number of firms and R&D expenditure are simultaneously determined. In
our model, the presence of a dynamic structure allows the perception of
the continuous development of the interaction between market structure and
incentives to innovate; moreover, we are able to examine the time path of the
responses to exogenous changes in the parameters and to policy measures.
The development of the endogenous growth models, in particular the
works from Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b,c) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992), gives new elements to create theories on the eﬀects of market structure
on R&D. In these works, firms perform research either to reduce marginal
costs or to increase the quality of their product in a framework of vertical
diﬀerentiation. In both cases, research improves the eﬃciency of the produc-
tion process, increasing the value of the output produced with one monetary
unit of input. They emphasize the Schumpeterian view of the relation and
therefore imply a negative relationship between competition and research.
However, in the same years several works (e.g. Geroski (1990), Geroski
and Pomroy (1990), Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (1995, 1999), Nickell
(1996)) point out that the empirical evidence seems to be favourable to a
positive eﬀect of competition and therefore to Arrow’s view. The most re-
cent empirical work by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2005)
find an inverted-U relationship, where, when increasing competition, R&D
falls in concentrated industries and increases in highly competitive ones. In
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fact, R&D generates further possibilities of rent extraction and consequently
reduces competition. Our empirical analysis shows a positive eﬀect of com-
petition. Moreover, a preliminary analysis of our data showed that the dif-
ference between Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2005) and
the previous literature could be due to the use of the Lerner index as a proxy
for the price-marginal cost ratio by the former.
The attempt to reconcile theoretical framework with empirical results
follows several lines of research. Peretto (1999) gets results on the same
lines as Arrow’s argument in an oligopolistic framework where the market
structure is endogenously determined following Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980).
An increase in the exogenous level of substitutability among products reduces
the equilibrium number of firms and increases the rents from innovation,
stimulating R&D.
Aghion and Howitt (1997), Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001),
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2005) use a “step-by-step”
model of innovation where duopolistic firms run a continuous “innovation
race”. Sometimes one competitor is able to achieve a monopolistic position
and other times the competitors share a symmetric Cournot duopoly. In this
kind of model the Schumpeterian eﬀect is balanced by a “competition es-
caping” increase in R&D when the firms share the market. The relationship
between R&D and market structure is cyclical, in the sense that a successful
innovation either increases or reduces the distance between firms in the mar-
ket and every gain of position in the market structure is temporary until the
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other firm innovates. This is because firms compete to improve production
of the same good in a vertical diﬀerentiation framework. Therefore, an inno-
vation reduces the eﬀectiveness of the past improvements of the other firms
on their own profits.
Nickell (1996), Schmidt (1997), Aghion and Howitt (1997), Aghion, De-
watripont and Rey (1999) try to explain the positive correlation between
competition and research using agency considerations: more competition in-
creases the incentives for managers to maintain a tighter discipline in the firm
in order to avoid losses, because the margins of profits are lower in a com-
petitive environment. Therefore, managers work to cut the marginal costs as
much as possible and invest in R&D to this aim. Moreover, the introduction
of an innovation by one firm increases the incentives to innovate of the other
firms, because otherwise they lose their market shares.
Aghion and Howitt (1996) make another attempt through separation
of research and development activities. An increase in competition raises
the speed of adaptability of old production lines to the new standards and
through this channel increases development activity and therefore the growth
rate of the economy.
Denicol and Zanchettin (2010) study a Cournot vertically diﬀerentiated
oligopoly with non-drastic innovations and show that the positive relationship
between innovation activity and competition can be due to the temporal
anticipation of profits from innovation when the market is more competitive.
Other recent related works discuss the correlation between process and
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product R&D in a simplified static framework similar to ours. Lin and Saggi
(2002) compare the incentives to the two kinds of research under Bertrand
and Cournot duopolistic structures. Product R&D allows the firm to reduce
the level of substitutability of its output with the one of the other firm, while
process R&D allows a reduction of the marginal costs. They find a positive
correlation between the two kinds of research and show that Bertrand com-
petition gives more incentive to product diﬀerentiation. Rosenkranz (2003),
working with a similar framework in a monopolistic competition market,
shows that cooperation between firms increases product innovation and that
the same happens when there is an enlargement of the potential market.
A last work related to our analysis is Bils and Klenow (2001), which
empirically examines the expenditure patterns in diﬀerentiated and homo-
geneous products. They find an increase over time of the expenditure in
products with increasing diﬀerentiation and a fall of the consumption of
more static and homogeneous products. Our model explains this behaviour.
The main contribution of this work to the literature regarding the rela-
tionship between R&D and market structure is its endogenous development
in a dynamic framework of horizontal diﬀerentiation, which has not been
previously explored. Diﬀerently from the previous models based on vertical
diﬀerentiation, our framework emphasizes that the R&D choices of a firm do
not necessarily have negative eﬀects on the strategic environment and on the
profits of the other firms producing the same product.
Moreover, while the other models were static, in our case the presence
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of a time dimension allows us to analyse the transitional dynamics of the
firm behaviour, in terms of output, prices and research investments, and the
temporal eﬀects of exogenous shocks and policy measures.
In most of the other models, the number of firms was positively corre-
lated with the profit opportunities in the market and was therefore a good
approximation of market power. Because in our model outsider and insider
firms have diﬀerent profits opportunities, the number of firms may not al-
ways be correlated with the price-marginal cost ratio of the existing firms
and therefore the use of concentration measures as a proxy for the market
power may be not always appropriate.
2.3 The model
2.3.1 The market framework
We consider an economy where L (normalized to 1) workers/consumers live
in continuous time, inelastically supplying their labour.
N + 1 goods are produced, using labour as the only production factor.
One good is homogeneous and produced under constant returns to scale and
perfect competition. The other N goods are diﬀerentiated and produced
under increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition with strategic
interaction among firms. Each firm produces a horizontally diﬀerent variety
of the good. Each variety can be produced in many versions that diﬀer from
each other in the degree of substitutability with the other varieties. The
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set of the currently available versions of a variety depends on the past R&D
history of a firm.
The resulting framework is a Cournot oligopolistic market with diﬀeren-
tiated products, but the model can be developed with similar results under
the hypothesis of monopolistic competition.4
Each good aims at satisfying a subset of needs of consumers. Diﬀerent
varieties of the same good have slightly diﬀerent characteristics; therefore,
they are comparatively more or less eﬃcient to satisfy each need.5 Con-
sumers choose a bundle of varieties to satisfy all their necessities, after a
comparison of the overall utility they get from the currently produced ver-
sions of the diﬀerent varieties. We capture this kind of environment saying
that consumers have homogeneous preferences and maximize the following
intertemporal quasilinear utility function:
U (0) =
Z ∞
0
(
x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
"
ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)
2
xjk (t)
#
xik (t)
)
e−rtdt (1)
where x0 (t) and xik (t) are the consumed quantities respectively of the ho-
mogeneous good and of the currently produced version of variety i of good k
at time t, mk ≥ 2 is the number of firms producing a variety of the diﬀeren-
4The oligopolistic framework seems a better environment because the idea of investing
to enhance the idiosyncratic characteristics of the product suggests attention to the other
varieties and therefore to the choices of the other firms.
5The framework we use here to give an intuition of the meaning of our utility function
and of our mechanism of innovation in horizontal diﬀerentiation is based on the charac-
teristics utility theory developed by Lancaster (1966a-b; 1975; 1979; 1980) and Gorman
(1980).
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tiated good k and r > 0 is the constant intertemporal discount rate.6 ,7 ,8 The
current utility derived from each variety of the diﬀerentiated goods depends
not only on the consumed quantities of that variety, but also on a weight (the
term in square brackets), which negatively depends on consumption of all the
diﬀerent varieties of the good. Therefore, increasing consumption of a variety
reduces the marginal utility of additional units not only of the same variety,
but also of the others. This is because we assume that there is partial substi-
tutability between varieties: to satisfy its needs, the consumer can substitute
6This utility function is an intertemporal generalization of the quadratic partial equilib-
rium function used, for example, by Spence (1976), Dixit (1979), Vives (1990), Ottaviano
and Thisse (1999). Homogeneity and quadratic quasilinearity of consumer preferences al-
low us to obtain a linear inverse demand function after aggregating by direct summation
the individual demand functions of the consumers. If we weaken one of these two hypothe-
ses, the resulting inverse demand functions would be not linear. In this case, we could not
derive explicit solutions of the equations, but the behaviour of the real variables would be
qualitatively the same as in our partial equilibrium economy. Therefore, we can consider
our simplified model a good approximation of the more general cases with heterogeneous
consumers and/or a general equilibrium utility function.
7The substitutability parameters bijk have a time index because firms change the
currently produced versions of their variety over time. Newer versions have lower
substitutability parameters. A more general formulation of the utility function tak-
ing into account all the possible versions of each variety is U (0) =
R∞
0
{x0 (t) +
+
PN
k=1
Pmk
i=1
R biik
0
...
R biik
0
h
ak −
Pmk
j=1
R bjjk
0
...
R bjjk
0
bijk
2 xjk (t, {bjlk}mkl=1) db1jk...dbmkjk
i
∗
∗xik (t, {bilk}mkl=1) dbi1k...dbimkk}e−rtdt, where diﬀerent versions of a variety are indexed
by the substitution coeﬃcients bijk and the own eﬀect of a version of a variety i on its
price is biik. We focus on an equilibrium where only the newest version is produced (that
is, xik(t, {bijk}mkj=1) > 0 only if bijk = bijk(t) ∀j, where the parameter with the time index
is the lowest parameter bijk achievable at time t). Therefore, the utility function can be
rewritten as in the main text. See Subsection 2.8.1 in the appendix for a discussion of the
choice of the produced versions of a variety and the proof that the production of the newest
version is the most common case. When we speak of a variety in the current Section we
usually mean the currently produced version of that variety.
8The number of firms in each market is here assumed to be constant over time. See
Subsection 2.3.3 for a discussion of the endogenization of the number of firms. We assume
mk ≥ 2 because otherwise the firm has no incentive to invest in R&D to diﬀerentiate its
own variety.
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one variety with another having similar, but not equal, characteristics, which
is therefore only partially suitable to satisfy the needs previously satisfied by
the other variety. The separation among the behaviours of the homogeneous
"static" good and the diﬀerentiated ones follows the empirical results of Bils
and Klenow (2001).
The utility maximization problem is subject to the budget constraint of
the consumer
x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
pik (t)xik (t) ≤ w (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
πik (t) (2)
where w (t) is the wage, πik (t) are the redistributed profits of the firm pro-
ducing variety i of good k at time t and pik (t) is the price of variety i of
good k at time t; good 0 is the numéraire of the economy and its price is
normalized to 1.9
Lemma 1 Maximization of the utility function (1) subject to the budget con-
straint (2), assuming x0 (t) > 0 and xik (t) > 0 ∀i, k, implies the following
linear inverse demand functions:
pik (t) = ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t) ∀i, k. (3)
Proof. From the first order conditions of the utility maximization problem.
See Subsection 2.8.2 in the appendix for further details about the formal
9Profits of the firms in the homogeneous good market are null because of the perfect
competition assumption.
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solution of the maximization problem.
The parameters bijk (t) are a measure of the influence of consumption of
variety j on the market of variety i; we assume bijk = bjik and biik = bjjk = b0k
∀i, j to complete the symmetry between varieties. If bijk = biik ∀j, the
eﬀect of consuming one more unit of any variety of the same good on the
equilibrium price of variety i of good k is the same. Hence, the resulting
market structure is a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous good. If bijk < biik
∀j 6= i, the equilibrium price of a variety is more sensitive to an increase of
the sold quantity of the same variety than to an increase of the sold quantity
of another variety and, therefore, the substitutability between varieties is
only partial and proportional to the bijk coeﬃcient.
Let us consider now the production process for the diﬀerentiated goods.
We use a simple linear production function only requiring labour, equal for
varieties of the same good, but that can diﬀer between goods: if the firm
producing variety i of good k wants to produce a quantity xik (t) of its own
variety, he needs
lik (t) = dk + ckxik (t) (4)
units of labour.
Given the current structure of parameters bijk (t) of variety i, the price
and quantity decisions of firms do not include any intertemporal element;
therefore, the firm producing variety i of good k at time t maximizes the
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current operating profit function:
πoik (t) = pik (t)xik (t)− w (t) lik (t) (5)
subject to the inverse demand function (3) and the production function (4).
Assuming x0 (t) > 0 and xik (t) > 0 ∀i, k, the first order conditions of maxi-
mization of current operating profits imply the following reaction curve:
xik (t) =
ak − w (t) ck −
P
j 6=i bijk (t)xjk (t)
2b0k
∀i, k. (6)
The only parameters depending on the variety index i are the cross-eﬀect
coeﬃcients. Therefore, if the bijk structure is the same ∀i, the optimal choice
of xik(t) is the same for all the firms producing diﬀerent varieties of the same
product.
Proposition 2 Given a parameters structure such that bijk (t) = bilk (t) ∀j 6=
i ∀l 6= i, maximization of the current operating profit function (5) subject to
the inverse demand function (3) and the production function (4), implies a
symmetric equilibrium with
xik (t) =
ak − w (t) ck
b0k + Γk (t)
∀i, k (7)
and
pik (t) =
akb0k + w (t) ckΓk (t)
b0k + Γk (t)
∀i, k (8)
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where Γk (t) =
Pmk
j=1 bijk (t) is an index of the level of substitutability with the
other varieties of the same good.
Proof. From the first order conditions of the current operating profits max-
imization problem. See Subsection 2.8.2 in the appendix for further details
about the formal solution of the maximization problem.
Quantities and prices are negatively related to the index Γk (t). We re-
quire w (t) < akck to rule out corner solutions.
A symmetric solution for quantities implies that operating profits of the
producer of variety i of good k are the same for all the producers of the same
good:
πoik (t) =
[ak − w (t) ck]2 b0k
[b0k + Γk (t)]
2 − w (t) dk. (9)
Operating profits negatively depend on the price sensitivity with respect to
all varieties too. A positive production requires πoik (t) ≥ 0. We will see in
the next Section that in equilibrium Γk (t) is decreasing over time. Therefore,
this condition is always verified if
w (t) dk ≤
[ak − w (t) ck]2 b0k
[b0k + Γk (0)]
2 . (10)
The overall profit function of the firm producing variety i of good k in
period t is
πik (t) = pik (t)xik (t)− w (t)
"
lik (t) +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)
#
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where Rijk(t) is the number of workers employed in R&D by the firm produc-
ing variety i of good k to improve the level of diﬀerentiation with variety j of
the same good.10 We assume perfect substitutability among all the workers,
either employed in the production of the diﬀerent (homogeneous and diﬀer-
entiated) goods or in the R&D activity; the wage is therefore the same for
all the workers of the economy.
We close the model deriving the demand of the numéraire good from the
budget constraint, which is always binding:
x0 (t) = w (t)
(
1−
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
"
ck
ak − w (t) ck
b0k + Γk (t)
+ dk +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)
#)
. (11)
The condition for a positive production of the homogeneous good is
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
(
ck [ak − w (t) ck]
b0k + Γk (t)
+ dk +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)
)
< 1.
Let us suppose that we need c0 units of labour to produce one unit of
homogeneous good. If we assume perfect competition in the homogeneous
sector and a positive production of the homogeneous good, the zero-profit
condition determines the equilibrium wage of the economy w (t) = 1c0 ∀t.
Coming back to the condition for a positive production of the homoge-
neous good, we will see at the end of the next Subsection that the amount
of labour used in the homogeneous sector is decreasing over time; hence, the
10We assume Riik(t) = 0 ∀i, k, t.
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condition is always satisfied on the adjustment path if it is satisfied in the
asymptotic steady state, where Rijk = 0 and bijk = 0 ∀i 6= j. Therefore, a
necessary and suﬃcient condition is:
NX
k=1
mk
⎡
⎣
ck
³
ak − ckc0
´
2b0k
+ dk
⎤
⎦ < 1.
Moreover, the nonnegativity condition of current operating profits (10)
requires
dk
c0
≤
³
ak − ckc0
´2
b0k
[b0k + Γk (0)]
2
and the positivity constraint of the diﬀerentiated goods is
ck
ak
< c0.
We assume in the remaining of the text that all these conditions are
satisfied.
2.3.2 The innovation activity
We now model how firms influence the market structure.
The utility of each good for the consumer is determined by the idiosyn-
cratic value of the good in several characteristics. If we associate a numerical
value to the consumer evaluation of each characteristic, we can display the
position of the good in a characteristics space. Consumers choose their op-
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timal bundle after evaluating the characteristics profiles of the outputs pro-
posed by firms. They consider spatially nearer characteristics profiles more
substitutable.
A firm adds to its feasible set of technologies new positions in the charac-
teristics space through investments in R&D. There is a technological trade-oﬀ
between characteristics: the development of some of them does not allow or
even damages the development of others.11 The optimal choice of the newly
added technological positions implies an increase of the level of specialization
in some characteristics of the good.
We call a "variety" the set of all the potential positions on the technologi-
cal frontier of the same good specialized in the same subset of characteristics.
For a given variety, a "version" is one of the possible characteristics profiles.
Diﬀerent versions show diﬀerent degrees of specialization, which translate to
diﬀerent levels of substitutability, with eﬀects on the profits of firms.
We can see in Figure 2.1 an example giving the intuition of the ideas: we
show the eﬀects of R&D of two firms in a two-dimensional space of charac-
teristics and the link with the bijk coeﬃcients.12 The two axes of the graph
are the values of two characteristics z1 and z2 of the good.
R&D allows firms to enlarge the set of feasible technologies on the tech-
11Lancaster (1966a) shows that the technological frontier of the optimally developed
combinations of characteristics must be concave and that the optimal behaviour of firms
is staying on the frontier.
12We assume that the number of potentially exploited characteristics of a product is not
smaller than the potential number of firms in the market. This technical assumption is
equivalent to saying that a sensible entrepreneur is always able to find a new specialization
to be exploited.
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nology frontier, which includes all the technologically possible z1/z2 ratios.
In our Figure, the level of substitutability between two products (and there-
fore the value of the bijk coeﬃcients) is given by the closeness in the z1/z2
ratios and by the physical nearness in the Cartesian plane.
Let us suppose that the only available technological position is point A.
Both firms must be positioned there and there is perfect substitutability
between the produced outputs.
Now the two firms invest in R&D. The farther the produced versions of
the varieties are one from the other, the lower is the level of substitutability
between them (and the larger are the profits of the two firms). Therefore, the
optimal behaviour of the two firms will be adding new positions on the tech-
nological frontier towards the opposite axes, for example towards positions
B and C.
Without loss of generality, the variety of firm 1 is z1 intensive and that one
of firm 2 is z2 intensive. Firm 1 (2) learnt how to produce all the versions
of its variety between A and B (C), but finds optimal the production of
variety B (C) only. The two firms increase the level of specialization of their
varieties and move towards the two opposite axes.
Let us go back to the formalization of this situation in our model.
We formally define the dynamics of the lower bound of the achievable
substitutability coeﬃcients between the newest versions of two varieties i
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and j of the same good with the following equation:
b˙ijk (t) = −γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))] . (12)
We assume that the dynamics of bijk (t) depend on the number of R&D
workers employed by the two interested firms to reduce substitutability with
the other firm. R&D is increasingly diﬃcult to be eﬃciently organized and
consequently there are diminishing returns formR&Dwhen the firm increases
the employed quantity of resources. This fact is captured by the function φ,
which is assumed to be continuous, increasing (φ0 > 0) and concave (φ00 < 0),
with φ (0) = 0 and φ0 (0) = ∞. We assume that the more diversified is the
product, the more diﬃcult is finding new useful ways to eﬀectively increase
specialization. If we consider the demand functions when the parameters bijk
tend to zero, we find that the varieties tend to become completely unrelated;
therefore, the impact of the development of new specialized features on the
level of substitutability becomes negligible and a kind of R&D aiming at
increasing diﬀerentiation with the other varieties becomes useless for the
firm. To capture this fact, we assume that a given eﬀort in R&D has the
same relative, and not absolute, eﬀect on market power.
The research process is completely deterministic to keep a symmetric
simplified outcome, not possible in presence of uncertainty. Moreover, we
assume that the firm only produces the most diﬀerentiated version of its
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variety (that is, the version with the lowest values of bijk).13
Last, we assume that, because of patent protection or industrial secrecy,
no firm can copy the newly developed version of a variety. Including the
ability to imitate some (but not all) characteristics of the new version would
weaken the eﬀects of R&D and slow the speed of movement towards the
steady state, but would not change the qualitative results.
The R&D choices are an intertemporal decision. Therefore, the firm
producing variety i of good k makes its choices maximizing the discounted
overall profits:
Πik (0) =
Z ∞
0
(
pik (t)xik (t)− w (t)
"
lik (t) +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)
#)
e−rtdt. (13)
Assuming a parameters structure such that bijk (t) = bilk (t) ∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i,
the equilibrium prices and quantities still follow the analysis of the previous
Subsection in each period.
We examine now the optimal R&D path.
Proposition 3 Assuming an initial parameters structure such that bijk (0) =
bilk (0) ∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i, the solution of the optimal control problem where
the firm maximizes the discounted sum of its current and future profits (13)
13We show in Subsection 2.8.1 in the appendix that the optimal choice of the firm is the
production of the most diﬀerentiated version only, if the fixed cost are high enough or if
there are three firms or more. Otherwise, the optimal choice could be the production of
both the most diﬀerentiated and the non-diﬀerentiated versions, but not of the interme-
diate versions. We consider the first case in the main model, but the second case can be
easily accommodated.
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subject to the inverse demand function (3), to the production function (4)
and to the dynamics of the lowest achievable values of the bijk coeﬃcients
(12) implies the following growth rate of Rijk (t):
R˙ijk (t)
Rijk (t)
=
1
ηφ0R (Rijk (t))
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
r −
γc0
³
ak − ckc0
´2
bijk (t)φ0 (Rijk (t))
[b0k + Γk (t)]
2
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
∀j, t
(14)
where ηφ0R (Rijk (t)) is the absolute value of the elasticity of φ
0 (Rijk (t)) with
respect to Rijk (t) and φ0 (.) is the first derivative of φ (.).
Proof. From the first order conditions of the optimal control problem. See
Subsection 2.8.2 in the appendix for further details about the formal solution
of the optimal control problem.
We can easily see the dynamics of the model for the case φ (Rijk (t)) =
Rijk(t)
1−η
1−η with 0 < η < 1, which implies a constant absolute value η of the
elasticity of the φ0 function, in the phase diagram in Figure 2.2. The two
diﬀerential equations (12) and (14) imply that the behaviours of bijk (t) and
of Rijk (t) are the same for all the varieties of good k, given a common initial
value bijk (0) and a common choice of Rijk (t) for some value of t. The locus
of points where b˙ijk = 0 in the (bijk, Rijk) space is defined by
Rijk |b˙=0 = 0
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and
bijk |b˙=0 = 0
while the set of points where R˙ijk = 0 is described by
Rijk |R˙=0 = 0
and
Rijk (t) |R˙=0 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γc0
³
ak − ckc0
´2
bijk (t)
r [b0k + Γk (t)]
2
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
1
η
.
The steady states of the model are identified by the set of points in the
phase diagram where both b˙ = 0 and R˙ = 0 are satisfied: this set is described
by the two conditions Rijk = 0 and 0 6 bijk 6 bijk (0). Let us consider the
path converging towards Rijk = 0 and bijk = 0 as a reference path. A
path with a higher initial level of Rijk would be diverging and would imply
Rijk (∞) =∞, which is not feasible. A path with a lower initial level of Rijk
would converge towards Rijk (∞) = 0 and bijk (∞) > 0. If we consider the
concentrated profit function (with pik (t), xik (t) and lik (t) already at their
optimal value), the returns from one additional infinitesimal unit of R&D
tend to infinite when Rijk (t) tends to zero if bijk (t) > 0:
lim
Rijk(t)→0
∂Πik (t)
∂Rijk (t)
= lim
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2γ
³
ak − ckc0
´2
b0kbijk (t)
r [b0k + Γk (t)]
3Rηijk (t)
− w
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
=∞.
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In this case the firm can easily increase its profits with a small R&D invest-
ment; therefore, a behaviour converging towards bijk (∞) > 0 and Rijk (∞) =
0 cannot be optimal. More in general, this limit and the fact that R˙ijk (t) =
0 when Rijk (t) = 0 imply together that Rijk (t) = 0 can never be part
of an optimal solution when bijk (t) > 0. The diﬀerential equations de-
scribing b˙ijk (t) and R˙ijk (t) ∀j are continuous and locally Lipschitz ∀t for
Rijk (t) 6= 0 and, therefore, a solution to the maximization problem exists
and is unique.14 Hence, the only remaining candidate behaviour, converging
towards bijk (∞) = 0 and Rijk (∞) = 0, is the equilibrium behaviour.15
Given the boundary conditions Rijk (∞) = 0 and the initial values bijk (0),
the dynamic behaviour of Rijk (t) is described by the forward-looking equa-
tion
Rijk (t) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γc0
³
ak − ckc0
´2
r
Z ∞
t
bijk (s) e−r(s−t)
[b0k + Γk (s)]
2 ds
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
1
η
while that one of bijk (t) is described by the backward-looking equation
bijk (t) = bijk (0) e−
γ
1−η
R t
0 [R
1−η
ijk (s)+R
1−η
jik (s)]ds.
Firms gradually reduce the quantity of invested resources in research, be-
cause increasing diﬀerentiation reduces the pressure of competition, and move
14See de la Fuente (2000), p. 433, Theorem 6.2.
15Because this model only focuses on a kind of R&D aiming at increasing the degree
of diﬀerentiation of varieties and does not include other kinds of R&D investments (e.g.,
to increase productivity), the steady-state situation where Rijk (∞) = 0 should not be
interpreted in the sense that firms do not invest in R&D, but that firms exert no eﬀort to
increase diﬀerentiation among varieties through R&D.
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towards the steady-state situation, where the demand functions of diﬀerent
varieties are uncorrelated and there are no incentives to further increase
diﬀerentiation. The level of research tends to the same steady state with
Rijk (∞) = 0 ∀j for all the firms producing diﬀerent varieties of the same
good and, therefore, assuming a common initial value bijk (0) ∀i, ∀j 6= i,
bijk (t) and Rijk (t) follow the same paths ∀i ∀j 6= i.
Let us consider now what are the consequences of the implied dynamics
on quantities, prices and operating profits of the firms producing the diﬀer-
entiated product. The equilibrium levels of these variables are the static ones
for the current bijk configuration. A review of equations (7), (8) and (9) tells
us that they increase during the transitional dynamics and asymptotically
tend to the higher steady-state levels. This is because the demand function
is less sensitive to the level of output of the other firms when there is more
diﬀerentiation. Therefore, the residual demand function, which is the space
where the firm maximizes its own profits, has a higher intercept. A larger
quantity is produced for a given price. Moreover, the firm can better exploit
the new residual demand function to charge a higher price for its output.
Instead, the produced quantity of the homogeneous good (11) falls be-
cause now the raw utility of one unit of diﬀerentiated product is higher (the
penalty to the utility for each unit of the other varieties is lower) and, there-
fore, the diﬀerentiated products are preferred.16 A consequence of this fact is
16These dynamics explain the empirical patterns reported by Bils and Klenow (2001)
where consumption of the "static" homogeneous good falls and expenditure in the varieties
of the diﬀerentiated ones increases over time.
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that the benefits of the successful research activity are not limited to firms:
consumers prefer the bundle of the newly developed varieties, where they
obtain a larger quantity of more diversified goods and a smaller one of the
homogeneous good.
2.3.3 Endogenization of the number of firms mk
The previous analysis considered an exogenous number of firms and varieties
mk. We try now to endogenize this variable. The results depend on the
market entry conditions of the new firms. In particular, they depend on the
initial level of diﬀerentiation of the variety produced by the entrant and on
the level of the fixed costs.
If we call biijk (t) the value of the substitutability parameter reached by
themik (t) already established firms, we assume that the output of the entrant
producing a new variety of good k will be initially characterized by a value
of the parameter of substitution with the other older varieties beejk (t) =
b0k+ 1mik(t)
Pmik(t)
i=1 b
i
ijk(t)
2
< b0k ∀j, k. The new firm indirectly takes advantage of
the R&D previously performed by the other firms to diﬀerentiate their own
varieties and, therefore, the initial value of bijk of the entrant is weakly lower
than b0k. This formulation of beejk (t) is equivalent to assume that the entrant
benefits from half the degree of diﬀerentiation created by the incumbents for
their own products, a situation equivalent to that one in which the incumbent
had done its usual research and the entrant had done none in the past periods.
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Proposition 4 When we endogenize the number of firms mk(t) in the pre-
viously described framework, at the initial time t = 0 new firms enter the
market until the discounted value of the expected profits is null:
Πik (0) =
Z ∞
0
⎧
⎨
⎩p
∗
ik (t)x
∗
ik (t)− w (t)
⎡
⎣l∗ik (t) +
mk(t)X
j=1
R∗ijk (t)
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭ e
−rtdt = 0
(15)
where the starred variables are the optimal values given by the previous anal-
ysis as functions of mk.
Assuming an initial parameters structure for the incumbents such that
biijk (0) = b
i
ilk (0) ∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i, no firm has incentives to leave the market in
the following periods.
Moreover, assuming also that a firm entering the market in period τ > 0
has an initial parameter structure beejk (τ) =
b0k+ 1mik(t)
Pmik(τ)
i=1 b
i
ijk(τ)
2
∀j, two
suﬃcient conditions to ensure no entry after the initial period are that either
the incumbents already attained bik (τ) ≤
mik−4
mik−2
b0k for mik > 4 or that
dk
c0
is
larger than a threshold.
Proof. Let us consider the possibility that a firm exits. If we examine the
path of profits over time we see that
π˙ik (t) = −
2
³
ak − ckc0
´2
b0k
Pmk
j=1 b˙ijk (t)
[b0k + Γk (t)]
3 −
Pmk
j=1 R˙ijk (t)
c0
> 0 ∀i, k (16)
because both b˙ijk (t) and R˙ijk (t) are negative. This implies that the dis-
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counted value of the expected profits is increasing over time and no firm
finds optimal to leave after the initial period.
Let us consider what happens if an additional firm tries to enter the
market in a period τ > 0, when mik firms are already established. Assuming
symmetry, we use bik (t) ≡ biijk (t) and bek (t) ≡ beejk (t) to simplify notation.
The formal optimization problems for both the entrant and the incumbent
are shown in Subsection 2.8.2 in the appendix. The optimal quantity for an
additional firm entering the market in a generic period τ , assuming bek (τ) =
b0k+bik(τ)
2
, is
xek (τ) =
2
³
ak − ckc0
´
[(4−mik) b0k + (mik − 2) bik (τ)]
(16−mik) b20k + (6mik − 8) b0kbik (τ)−mikbik (τ)
2
which is positive only if mik < 4 or b
i
k (τ) >
mik−4
mik−2
b0k. If the incumbents
already diﬀerentiated their outputs and achieved a bik (τ) smaller than this
threshold, the entrant is not even able to cover the marginal costs with the
revenues and, therefore, does not produce.
Production is also null whether the operative profits of the entrant are
negative, which is always verified if
dk
c0
>
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
4
³
ak−
ck
c0
´2
49b0k
if mik = 2³
ak−
ck
c0
´2
b0k(mik+2)
2 if mik > 2
.
In both cases, the maximum principle conditions imply that no research is
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undertaken without production and therefore the entrant is inactive.
A consequence of the zero-profit condition (15) and of equation (16) is
that firms bear negative profits at the beginning and positive ones in the
steady state.
2.3.4 Comparison between the social optimum and the decentral-
ized economy solution
Now, let us consider the comparison between the social optimum and the
solution of the decentralized economy problem.
We assume that there is a benevolent planner choosing the allocations
of the real variables x0 (t), xik (t), lik (t), Rijk (t) and mk (t) to maximize the
present value of the utility of consumers. We will see that the socially optimal
number of produced varieties mk (t) is not constant over time. Therefore,
to allow a comparison between the two cases, we start by determining the
socially optimal amounts of research and production of the diﬀerentiated
goods for a given mk and then we discuss the mk (t) behaviour.
Proposition 5 The benevolent planner maximizes the utility function (1)
subject to the production functions (4) for diﬀerentiated products, the pro-
duction function for the homogeneous product l0 (t) = c0x0 (t), the full em-
ployment condition l0 (t) +
PN
k=1
Pmk
i=1 lik (t) +
PN
k=1
Pmk
i=1
Pmk
j=1Rijk (t) = 1
and the diﬀerential equations (12) determining the bijk (t) of all the currently
produced versions of the varieties.
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Assuming a parameters structure such that bijk (t) = bilk (t) ∀i ∀j 6= i
∀l 6= i, for a given number of produced varieties mk of good k, the chosen
quantities of the socially optimal solution are given in each period by
xSOik (t) =
ak − ckc0
Γk (t)
> xDik (t) ∀i, k.
Proof. From the first order conditions of the benevolent planner’s maxi-
mization problem. See Subsection 2.8.2 in the appendix for further details
about the formal solution of the maximization problem.
Here, we can see a first distortion: the socially optimal production is larger
than the decentralized output. This is because in the decentralized outcome
firms choose quantities to equate marginal cost and marginal revenue, while
the socially optimal production equates marginal cost and implicit price.17
The socially optimal level of production cannot be implemented in the de-
centralized economy because it would imply a loss for firms due to fixed
costs.
Proposition 6 There is a second distortion in the competitive equilibrium:
when taking the decision of investing in R&D the firm does not internalize
the benefits of reducing substitutability with the other varieties on the profits
of the other producers.
There are two sides of this fact: on one hand, the firm does not internalize
17That is the price that would prevail in a decentralized framework where firms produce
the socially optimal quantities.
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the positive eﬀect of the R&D activity of the other firms on the substitutabil-
ity coeﬃcients of the currently chosen version of its variety. On the other
hand, it does not internalize the eﬀect of its own research on the level of
substitutability of the currently chosen versions of the other varieties. The
two sides have opposite eﬀects.18
Moreover, the above mentioned distortion in quantities has negative eﬀects
on the optimal R&D level because it reduces the production taking advantage
of research and therefore its returns.
The overall eﬀect of the externalities is such that the decentralized level
of R&D is lower than the socially optimal one.
Proof. Assuming an initial parameters structure such that bijk (0) = bilk (0)
∀i ∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i, the solution of the benevolent planner’s dynamic optimiza-
tion problem implies that the R&D path must satisfy:
R˙SOijk (t)
RSOijk (t)
=
1
ηφ0R
¡
RSOijk (t)
¢
⎡
⎢⎣r −
γc0
³
ak − ckc0
´2
bijkφ0
¡
RSOijk (t)
¢
Γ2k (t)
⎤
⎥⎦
∀i, k, t ∀j 6= i.
See Subsection 2.8.2 in the appendix for further details about the formal
solution of the dynamic optimization problem.
18When we consider the socially optimal level of production, the overall eﬀect of the
two sides of the externality is null. Instead, if we consider another level of production
(for example, if we implement the decentralized solution quantities or more in general
if there are sources of distortions), this is not true anymore. We can show that with a
smaller output than the socially optimal one the overall distortion due to this externality
is negative.
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We can graphically see the comparison between the decentralized and the
socially optimal paths in the phase diagram displayed in Figure 2.3. Similarly
to what happened in the decentralized case, the steady states of the model
are identified by the set of points in the phase diagram with both Rijk = 0
and 0 6 bijk 6 bijk (0). Paths with higher initial levels of Rijk than that of the
path converging towards Rijk = 0 and bijk = 0 would be diverging and would
imply Rijk (∞) =∞, which is not feasible. Paths with lower initial levels of
Rijk than that of the path converging towards Rijk = 0 and bijk = 0 would
converge towards Rijk (∞) = 0 and bijk (∞) > 0. These paths cannot be
optimal, because when considering the concentrated utility function (with
x0 (t), l0 (t), xik (t), lik (t) ∀i, k, t already at their optimal value) we find
that the utility created by one additional infinitesimal unit of R&D tends to
infinite when Rijk (t) tends to zero if bijk (t) > 0:
lim
Rijk(t)→0
∂U (t)
∂Rijk (t)
= lim
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2γ
³
ak − ckc0
´2
bijk (t)φ0 (Rijk (t))
rΓ2k (t)
− 1
c0
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
=∞.
Once again, this limit also implies that Rijk (t) = 0 cannot be part of an op-
timal solution if bijk (t) > 0; the diﬀerential equations describing b˙ijk (t) and
R˙ijk (t) ∀j are continuous and locally Lipschitz ∀t for Rijk (t) 6= 0 and, there-
fore, a solution to the maximization problem exists and is unique.19 Hence,
the only remaining candidate behaviour, converging towards bijk (∞) = 0
and Rijk (∞) = 0, is the optimal choice for the benevolent planner. Let
19See de la Fuente (2000), p. 433, Theorem 6.2.
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us consider the slopes of the decentralized and the socially optimal paths
passing through a given point (b, R) in the phase diagram. We see that:
∂RSOijk
∂bijk
−
∂RDijk
∂bijk
¯¯¯¯
¯ bijk=bRijk=R = −
γc0
³
ak − ckc0
´2
b0kb (b0k + 2Γk)φ0 (R)R
ηφ0RΓ2k (b0k + Γk)
2 b˙
(17)
∀i, k, b, R ∀j 6= i
which is always positive because in the model b˙ (t) < 0 for b > 0. Therefore,
the R&D paths in the socially optimal solution are always steeper than in the
decentralized case. It must be true not only for a given point (b, R), but also
in a suﬃciently small neighbourhood of each point, because the functions of
the slopes are continuous. If we consider a value b of bijk suﬃciently near to
the steady state, this implies that
RSOijk
¯¯
bijk=b =
Z b
0
∂RSOijk
∂bijk
dbijk=˜b
∂RSOijk
∂bijk
¯¯
bijk=b >
> b
∂RDijk
∂bijk
¯¯
bijk=b =˜
Z b
0
∂RDijk
∂bijk
dbijk = RDijk
¯¯
bijk=b
where the approximation error becomes negligible for b small enough. There-
fore, in a suﬃciently small neighbourhood of the steady state the socially op-
timal amount of research is always bigger than that one in the decentralized
equilibrium. The result RSOijk > R
D
ijk can be extended to any value of bijk:
Rijk is continuous in bijk; therefore, a situation where RDijk > R
SO
ijk for some
bijk > 0 requires that in the optimal paths RDijk
¯¯
bijk=b0 = R
SO
ijk
¯¯
bijk=b0 and
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∂RDijk
∂bijk
¯¯
bijk=b0 >
∂RSOijk
∂bijk
¯¯
bijk=b0 for some b
0 (0, bijk), which contradicts equation
(17).
Let us consider now what happens to the socially optimal number of
varieties mk (t) if it is allowed to change over time. In this case, the formal
analysis becomes quite complicated, because the optimal number of varieties
is not constant and the currently produced versions of diﬀerent varieties
have now diﬀerent substitution indexes Γik (t), depending on the period they
entered the market. The optimal real variables are now asymmetric and we
can have diﬀerent solutions, where the produced quantities are given by the
solutions of the first order conditions with respect to xik (t):
mk(t)X
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t) = ak −
ck
c0
∀i, k, t.
The socially optimal R&D decision is symmetric among firms (Rijk (t) =
Rjik (t)) because of the decreasing eﬃciency of the φ function. The path
depends on the chosen quantities and on the value of the bijk (t) coeﬃcients
of the currently produced versions:
R˙ijk (t)
Rijk (t)
=
1
ηφ0R (Rijk (t))
£
r − c0γbijk (t) x∗SOik (t)x∗SOjk (t)φ0 (Rijk (t))
¤
(18)
∀i, k, t ∀j 6= i
where the starred variables are the optimal choices of the benevolent planner
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for quantities from the previous analysis.
Proposition 7 Under the hypothesis of constant elasticity of the φ0 function,
the number of varieties in the socially optimal solution implies that in each
period the fixed cost of one more variety is approximatively equal to the future
gain in terms of diﬀerentiation due to R&D:
dk=˜
2η
1− η
mk(t)X
j=1
Rmjk (t) ∀k, t (19)
where the m index is referred to the marginal variety, which is either the last
produced or the last abandoned. Assuming a parameters structure such that
bijk (t) = bilk (t) ∀i ∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i, the number of varieties is increasing over
time.
Proof. From the first order conditions of the benevolent planner’s dynamic
optimization problem; the approximation is due to the fact that mk(t) is
always an integer and therefore its optimal value is usually either slightly
smaller or slightly bigger than the solution of the first order conditions. See
Subsection 2.8.2 in the appendix for further details about the formal solution
of the dynamic optimization problem.
We cannot have a solution where the number of varieties is decreasing:
in this case, the solution would be symmetric because, given a symmetric
initial situation, the first order conditions are symmetric too. Therefore, all
the decisions are always the same for all the varieties. This implies that
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the R&D and production paths should be positive also for the varieties to
be abandoned, which contradicts our assumption of decreasing number of
varieties.
A solution where the number of varieties is constant is not possible, be-
cause equation (19) implies that the overall R&D level of the marginal firm
should be the same ∀t, which requires the product bmjk(t)xmk (t)xjk (t) in
equation (18) to be constant over time and such that R˙mjk (t) = 0, a value
not compatible with the R&D optimal path.
The variation of R&D implied by equation (18) for the marginal variety
is concave over time, which implies that the product bmjk(t)xmk (t)xjk (t)
must decrease. In this case, the economy asymptotically moves towards a
situation where the homogeneous good is not produced any longer and all the
products are diﬀerentiated. The overall number of varieties, in the simplified
symmetric case where ak = a, b0k = b, ck = c, dk = d ∀k, is given by
mk =
n
N
h
d+ cb0
³
a− cc0
´io−1
∀k.
In fact, we saw in Subsection 2.3.3 that the endogenous number of firms in
the decentralized solution is determined by a zero-profit condition (equation
(15)), while the socially optimal one depends on the comparison between
the marginal utility of a new variety and the marginal utility of the old one.
Because the produced quantities of the old varieties are increasing, their
marginal utility is decreasing over time; therefore, the consumer is better oﬀ
by introducing new varieties. Increasing the number of varieties reduces the
marginal utility of an additional one (because it increases the number of bijk
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terms in the demand function). Hence, a situation with increasing quantities
and number of varieties is compatible with the first order conditions of the
social optimum problem.
When we compare the endogenous number of firms in the decentralized
solution (given by equation (15)) and in the social optimum, we see that the
former depends on parameters that are not relevant in the steady-state be-
haviour of the latter, like the intertemporal discount parameter r. Inspection
of equation (19) shows that the socially optimal number of varieties always
exceeds the number of varieties in the decentralized case when the economy
is near the steady state (because average R&D is low, which implies a large
socially optimal number of varieties). The comparison in the short run de-
pends on the size of the R&D distortions. If the distortions are big enough
and the economy is suﬃciently far from the steady state, the socially optimal
number of varieties may be smaller than the one in the decentralized case.
2.4 Comparative statics and policy implications
Let us examine now what happens to the model when there are unexpected
changes in the exogenous variables. We can interpret these changes either
as modifications in the institutional framework or as external shocks to the
economic structure of firms.
We assume φ (Rijk (t)) =
Rijk(t)
1−η
1−η with 0 < η < 1. Let us consider the
vector of the equations determining the equilibrium in the transitional dy-
namics whenmk is exogenous, that are the choices of firms for quantities and
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prices, their operating profits, the amount of R&D investments to increase
diﬀerentiation with one other variety, the wage equation, the equations de-
termining the size of the distortions in the production and in the research
activity in the decentralized solution with respect to the social optimum:
S (t) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x0 (t) = 1c0 −
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
{ ck(ak−
ck
c0
)
c0[b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]
+ dkc0 +
mkX
j=1
Rijk(t)
c0
}
xik (t) =
ak−
ck
c0
b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
pik (t) =
akb0k+
ck
c0
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
πoik (t) =
(ak−
ck
c0
)2b0k
[b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]2
− dkc0
Rijk (t) = {
R∞
t
γc0(ak−
ck
c0
)2bijk(s)e−r(s−t)
[b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(s)]
2 ds}
1
η
w (t) = 1c0
xSOik (t)− xDik (t) =
(ak−
ck
c0
)b0kPmk
j=1 bijk(t)[b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]
∂Rijk(t)
∂bijk(t)
|SO − ∂Rijk(t)∂bijk(t) |D = −
γc0(ak−
ck
c0
)2b0kbijk(t)[b0k+2
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]R
1−η
ijk (t)
η[
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]
2[b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]
2b˙ijk(t)
.
To determine the eﬀects of a small change in a generic parameter ϑ on
the variables in the vector S (t) in case of exogenous mk, we diﬀerentiate the
vector with respect to the parameter:
dS (t)
dϑ
=
∂S (t)
∂ϑ
+
mkX
j=1
∂S (t)
∂Rijk (t)
∂Rijk (t)
∂ϑ
+
mkX
j=1
Z ∞
t
∂S (s)
∂bijk (s)
∂bijk (s)
∂ϑ
ds.
The eﬀects on the steady state variables can be calculated diﬀerentiating
the vector SSS with the relevant variables in the steady state, where
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SSS =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
xSS0 =
1
c0
−
NX
k=1
mk[
ck(ak−
ck
c0
)
2c0b0k
+ dkc0 ]
xSSik =
ak−
ck
c0
2b0k
pSSik =
ak+
ck
c0
2
πo,SSik =
(ak−
ck
c0
)2
4b0k
− dkc0
wSS = 1c0
xSO,SSik − x
D,SS
ik =
ak−
ck
c0
2b0k
.
When mk is endogenous, the analysis of the derivatives of S (t) and SSS
must be complemented with the eﬀects on the profits of an existing firm
producing diﬀerentiated good (exit condition) and of a potential entrant in
the same market (entry condition):
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Πik (t) =
Z ∞
t
{ (ak −
ck
c0
)2b0k
[b0k +
Pmk
j=1 bijk (s)]2
−
dk +
Pmk
j=1Rijk (s)
c0
}e−r(s−t)ds
Πek (t) =
Z ∞
t
{(ak −
ck
c0
)2b0k[4b0k + (mik − 1)bik (s)− (mik + 1)bek (s)]2
[4b20k + 2b0k(m
i
k − 1)bik (s)−mikbek (s)
2]2
+
−dk+
Pmk
j=1R
e
ejk(s)
c0
}e−r(s−t)ds.
The number of firms increases if Πek (t) > 0 and decreases if Πik (t) < 0 after
the change in ϑ. Because the equilibrium profits imply both Πik (t) > 0 and
Πeik (t) < 0 if t > 0, an infinitesimal change in ϑ will never aﬀect mk and only
a bigger variation of ϑ will change it. In the case mk is aﬀected, we have to
sum the direct eﬀect of the variation in ϑ with the indirect one due to the
variation in mk.
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We begin now by examining the eﬀects of a change in mk when this
variable is exogenous; this comparative statics not only can be useful to
understand the eﬀects of the competition policy, but also may be comple-
mentary to explain the eﬀects of changes in other variables when the number
of firms is endogenous. A rise in mk increases the possibilities of substitu-
tion between varieties and therefore reduces the market power of firms. This
causes a drop in prices, quantities and operating profits of the firms pro-
ducing diﬀerentiated good and in the produced quantity of the homogenous
good. The smaller output reduces the investment to increase diﬀerentiation
towards one single variety, but the eﬀect on the overall investments in R&D
(given by
Pmk
j=1Rijk (t)) is positive. Another eﬀect is the reduction of the
distortions in both quantity and R&D with respect to the socially optimal
solution. In fact, a lower price is nearer to the marginal cost and therefore
the produced quantity approaches the optimal one. Moreover, this fact re-
duces one of the R&D distortions. Finally, under the hypothesis that the new
firms enter the market with a homogeneous product, increasing the number
of firms pushes our economy farther from the steady state, as Γk will be larger
for all firms. When we consider the steady-state equilibrium, the varieties of
the diﬀerentiated product are completely unrelated. Therefore, the inclusion
of a new variety does not aﬀect prices, quantities and profits in the other dif-
ferentiated markets, but simply reduces the production of the homogeneous
good.
For each other parameter, we now analyze the eﬀect of an infinitesimal
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change on S (t) and SSS and we examine how a suﬃciently big change may
aﬀect mk.
A decrease of the fixed cost dk, equivalent to a lump sum subsidy to the
firms producing diﬀerentiated good, does not aﬀect the equilibrium quantities
of these firms, but simply increases their profits and increases production of
the homogeneous good. A suﬃciently strong fall in dk raises the number of
firms through the increase in future profits.
Let us now turn the attention to the γ parameter, which measures the
eﬀectiveness of research activity. Changes in this parameter can be associated
not only with economic shocks, but also with R&D policy measures. This is
because, for example, a subsidy on research, financed through a lump sum
tax, increases the eﬃciency of R&D for the firm, while the tax does not
aﬀect the demand functions of the diﬀerentiated products, but only that one
of the homogeneous one. The most relevant eﬀects of an increase in γ are
stronger incentives to invest in R&D. Because a firm does not completely
internalize the externalities of the research process of the other firms in the
decentralized solution, this increases the distortions and the distance from
the socially optimal R&D level. More research speed up the diﬀerentiation
process and therefore the achievement of the higher profits in the long run and
in the steady-state equilibrium. This fact may create incentives to enter the
market, and, if the increase in γ is strong enough, it may increase the number
of firms producing diﬀerentiated good. Because we do not have research in
the long run, the steady-state variables are only touched by changes in γ
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through the possible increase in the number of varieties and the consequent
reduction in the production of the homogeneous good.
Another parameter linked to the eﬃciency of R&D is the absolute value
η of the elasticity of the φ0 (.) function, which measures how quickly the
marginal eﬀect of R&D falls. An increase in η does not aﬀect the choices in
production, but reduces the chosen level of research. The overall eﬀects on
the speed of movement towards the steady state and on the entry choices are
uncertain, because, after the shock, R&D is more eﬃcient at low levels and
less eﬃcient at high levels. However, we can say that when the chosen level of
research is low, greater eﬃciency more than compensates for the lower level
of research. Therefore, the diﬀerentiation process is faster and the number
of firms mk may increase, if the change in η is big enough. Once again, the
only steady-state eﬀects of changes in η are those eventually due to changes
in the number of firms.
Let us consider now the eﬀects of a positive shock on the term
³
ak − ckc0
´
,
which can reflect either an increase in the level of demand (through ak)
or a decrease in the marginal labour requirements of production (through
ck). We can see a subsidy on the production activity as a negative shock
on the marginal cost. Although we are considering both a demand and a
technology shock, the structure of the model is such that the eﬀects on the
real variables are symmetric. A positive shock increases production and
operating profits. The possibility of exploiting higher profits in the future
stimulates R&D activity, quickening the achievement of the steady state, and,
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if strong enough, may provide incentives for firms to enter the market. In the
steady state, we still have the positive eﬀects on production and eventually
the increase in the number of firms, which both reduce the production of the
homogeneous good.
A comparison of the eﬀects of a production and a R&D subsidy shows that
only the former has real consequences on production for a given structure of
the substitutability parameters. Inspection of equation (14) shows that this
function is linear in γ and quadratic in
³
ak − ckc0
´
. This means that when the
intervention is large enough, the production subsidy tends to dominate the
R&D one and to increase the slope of the R&D path and the level of R&D
more than the R&D subsidy for a given structure of the substitutability
parameters.
The last case we consider is the eﬀect of a decrease in the parameter c0,
which is equivalent to an increase in the wage. The eﬀect is the same as
that of a joint increase in the marginal cost and drop in the eﬀectiveness
of R&D. The overall eﬀect is a reduction in production and profits for the
firms producing diﬀerentiated good. The drop in production also reduces
the incentives to invest in R&D, delaying the achievement of the steady
state. Clearly, if the change in the parameter is big enough, the drop in the
future profits may reduce mk. In the steady state, we have a contraction of
the production of each diﬀerentiated variety and eventually of their number,
while there is an increase in the output of the homogeneous product.
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2.5 Empirical results
We investigate the empirical evidence on R&D to find out whether it is
consistent with our theoretical findings. In particular, we are interested in
checking if the R&D and the b paths, described by equations (12) and (14),
are coherent with the available data. Then we turn the attention to the
relationship between the number of firms and the current level of market
power: we check whether they are independent of each other.
We use data from the second and the third Community Innovation Sur-
veys (CIS 2 and CIS 3), coordinated by Eurostat, matched with market power
indicators calculated using data from Amadeus.
The CIS are the main innovation monitoring publications of the European
Union. The two surveys were carried out in 1996 and in 2001 following the
methodological directions of the Oslo manual. They report a lot of informa-
tion about the innovative activity of European enterprises. We use aggregate
data for sector and country in the empirical analysis. The available data al-
low us to work on an unbalanced panel of 17 sectors, 13 countries and 2 time
periods.
Amadeus is a continuously updated database by the Bureau van Dijk
Electronic Publishing reporting last ten years balance sheets and other in-
formation regarding several million European enterprises. We use the data
release updated up to January 2006. Therefore, the available data are about
the period 1996-2005.
We work at the sectorial level because the estimates of the market power
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index, given by the ratio between price and marginal cost, can be done with
a suﬃcient degree of reliability at this level only. In fact, the marginal cost
cannot be observed and therefore we have to estimate it by using econometric
techniques at the firm level. Alternatively, we could have used an observ-
able approximation, like the ratio between price and average cost. In our
framework, this would not be optimal, because firms can have null or even
negative profits in a single period, even if they have market power.
We use data for the average firm in each time period, sector and country.
We control for time and sector components with the usual panel data fixed
eﬀects methodologies and we estimate the trend of the common behaviour of
firms.
The first step of the analysis is the estimation of the market power index.
We use a variation of the methodology proposed by Klette (1996, 1999) and
Hall (1988, 1990), based on the estimate of the price-marginal cost ratio.
Once we have these estimates, we consider a general version of the solution
of the diﬀerential equation (14). The current R&D level is an undetermined
function of the initial market power and the initial level of R&D (which in
turn is one-to-one determined by the initial market power on the optimized
path and can therefore be neglected, since its eﬀect is absorbed by the ini-
tial market power). Therefore, we can estimate the chosen R&D path as a
function of the initial market power only.
We use then the average variation in the market power index in periods
1996-1999 and 2000-2003 as a proxy for the variation of the substitution
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coeﬃcient b in equation (12). After substituting equation (14) for R, we are
able to estimate the eﬀect of the initial level of market power on the variation.
We use a semiparametric methodology to estimate the relationships: we
add a battery of dummy variables checking sectorial and temporal fixed ef-
fects to our nonparametric relationships.
In our model we assume that the number of varietiesmk is constant. This
hypothesis is clearly too strong to be verified with real data, because we do
not take into account several factors such as the presence of uncertainty in
the firm activities and the asymmetries between agents. We test a weaker
version: we check whether the number of firms is independent of the current
value of the other variables of the model.
In the next Subsection, we estimate the market power indexes. In Sub-
section 2.5.2, we examine the results of the semiparametric analysis and of
the test for independence of the number of firms.
2.5.1 Estimation of the market power indexes
Let us consider the firms of a single sector, country and year.20 Firm i follows
a general production function Yi (t) = Ai (t)Ft (Xi (t)) where the function
Ft (.) is common to all firms, but can diﬀer over time, Yi (t) and Xi (t) are
respectively the output produced and the input vector used by firm i at time
t.21
20This Subsection is based on a variation of the methodology proposed by Klette (1996,
1999) and Hall (1988, 1990).
21We do not take into account in our empirical analysis the simplifying, but completely
unrealistic, hypothesis of the model of a linear production function depending on labour
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Using the mean value theorem, we can write the deviation of the logarithm
of the output from a benchmark, given by that one of the median firm, as a
linear function of the deviation of the logarithm of the inputs from those of
the benchmark:
yi (t)− y0 (t) = ai (t)− a0 (t) +
X
j
ε¯ji (t)
£
xji (t)− x
j
0 (t)
¤
(20)
where the small letters are the logarithms of the capital letters, ε¯ji (t) =
X¯j(t)
Ft(X¯(t))
∂Ft(X¯(t))
∂Xj(t) is the elasticity of output with respect to input j, X¯j (t)
is the input vector evaluated at an intermediate point between Xj (t) and
Xo (t).
Under the hypothesis of imperfect competition in the final output mar-
ket, the first order conditions of the profit maximization problem imply the
following definition of the ratio between price and marginal cost:
Pi (t)
C 0
¡
Xji (t)
¢ = Pi (t)
wj (t)
Ai (t)
∂Ft (Xi (t))
∂Xji (t)
≡ θi (t)
where C 0(Xji (t)) is the marginal cost function.
We see the relationship between the bijk parameters in the model of Sec-
tion 2.3 and the θi (t) substituting price and marginal cost in the definition:
only.
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θi (t) ≡
Pi (t)
C 0
¡
Xji (t)
¢ = akb0k + wckΓk (t)
wck [b0k + Γk (t)]
(21)
=
akb0k + wck
Pmk
j=1 bijk (t)
wck
h
b0k +
Pmk
j=1 bijk (t)
i ≡ Ξi({bijk(t)
−
}mkj=1).
The price-marginal cost ratio is inversely proportional to the level of the bijk
parameters. Substituting θi (t) in the definition of elasticity ε¯
j
i (t) we obtain
ε¯ji (t) = θi (t)
wj (t) X¯j (t)
P¯ (t) Y¯ (t)
. (22)
The methodology we are using tackles the realistic presence of adjustment
costs in the accumulation of capital, that are additional costs, complementary
to physical investment, borne when the firm changes its level of physical cap-
ital. This element has not been considered in our theoretical model because
our production function only included labour for simplicity. Adjustment
costs do not allow equation (22) to empirically hold for capital. We solve the
problem by using the definition of elasticity of scale in production:
ϑ¯i (t) =
X
j
ε¯ji (t)
which implies for capital K
ε¯Ki (t) = ϑi (t)−
X
j 6=K
ε¯ji (t) .
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Our equation (20) becomes:
y˜i (t) = a˜i (t) + θi (t)
X
j 6=K
wj (t) X¯j (t)
P¯ (t) Y¯ (t)
£
x˜ji (t)− x˜Ki (t)
¤
+ ϑi (t) x˜Ki (t)
where the variables with the tilde are the deviations from the reference point,
e.g. y˜i (t) = yi (t)− y0 (t).
Under the basic structure of our model (same production function for all
firms, perfect competition in the labour market) and under the additional
hypothesis that the diﬀerence between the parameters of the individual firm
and those of the average one is white noise we can estimate the following
equation:
y˜i (t) = aˆ (t) + θˆ (t)
X
j 6=K
s¯ji (t)
£
x˜ji (t)− x˜Ki (t)
¤
+ ϑˆ (t) x˜Ki (t) + ωi (t)
where the coeﬃcients to be estimated have a hat and s¯ji (t), the share of
the value of the input on the overall value of production at an intermediate
point, is approximated by the average of the individual observation and the
benchmark. We use in the calculations the vector of the input costs as a
measure of the inputs used by the firm. It includes the following elements:
material variable costs, cost of employees and depreciation of capital.
The error term ωi (t) depends on the value of the regressors, because we
include in it the diﬀerence between the individual and the average eﬀects.
Consequently, we need instruments to correctly estimate the equation. The
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θˆ (t) coeﬃcient is the market power index of the representative firm, while
ϑˆ (t) is the average elasticity of scale in production.
For each year, we use the number of employees and the value of the fixed
assets of the firm for the previous years since 1995 as instruments. In some
cases, not all the years are available because the variables were not reported.
Therefore, we use the available years only.
We use a GMM procedure to estimate the equation; after calling ω (t)
the vector with the values of the error terms and Z the matrix with the
instruments, we write our objective equation to be minimized:
N
µ
ω (t)0 Z
N
V (t)−1
Z 0ω (t)
N
¶
where N is the number of firms in our sample and V (t) is the estimated
covariance matrix of Z 0ω (t).
We estimate the coeﬃcients of this equation for each country and sector
in the years between 1996 and 2004. Then, we use the estimates of the
θˆ (t) coeﬃcients as market power indexes of the representative firms in the
following stages.
2.5.2 Empirical analysis of the relations between R&D, market
power and number of firms
After obtaining the estimates of the price-marginal cost ratios, we are now
able to work on the relationships between R&D and market power, which are
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defined by equations (12) and (14) in the model. They require a bit of ma-
nipulation before being in the convenient shape for estimation. In particular,
we are not able to obtain a closed-form solution to equation (14). However,
the system of the two diﬀerential equations (12) and (14) has continuous
partial derivatives in the open set where bijk ∈ (0,∞) and Rijk ∈ (0,∞).
The theorems of existence of solutions for diﬀerential equations show that,
given boundary conditions included in this set, there exists a solution.22 We
can implicitly write the solution for equation (14) as
R (t) = f (R (0) , b (0) , t) . (23)
The fact that we are excluding the points bijk = 0 and Rijk = 0 does
not present diﬃculties. In the non-trivial case bijk (0) > 0, the steady state
can be reached only asymptotically. On the other hand, we have shown in
Subsection 2.3.2 that Rijk = 0 is never an optimal solution of the system in
non-trivial cases.23
R (t) is the choice variable of the firm. The uniqueness of the optimal path
(see Figure 2.2 and the discussion in Subsection 2.3.2) implies that there is a
one-to-one relationship between R (t) and b (t). Given the initial parameters,
our R (t) can be simply written as a positive function of b (0) and a negative
22See for example Boyce and DiPrima (1970), p. 207, Theorem 6.1.
23In the case bijk(0) = 0, the solution would collapse to bijk(t) = 0 and Rijk(t) = 0 ∀t.
We rule out this pathological case because outside the aims of our discussion.
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one of t. This must be true in particular for t = 0 and therefore we can write:
R (0) = f(b (0))
+
. (24)
We can rewrite equation (12) in a discrete time general version, which
negatively depends on R (t). Using the general solution to the other diﬀer-
ential equation (23) and the one-to-one relationship between R (0) and b (0),
we obtain:
∆b (t)
b (t)
= g (R (t)) = g(f(R (0)
−
, b (0)
−
, t)) = h(b (0)
+
, t). (25)
We estimate the two functionally undetermined relationships (24) and
(25) using a semiparametric procedure.24 We use the market power index
calculated in the previous Subsection as a proxy for the b coeﬃcient. Be-
cause there is a negative relation between the market power index and the b
coeﬃcients (see equation (21)), the signs of the relationships are inverted.
In equation (24), we use the average (per sector, year and country) R&D
levels in 1996 and 2000 as the dependent variable and the average initial
market power index in 1996 and 2000 as the regressor.
In equation (25) the dependent variable is the percentage average varia-
tion of the market power index between 1996 and 1999 and between 2000 and
2003, while the independent one is the average initial market power index.
We added to both equations dummy variables per sector (17 sectors) and
24See as a reference Pagan and Ullah (1999) and Härdle (1990).
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time period (2 periods). Hence, the resulting semiparametric structure is:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R = f
³
θˆ
´
+ α0s+ βt+ ε1
∆θˆ
θˆ
= h
³
θˆ
´
+ γ0s+ δt+ ε2
(26)
where s is the sectorial dummy variables vector, t is the time period dummy
variable and ε1 and ε2 are the disturbances. Taking the expectations of these
two equations with respect to the market power index θˆ we eliminate the
nonparametric terms of the two regressions:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R−E
³
R| θˆ
´
= α0
h
s− E
³
s| θˆ
´i
+ β
h
t− E
³
t| θˆ
´i
+ ε1
∆θˆ
θˆ
−E
³
∆θˆ
θˆ
¯¯¯
θˆ
´
= γ0
h
s− E
³
s| θˆ
´i
+ δ
h
t−E
³
t| θˆ
´i
+ ε2.
(27)
The expectations can be nonparametrically estimated.25 Afterwards, we ob-
tain the dummy variables coeﬃcients from system of equations (27) by OLS.
The nonparametric terms of system of equations (26) are now retrieved using
the expectation equations:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
fˆ
³
θˆ
´
= Eˆ
³
R| θˆ
´
− αˆ0Eˆ
³
s| θˆ
´
− βˆEˆ
³
t| θˆ
´
hˆ
³
θˆ
´
= Eˆ
³
∆θˆ
θˆ
¯¯¯
θˆ
´
− γˆ0Eˆ
³
s| θˆ
´
− δˆEˆ
³
t| θˆ
´
.
We see the estimated nonparametric functions fˆ (.) and hˆ (.) in Figures
2.4 and 2.5, where we also report the true data. The predictions shown do
25We used a local linear regression estimator with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth
of 0.2. The results are quite robust to changes in the bandwidth parameters and in the
kernel functional form.
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not take into account the dummy variables eﬀects, but only the net common
trend of the variables.
The relationship between the variation in the market power index of the
firm and the initial market power index is negative, as our theory says, and
it seems to be quite robust.
Figure 2.5 shows also a negative relationship for R&D as expected. We
see that there is a lot of variance in the chosen R&D levels of the firms.
This is explained through very strong sectorial diﬀerences in the parameters,
which are captured by our dummy variables. Moreover, another source of
variance can be the share of R&D that is used with other aims, for example
to improve production processes.26
The relationship shown in this Figure has been broadly discussed in the
previous literature on the subject. Our results are on the same lines as most
of the works developed in the last years, where a positive relationship be-
tween competition and incentives to R&D has been shown.27 On the other
hand, they diﬀer from the most recent work written by Aghion, Bloom, Blun-
dell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2005), where they find an inverted-U relationship
and it can be worthy of note examining why we have this diﬀerence. In the
cited work, the authors use a panel of U.K. firms in the period 1973-1994 to
26It is possible that our results are biased because we do not use instruments to correct
measurement error. Anyway, measurement error causes an attenuation bias and there-
fore the slope of the "true" curve would be even more negative in an estimation using
instruments to tackle this problem.
27See for example Geroski (1990), Geroski and Pomroy (1990), Blundell, Griﬃth and
Van Reenen (1995, 1999), Nickell (1996).
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create a database of observations per year and per sector. Then, they esti-
mate a nonlinear relationship between the citation weighted average number
of patents (as a proxy for the research activity) and a function of the average
of the Lerner indexes in the sector (as a proxy for the competition level).
The essential diﬀerence between their and our methodology is that they use
the Lerner index, which is the ratio between average cost and sales, to mea-
sure competition, while we use the theoretically more accurate ratio between
marginal cost and price. If we use their function of the average Lerner index
in our calculations, we are able to replicate their result.
The last relationship we take into account regards the number of firms
in each sector and we check if it is independent of the other variables of the
model. To do this, we use partial correlation coeﬃcients between the number
of firms, the level of market power, the variation of the market power index
and the average R&D expenditure, net of the dummy variables eﬀects. We
add to the usual sectorial and time dummy variables a battery of country
variables to account for scale eﬀects due to population and for the diﬀerent
institutional frameworks.
We see in Table 2.1 that the number of firms is uncorrelated with the
other variables, whichever dummy variables combination is considered.28
28Our results about the correlation between concentration and market power are slightly
stronger than those presented in the past literature: previous studies (e.g. Salinger, Caves
and Peltzman (1990), Bradburd and Owen (1982), Weis (1974)) find very small positive
correlations, not usually significant.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examined the relationship between R&D and the evolution
of market structure over time.
We developed a mechanism of interaction between R&D and market
structure based on the idea that firms can invest in research to increase
the level of horizontal diﬀerentiation between their and the others varieties
of a product. Producers try to modify the characteristics of their output to
better satisfy needs of consumers that are not fully fulfilled by the other va-
rieties. Doing so, they are able to increase the level of specialization of their
product and, therefore, to reduce substitutability with the other varieties.
We develop a dynamic framework, which allows us to see how the interaction
between market structure and incentives to research changes over time.
Our most important results are that in this environment firms find in-
centives to invest in R&D to increase their specialization; the quantity of
invested resources in research is declining over time, because the returns
from further specialization decrease when the firm is more specialized, while
prices, output and short-run profits of the firms producing a diﬀerentiated
product increase.
We compare the decentralized outcome and the socially optimal solution
and we find that there is a suboptimal investment in R&D, because the so-
cially optimal production is larger than the decentralized one and more out-
put taking advantage of research implies more incentives to invest in R&D;
moreover, the firm does not internalize the benefits of reducing substitutabil-
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ity with the other varieties on the profits of the other producers.
Afterwards, we examine some empirical evidence using a panel of secto-
rial data about European firms. The results of the empirical analysis are
coherent with the model. R&D investments and the variation of the market
power index are both negatively related to the initial value of market power.
Moreover, the number of firms in each sector is independent of all the other
variables in the model.
The developed analysis is a good starting point for further extensions:
introducing uncertainty would allow greater realism, but afterwards the sim-
plifying hypothesis of symmetry cannot be maintained and therefore the
complexity of the model substantially increases. The presence of capital
as a production factor could be interesting, because adjustment costs when
converting from one variety to another can influence development costs and
profits and therefore the incentives to research. The empirical analysis could
be extended and deepened, in particular a comparison of the eﬀects of dif-
ferent kinds of R&D (e.g. product and process) may give interesting hints.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Endogenous choice of the produced versions
We examine here the conditions under which the optimal behaviour of the
firm is the production of the newest version and what happens when these
conditions are not satisfied. We find that the case where the only produced
version is the one with the lowest bijk coeﬃcients, examined in the main
model, is the right one for most values of the parameters. Moreover, we find
that the model can be easily extended to tackle the other case, where the
optimal behaviour of a subset of firms is the production of both the most
diﬀerentiated and the perfectly substitutable versions of their variety.
Let us suppose that we are in the short-run equilibrium described in the
main text and one firm (which we suppose is producing variety i of good k)
deviates producing both the newest version of its variety and an older version.
We can restrict our proof to this case: if the introduction of a second version
is not optimal, production of more than two versions will be suboptimal a
fortiori. This is because increasing returns to scale imply that diﬀerential
profits from one additional version are increasing in the produced output of
that version and, therefore, decreasing in the number of produced versions.29
We show that this deviation is only profitable in one case, where our main
model can be easily extended. Because the choice of the produced versions
29In the case the production of two versions is preferred to the production of the newest
version only, we can show using the same methodology of this Subsection that the intro-
duction of a third version is never profitable.
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is a pure choice of production and does not require intertemporal elements,
we omit the time dimension. Our reasoning can be repeated in each period
t.
Given the newest version of a variety, we index all the previously devel-
oped versions of the variety using a variable h, which measures the relative
distance between the average level of substitutability of the newest and of an
older version, calculated at the time of development of the newest version:
h =
1
mk−1
P
j 6=i b
o,n
ijk − 1mk−1
P
j 6=i b
n,n
ijk
b0k − 1mk−1
P
j 6=i b
n,n
ijk
=
bo,nijk − b
n,n
ijk
b0 − bn,nijk
where bo,nijk is the substitutability parameter between the older (with index
h) version of variety i and the newest version of variety j, while bn,nijk is the
substitutability parameter between the newest version of variety i and the
newest version of variety j; the last equality holds because in equilibrium
we have symmetry in the bijk coeﬃcients. The index h is equal to 1 if we
consider the perfectly substitutable version of the good (bo,nijk = b0k), while it
tends to 0 as we approach the newest version of the variety.
In the main text, we defined the substitutability level between two vari-
eties, but we did not consider that one between versions of the same variety.
We will examine now a reasonable assumption to define substitutability of
an old version of a variety with the other varieties and with other versions of
the same variety. Let us consider the two extreme cases of h = 1 (perfectly
substitutable version of the product) and h = 0 (a second copy of the newest
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version of the variety).
In the former case, the substitutability level of the perfectly substitutable
version does not benefit at all of the direct past eﬀorts in R&D of firm i,
but only of the eﬀort of the other firms to diﬀerentiate their variety. In
equilibrium, R&D is symmetric for all firms. Therefore, when considering
substitutability with another variety, the perfectly substitutable version of
variety i benefits of half the current maximum progress on diﬀerentiation
(that is all the progress attributed to investments on the other varieties).
The same is true when we consider substitutability with the newest version
of the variety of the same firm. We will call bo,niik (h) the substitutability
parameter between an older (with index h) and the newest version of the
same variety i. Therefore, we have that
bo,niik (1) = b
o,n
ijk (1) = b0k −
b0k − bn,nijk
2
=
b0k + b
n,n
ijk
2
∀j.
If we produce a second copy of the newest version of variety i, it is per-
fectly substitutable with the other copy of the variety i and has the lowest
available level of substitutability with the other varieties. Therefore, we have
that
bo,niik (0) = b0k and b
o,n
ijk (0) = b
n,n
ijk .
The level of substitutability between an older version of variety i and
the newest version of another variety of the same good linearly depends on
h by definition of this parameter. If we suppose that this is also true for
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the substitutability level between diﬀerent versions of the same variety, we
obtain these two expressions of bo,niik (h) and b
o,n
ijk (h):
bo,niik (h) = b0k + h
µb0k + bn,nijk
2
− b0k
¶
= b0k − h
b0k − bn,nijk
2
(28)
bo,nijk (h) = b
n,n
ijk + h
µb0k + bn,nijk
2
− bn,nijk
¶
= bn,nijk + h
b0k − bn,nijk
2
. (29)
Firm i now maximizes the sum of the operating profits due to the newest
and to the older versions of its variety:
π(2)ik (h) = p
n
ikx
n
ik + p
o
ikx
o
ik − w (lnik + loik)
where the indexes n and o discriminate the variables referred respectively to
the newest and the older versions of the variety; pnik and p
o
ik are the prices
implied by the demand function (3), remembering that now we have mk + 1
diﬀerent versions of the good. The operating profits function of the other
firms follows equation (5) as before.
Proposition 8 When considering the equilibrium described in Section 2.3,
let us assume that substitutability among diﬀerent versions of the same vari-
ety is linear in h, where h has been defined above.
If mk > 3, a deviation from the equilibrium where the firm produces two
or more versions of its variety is never profitable.
If mk = 2 and dkc0 is larger than a threshold, a deviation is never profitable
too.
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If mk = 2 and dkc0 is smaller than a threshold, a deviation can be profitable.
Proof. See Subsection 2.8.2 in the appendix for formal details about the
proof and the maximization problem. In the period of deviation, maximiza-
tion of profits implies the following equilibrium quantities (we call xnjk (h) the
quantities produced by the other firms):
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
xnik (h) =
χ[2(mk+1)(2b0k−bn,nijk )−3h(mk−1)(b0k−b
n,n
ijk )]
2
xoik (h) = χ(2b0k − b
n,n
ijk ) (3−mk)
xnjk (h)
¯¯
j 6=i = χ[4(2b0k − b
n,n
ijk )− 3h(b0k − b
n,n
ijk )]
(30)
where χ =
ak−
ck
c0
bn,nijk b0k[8(mk−2)−3h(mk−3)]−b20k[h(mk+3)−16]+(b
n,n
ijk )
2
[h(4mk−6)−4(mk−1)]
.
We are interested in equilibria where xoik (h) > 0, otherwise the model
collapses to the main text structure. This implies that xnik (h)must be greater
than zero too, because the residual demand when only the older version of
the variety is produced has a lower intercept and the same slope as in the
situation where only the newest version is produced. xnik (h) > 0 implies that
the denominator is always positive. Moreover, ckak < c0 by assumption and
b0k > b
n,n
ijk by construction.
Therefore, the second equation in (30) implies that the older version of
variety i of good k is only produced if the number of firms mk is fewer than
three. Otherwise, the optimal production of xoik (h) is null.
With mk > 3, the competition is tight. The negative eﬀects of the intro-
duction of another version on demand are so strong that a positive production
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of xoik (h) yields negative eﬀects on profits, whatever are the fixed costs.
We continue our analysis examining the eﬀects on profits in the case we
have two firms in the market of good k30.
Profits depend on the chosen version h of the variety. There is a trade-oﬀ
between a high and a low h. If h is high, the version is more substitutable with
the other variety, but less substitutable with the newest version of the same
variety. The opposite is true when h is low. The choice of the firm depends on
the relative weight of these two eﬀects. If we maximize profits with respect to
h, we find that its optimal value is always h = 1. The eﬀect of substitutability
with the newest version of the same variety is always dominating and the
deviating firm maximizes its profits producing the perfectly substitutable
version of the good together with the newest version of its variety.
Let us consider the comparison between profits when firm i produces the
latest version only of the good (π(1)ik ) and when it produces both the latest
and an older version. The deviation is the best behaviour if
∆πik (h) = π
(1)
ik − π
(2)
ik (h) < 0.
This inequality implies that producing the newest version only of the
variety is the optimal behaviour if dkc0 is larger than a threshold defined by
the parameters.
With a small dkc0 , given a situation where all the other firms produce the
30We neglect the case mk = 1 because the firm would have no incentives to invest in
R&D to diﬀerentiate its own product.
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newest version of the good, firm i finds optimal a deviation where it produces
a positive quantity of both the newest version and the perfectly substitutable
version of its variety.
We can easily extend our main model to take into account a duopoly
where a firm produces both the newest version and the perfectly substitutable
version of its variety. In the new situation, one or both firms chooses to
produce both the most diﬀerentiated and the perfectly substitutable versions
of their variety, while the remaining ones produce the diﬀerentiated version
only. The share of firms producing both versions of their variety is pinned
down by the comparison of the profits for the two cases.
While the time path of production of the most diﬀerentiated versions of
the diﬀerentiated good is increasing as in the main model for both types of
firms, the firms producing the perfectly substitutable versions of the diﬀer-
entiated good continuously reduce the perfectly substitutable output.
Because the other results about the R&D choices of firms, our main aim,
do not qualitatively change, we do not explicitly derive the new version of
the model, which is quite straightforward, given the analysis developed in
the main text.
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2.8.2 Technical details
Lemma 1 The consumer’s utility maximization problem in each period t is
static and can be written as
max
V (t)
(
x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
"
ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk(t)
2
xjk (t)
#
xik (t)
)
subject to⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
pik (t)xik (t) ≤ w (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
πik (t)
x0 (t) > 0, xik (t) ≥ 0 ∀i, k
where V (t) = {x0 (t) , {{xik (t)}mki=1}Nk=1} is the vector with the choice vari-
ables of the consumer and we assume x0 (t) > 0. The Lagrangian function of
this maximization problem is
L (t) = x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
[ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)
2
xjk (t)]xik (t)+
− λ (t) [x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
pik (t)xik (t)− w (t)−
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
πik (t)]
where λ (t) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget con-
straint. The optimal values of x0 (t) and xik (t) ∀i, k are described by the
first order conditions:
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⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L(t)
∂x0(t)
= 1− λ (t) = 0
∂L(t)
∂xik(t)
= ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t)− λ (t) pik (t) ≤ 0 ∀i, k
xik (t)
∂L(t)
∂xik(t)
= xik (t) [ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t)− λ (t) pik (t)] = 0 ∀i, k
∂L(t)
∂λ(t) = x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
pik (t)xik (t)− w (t)−
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
πik (t) ≤ 0
λ (t) ∂L(t)∂λ(t) = λ (t) [x0(t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
pik (t)xik (t)− w (t)−
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
πik (t)] = 0
λ (t) ≥ 0, x0 (t) > 0, xik (t) ≥ 0 ∀i, k.
The first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the unique global
maximum because the objective function is pseudoconcave and the con-
straints are quasiconcave.31
We assume xik (t) > 0 ∀i, k.32 The system of first order conditions implies:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λ (t) = 1
pik (t) = ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t) ∀i, k
x0 (t) = w (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
πik (t)−
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
[ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t) xjk (t)]xik (t)
x0 (t) > 0, xik (t) > 0 ∀i, k.
31See de la Fuente (2000), p. 296, Theorem 1.19.
32In the case xik (s) = 0, we find that Rijk (s) = 0 ∀j and, therefore, the analysis
becomes trivial.
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Proposition 2 The choice of quantity and price maximizing current
operating profit in each period t for the firm producing variety i of good
k is a static problem and can be written as
max
Vik(t)
pik (t)xik (t)− w (t) lik (t)
subject to⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pik (t) = ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t)
lik (t) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxik (t) if xik (t) > 0
0 otherwise
xik (t) ≥ 0, lik (t) ≥ 0
where Vik (t) = {pik (t) , xik (t) , lik (t)} is the vector with the choice variables
of the firm. We assume xik (t) > 0, which implies lik (t) > 0;33 the Lagrangian
function of this maximization problem is
Lik (t) = pik (t)xik (t)− w (t) lik (t)− λ1ik (t) [pik (t)− ak+
+
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t)]− λ2ik (t) [lik (t)− dk − ckxik (t)]
where λ1ik (t) and λ2ik (t) are the Lagrangian multipliers respectively asso-
ciated with the inverse demand function and the production function. The
optimal values of pik (t), xik (t) and lik (t) ∀i, k are determined by the first
33In the case xik (s) = 0, we find that Rijk (s) = 0 ∀j and, therefore, the analysis
becomes trivial.
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order conditions and by the condition of nonnegative operative profits:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂Lik(t)
∂pik(t)
= xik (t)− λ1ik (t) = 0
∂Lik(t)
∂xik(t)
= pik (t)− λ1ik (t) b0k + λ2ik (t) ck = 0
∂Lik(t)
∂lik(t)
= −w (t)− λ2ik (t) = 0
∂Lik(t)
∂λ1ik(t)
= pik (t)− ak +
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t) = 0
∂Lik(t)
∂λ2ik(t)
= lik (t)− dk − ckxik (t) = 0
xik (t) > 0, lik (t) > 0
pik (t)xik (t)− w (t) lik (t) ≥ 0.
The first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the unique global
maximum because the objective function is pseudoconcave and the con-
straints are quasiconcave.34
We assume a parameters structure such that bijk (t) = bilk (t) ∀j 6= i
∀l 6= i. The system of optimality conditions implies
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
xik (t) = λ1ik (t) =
ak−w(t)ck
b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
pik (t) =
akb0k+w(t)ck
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
lik (t) = dk +
ck[ak−w(t)ck]
b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
λ2ik (t) = −w (t)
w (t) < akck
w (t) dk ≤ [ak−w(t)ck]
2b0k
[b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]
2 .
34See de la Fuente (2000), p. 289, Theorem 1.14.
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Proposition 3 The optimal control problem of the firm producing variety
i of good k is dynamic and can be written as
max
Vik
Z ∞
0
(
pik (t)xik (t)− w (t)
"
lik (t) +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)
#)
e−rtdt
subject to⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pik (t) = ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t) ∀t
lik (t) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxik (t) if xik (t) > 0
0 otherwise
∀t
b˙ijk (t) = −γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))] ∀t ∀j 6= i
xik (t) ≥ 0, lik (t) ≥ 0, Riik (t) = 0, Rijk (t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∀j 6= i
where Vik = {{pik (t) , xik (t) , lik (t) , {Rijk (t)}mkj=1}t∈[0,∞)} is the vector with
the choice variables of the firm. The state variables are bijk (t) ∀j 6= i. The
concentrated Hamiltonian function of this optimal control problem, where
xik (t), pik (t) and lik (t) are at their optimal values (starred variables), is
Hik (t) = {p∗ik (t)x∗ik (t)− w (t) [l∗ik (t) +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)]}e−rt+
−
X
j 6=i
μijk (t) γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))]
where μijk (t) is the costate variable associated with bijk (t) ∀j 6= i. The
behaviour of the candidates for the optimal path of Rijk (t) ∀j 6= i is described
by the maximum principle conditions and by the nonnegativity condition of
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the discounted sum of current and future profits:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂Hik(t)
∂Rjk(t)
= −w (t) e−rt − μijk (t) γbijk (t)φ0 (Rijk (t)) = 0 ∀j 6= i
∂Hik(t)
∂bijk(t)
= −e−rtx∗ik (t)x∗jk (t) + μijk (t)
b˙ijk(t)
bijk(t)
= −μ˙ijk (t) ∀j 6= i
∂Hik(t)
∂μijk(t)
= −γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))] = b˙ijk (t) ∀j 6= i
Riik (t) = 0, Rijk (t) ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i
lim
t→∞
Hik (t) = 0 (trasversality condition)Z ∞
t
{p∗ik (s)x∗ik (s)− w (s) [l∗ik (s) +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (s)]}e−r(s−t)ds ≥ 0.
We assume an initial parameters structure such that bijk (0) = bilk (0)
∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i; the behaviour of xik (t), pik (t) and lik (t) follows the analysis
described in Proposition 2. The system of optimality conditions implies
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μijk (t) = − e
−rtw(t)
γbijk(t)φ0(Rijk(t))
∀j 6= i
R˙ijk(t)
Rijk(t)
= − φ
0(Rijk(t))
φ00(Rijk(t))Rijk(t)
{r − γ[ak−w(t)ck]
2bijk(t)φ0(Rijk(t))
w(t)[b0k+
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]
2 } ∀j 6= i
b˙ijk (t) = −γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))] ∀j 6= i
Riik (t) = 0, Rijk (t) > 0 ∀j 6= iZ ∞
0
{ [ak − w (t) ck]
2 b0k
[b0k +
Pmk
j=1 bijk (t)]2
− w (t) [dk +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)]}e−rtdt ≥ 0
where only the initial condition about profits is relevant because they are
increasing over time:
π˙ik (t) = −
[ak − w (t) ck]2 b0k
[b0k + Γk (t)]
3
mkX
j=1
b˙ijk (t)− w (t)
mkX
j=1
R˙ijk (t) > 0.
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The transversality condition is verified in the solution because
lim
t→∞
n
p∗ik (t)x
∗
ik (t)− w (t)
h
l∗ik (t) +
Pmk
j=1R
∗
ijk (t)
io
<∞,
lim
t→∞
e−rt = 0, limt→∞ μ∗ijk (t) = 0 and
lim
t→∞
−γbijk (t)
£
φ(R∗ijk (t)) + φ(R
∗
jik (t))
¤
= 0 ∀j.
Proposition 4 Let us assume that the number of incumbent firms mik is
determined according to the zero-profit condition (15); an additional firm en-
ters the market in period τ ≥ 0; in a generic period t ≥ τ , the substitutability
parameters of its variety with the other varieties are beejk (t) ∀j, while biijk (t)
are the substitutability parameters between two incumbent firms producing
varieties i and j of good k. The optimal control problem of an incumbent
producing variety i of good k is dynamic and can be written as
max
V iik
Z ∞
0
⎧
⎨
⎩p
i
ik (t)x
i
ik (t)− w (t)
⎡
⎣liik (t) +
mikX
j=1
Riijk (t) +R
i
iek (t)
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭ e
−rtdt
subject to⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
piik (t) = ak −
mikX
j=1
biijk (t)x
i
jk (t)− beeik (t)xek (t) ∀t
liik (t) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxiik (t) if x
i
ik (t) > 0
0 otherwise
∀t
b˙iijk (t) = −γbiijk (t)
£
φ(Riijk (t)) + φ(R
i
jik (t))
¤
∀t ∀j 6= i
b˙eeik (t) = −γbeeik (t) [φ (Riiek (t)) + φ (Reeik (t))] ∀t
xiik (t) ≥ 0, liik (t) ≥ 0 ∀t
Reiek (t) ≥ 0, Riiik (t) = 0, Riijk (t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∀j 6= i
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where V iik = {{piik (t) , xiik (t) , liik (t) , Reiek (t) , {Riijk (t)}m
i
k
j=1}t∈[0,∞)} is the vec-
tor with the choice variables of the entrant, Riijk (t) is the expenditure in
R&D of the incumbent producing variety i of good k to increase diﬀerenti-
ation with variety j of good k produced by another incumbent and Riiek (t)
is the expenditure in R&D of the incumbent to increase diﬀerentiation with
the variety of the entrant. The state variables are beeik (t) and b
i
ijk (t) ∀j 6= i.
The optimal control problem of the entrant is dynamic too and can be
written as
max
V ek
Z ∞
τ
⎧
⎨
⎩p
e
k (t)x
e
k (t)− w (t)
⎡
⎣lek (t) +
mikX
j=1
Reejk (t)
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭ e
−r(t−τ)dt
subject to⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pek (t) = ak −
mikX
j=1
beejk (t)x
i
jk (t)− b0kxek (t) ∀t
lek (t) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxek (t) if x
e
k (t) > 0
0 otherwise
∀t
b˙eejk (t) = −γbeejk (t)
£
φ(Reejk (t)) + φ(R
i
jek (t))
¤
∀t ∀j
xek (t) ≥ 0, lek (t) ≥ 0, Reejk (t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∀j
where V ek = {{pek (t) , xek (t) , lek (t) , {Reejk (t)}m
i
k
j=1}t∈[τ,∞)} is the vector with
the choice variables of the entrant, Reejk (t) is the expenditure in R&D of the
entrant to increase diﬀerentiation with variety j of the same good. The state
variables are beejk (t) ∀j.
We split the analysis in two steps. In the first one we determine the chosen
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quantities and prices of the incumbents and the entrant for given values of
beejk (t) and b
i
ijk (t) ∀i, j, k, t. In the second one we examine the R&D decisions
of entrant and incumbents and the overall dynamics of their profits.
Step 1 : the choice of quantity and price in period t ≥ τ is a static decision
and does not depend on the dynamics of the lowest achievable values of the
bijk coeﬃcients. We assume xiik (t) > 0 and x
e
k (t) > 0 ∀i, k, which imply
liik (t) > 0 and l
e
k (t) > 0.
35
The Lagrangian function of the maximization problem for the incumbent
producing variety i of good k is
Liik (t) = p
i
ik (t)x
i
ik (t)− w (t) liik (t)− λi1ik (t) [piik (t)− ak+
+
mikX
j=1
biijk (t)x
i
jk (t) + b
e
eikx
e
k (t)]− λi2ik (t)
£
liik (t)− dk − ckxiik (t)
¤
where λi1ik (t) and λ
i
2ik (t) are the Lagrangian multipliers respectively associ-
ated with the inverse demand function and the production function.
The optimal decisions regarding piik (t), x
i
ik (t) and l
i
ik (t) are functions of
the choices of the entrant. They are determined by the first order conditions
35In the case xeik (s) = 0, we find that R
e
ijk (s) = 0 ∀j. If xiik (t) = 0, we find that
xeik (s) = 0 and R
e
ijk (s) = 0. In both cases the Proposition is trivially dimostrated.
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and by the condition of nonnegative operating profits:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂Liik(t)
∂piik(t)
= xiik (t)− λi1ik (t) = 0
∂Liik(t)
∂xiik(t)
= piik (t)− λi1ik (t) b0k + λi2ik (t) ck = 0
∂Liik(t)
∂liik(t)
= −w (t)− λi2ik (t) = 0
∂Liik(t)
∂λi1ik(t)
= piik (t)− ak +
mikX
j=1
biijk (t)x
i
jk (t) + b
e
eik (t)x
e
k (t) = 0
∂Liik(t)
∂λi2ik(t)
= liik (t)− dk − ckxiik (t) = 0
xiik (t) > 0, l
i
ik (t) > 0
piik (t)x
i
ik (t)− w (t) liik (t) ≥ 0.
The first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the unique global
maximum because the objective function is pseudoconcave and the con-
straints are quasiconcave.36
The Lagrangian function of this maximization problem for the entrant is
Lek (t) = p
e
k (t)x
e
k (t)− w (t) lek (t)− λe1k (t) [pek (t)− ak+
+
mikX
j=1
beejk (t)x
i
jk (t) + b0kx
e
k (t)]− λe2k (t) [lek (t)− dk − ckxek (t)]
where λe1k (t) and λ
e
2k (t) are the Lagrangian multipliers respectively associ-
ated with the inverse demand function and the production function.
The optimal decisions regarding pek (t), x
e
k (t) and l
e
k (t) are functions of
the choices of the incumbent firms and are determined by the first order
36See de la Fuente (2000), p. 289, Theorem 1.14.
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conditions and by the condition of nonnegative operating profits:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂Lek(t)
∂pek(t)
= xek (t)− λe1k (t) = 0
∂Lek(t)
∂xek(t)
= pek (t)− λe1k (t) b0k + λe2k (t) ck = 0
∂Lek(t)
∂lek(t)
= −w (t)− λe2k (t) = 0
∂Lek(t)
∂λe1k(t)
= pek (t)− ak +
mikX
j=1
beejk (t)x
i
jk (t) + b0kx
e
k (t) = 0
∂Lek(t)
∂λe2k(t)
= lek (t)− dk − ckxek (t) = 0
xek (t) > 0, l
e
k (t) > 0
pek (t)x
e
k (t)− w (t) lek (t) ≥ 0.
The first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the unique global
maximum because the objective function is pseudoconcave and the con-
straints are quasiconcave.37
We assume a parameters structure such that biijk (t) = b
i
ilk (t) ∀j 6= i
∀l 6= i and beejk (t) = beelk (t) ∀j, l.
The two systems of optimality conditions imply:
37See de la Fuente (2000), p. 289, Theorem 1.14.
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⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
xiik (t) = λ
i
1ik (t) =
[ak−w(t)ck][2b0k−beeik(t)]
2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)
piik (t) =
akb0k[2b0k−beeik(t)]
2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)
+
+
w(t)ck[2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)+b0kb
e
eik(t)]
2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)
liik (t) = dk +
ck[ak−w(t)ck][2b0k−beeik(t)]
2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)
xek (t) = λ
e
1k (t) =
[ak−w(t)ck][b0k+
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)]
2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)
pek (t) =
akb0k[b0k+
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)]
2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)
+
+
w(t)ck[b20k+b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)+b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)]
2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)
lek (t) = dk +
ck[ak−w(t)ck][b0k+
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)]
2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)
w (t) dk ≤
[ak−w(t)ck]2b0k[b0k+
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)]
2
[2b20k+2b0k
Pmik
j=1 b
i
ijk(t)−beeik(t)
Pmik
j=1 b
e
ejk(t)]
2
λi2ik (t) = λ
e
2k (t) = −w (t)
mikX
j=1
beejk (t) <
mikX
j=1
biijk (t) + b0k.
Step 2: We assume an initial parameters structure such that biijk (0) =
biilk (0) ∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i and beejk (τ) = beelk (τ) ∀j, l. The concentrated Hamil-
tonian function of the optimal control problem for the incumbent producing
variety i of good k, where liik (t), p
i
ik (t) and x
i
ik (t) are at their optimal values
(starred variables), is
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Hiik (t) = {pi,∗ik (t)xi,∗ik (t)− w (t) [li,∗ik (t) +
mikX
j=1
Riijk (t)+
+Riiek (t)]}e−rt − μiiek (t) γbeiek (t)
£
φ
¡
Riiek (t)
¢
+ φ (Reeik (t))
¤
+
−
X
j 6=i
μiijk (t) γb
i
ijk (t)
£
φ(Riijk (t)) + φ(R
i
jik (t))
¤
where μiiek (t) and μ
i
ijk (t) ∀j 6= i are the costate variables associated respec-
tively with biiek (t) and b
i
ijk (t) ∀j 6= i. The behaviour of the candidates for
the optimal path of Riiek (t) and R
i
ijk (t) ∀j 6= i is described by the follow-
ing maximum principle conditions and by the nonnegativity condition of the
discounted sum of current and future profits:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂Hiik(t)
∂Riijk(t)
= −w (t) e−rt − μiijk (t) γbiijk (t)φ0(Riijk (t)) = 0 ∀j 6= i
∂Hiik(t)
∂Reiek(t)
= −w (t) e−rt − μiiek (t) γbeiek (t)φ0(Riiek (t)) = 0
∂Hinxijk (t)
∂beijk(t)
= −e−rtxi,∗ik (t)x
i,∗
jk (t) + μ
i
ijk (t)
b˙eijk(t)
beijk(t)
= −μ˙iijk (t) ∀j 6= i
∂Heik(t)
∂beiek(t)
= −e−rtxi,∗ik (t)x
e,∗
k (t) + μ
i
iek (t)
b˙eiek(t)
beiek(t)
= −μ˙iiek (t)
∂Hiik(t)
∂μiijk(t)
= −γbiijk (t) [φ(Riijk (t)) + φ(Rijik (t))] = b˙iijk (t) ∀j 6= i
∂Hiik(t)
∂μiiek(t)
= −γbeiek (t) [φ(Riiek (t)) + φ(Reeik (t))] = b˙eiek (t)
Riiik (t) = 0, R
i
iek (t) ≥ 0, Riijk (t) ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i
lim
t→∞
Hiik (t) = 0 (trasversality condition)Z ∞
t
{pi,∗ik (s)xi,∗ik (s)− w (s) [li,∗ik (s) +
mkX
j=1
Riijk (s) +R
i
iek (s)]}e−r(s−t)ds ≥ 0.
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The behaviours of xiik (t), p
i
ik (t) and l
i
ik (t) follow the analysis described
in Proposition 2 in each period t < τ and in Step 1 in this Proposition
afterwards. The chosen R&D paths imply that the initial symmetry in the
substitutability parameters is carried on; let us call bik (t) = b
i
ijk (t) ∀i ∀j 6= i
and bek (t) = b
e
ejk (t) ∀j. The system of optimality conditions implies
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μiijk (t) = −
e−rtw(t)
γbik(t)φ
0(Rijk(t))
∀j 6= i
R˙iijk(t)
Riijk(t)
= − φ
0(Riijk(t))
φ00(Riijk(t))R
i
ijk(t)
{r − γ[ak−w(t)ck]2bik(t)φ
0(Riijk(t))
w(t)[2b0k+(mik−1)bik(t)]2
} ∀j 6= i ∀t < τ
R˙iijk(t)
Riijk(t)
= − φ
0(Riijk(t))
φ00(Riijk(t))R
i
ijk(t)
{r − γ[ak−w(t)ck]
2bik(t)[2b0k−bek(t)]2φ
0(Riijk(t))
w(t)[4b20k+2(m
i
k−1)b0kbik(t)−mikbek(t)
2]2
}
∀j 6= i ∀t ≥ τ
R˙iiek(t)
Riiek(t)
= − φ
0(Riiek(t))
φ00(Riiek(t))R
i
iek(t)
{r+
−γ[ak−w(t)ck]
2bek(t)[2b0k−bek(t)][2b0k+(mik−1)bik(t)−mikbek(t)]φ
0(Riiek(t))
w(t)[4b20k+2(m
i
k−1)b0kbik(t)−mikbek(t)
2]2
}
∀j 6= i ∀t ≥ τ
b˙ik (t) = −γbik (t) [φ(Riijk (t)) + φ(Rijik (t))] ∀j 6= i
b˙ek (t) = −γbek (t) [φ(Riiek (t)) + φ(Reeik (t))]
Riiik (t) = 0, R
i
ijk (t) > 0 ∀j 6= i, Riiek (t) > 0 ∀t ≥ τZ τ
0
{ [ak − w (t) ck]
2b0k
[2b0k + (mik − 1)bik (t)]2
− w (t) [dk +
mkX
j=1
Riijk (t) +R
i
iek (t)]}e−rtdt+
+
Z ∞
τ
{ [ak − w (t) ck]
2b0k[2b0k − bek (t)]2
[4b20k + 2(m
i
k − 1)b0kbik (t)−mikbek (t)
2]2
− w (t) [dk +
mkX
j=1
Riijk (t)+
+Riiek (t)]}e−rtdt ≥ 0Z ∞
τ
{ [ak − w (t) ck]
2b0k[2b0k − bek (t)]2
[4b20k + 2(m
i
k − 1)b0kbik (t)−mikbek (t)
2]2
− w (t) [dk+
+
mkX
j=1
Riijk (t) +R
i
iek (t)]}e−r(t−τ)dt ≥ 0
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where only the conditions about profits in periods 0 and τ are relevant be-
cause profits are increasing over time (π˙jk (t) > 0) in subperiods [0, τ) and
[τ ,∞).
The transversality condition is verified in the solution because
lim
t→∞
n
pi,∗ik (t)x
i,∗
ik (t)− w (t)
h
li,∗ik (t) +
Pmik
j=1R
i,∗
ijk (t) +R
i,∗
iek (t)
io
<∞,
lim
t→∞
e−rt = 0, limt→∞ μ
i,∗
ijk (t) = 0, limt→∞ μ
i,∗
iek (t) = 0,
lim
t→∞
−γbeiek (t)
£
φ(Ri,∗iek (t)) + φ(R
e,∗
eik (t))
¤
= 0 and
lim
t→∞
−γbiijk (t)
£
φ(Ri,∗ijk (t)) + φ(R
i,∗
jik (t))
¤
= 0 ∀j 6= i.
The concentrated Hamiltonian function of the optimal control problem
for the entrant is
Hek (t) = {pe,∗k (t)xe,∗k (t)− w (t) [le,∗k (t) +
mikX
j=1
Reejk (t)]}e−r(t−τ)+
−
mikX
j=1
μeejk (t) γb
e
ejk (t)
£
φ(Reejk (t)) + φ(R
i
jek (t))
¤
where μeejk (t) ∀j is the costate variable associated with beejk (t) ∀j. The
behaviour of the candidates for the optimal path of Reejk (t) ∀j is described
by the maximum principle conditions and by the nonnegativity condition of
the discounted sum of current and future profits:
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⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂Hek(t)
∂Reejk(t)
= −w (t) e−r(t−τ) − μeejk (t) γbeejk (t)φ0(Reejk (t)) = 0 ∀j
∂Hek(t)
∂beejk(t)
= −e−r(t−τ)xe,∗k (t)x
i,∗
ik (t) + μ
e
ejk (t)
b˙eejk(t)
beejk(t)
= −μ˙eejk (t) ∀j
∂Hek(t)
∂μeejk(t)
= −γbeejk (t) [φ(Reejk (t)) + φ(Rijek (t))] = b˙eejk (t) ∀j
Reejk (t) ≥ 0 ∀j
lim
t→∞
Hek (t) = 0 (trasversality condition)Z ∞
t
{[pe,∗k (s)xe,∗k (s)− w (s) [le,∗k (s) +
mkX
j=1
Reejk (s)]}e−r(s−t)ds ≥ 0.
The behaviours of xik (t), pik (t) and lik (t) follow the analysis described
in Step 1. The chosen R&D paths imply that the initial symmetry in the
substitutability parameters is carried on. The optimality conditions imply
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μeejk (t) = −
w(t)e−r(t−τ)
γbek(t)φ
0(Reejk(t))
∀j
R˙eejk(t)
Reejk(t)
= − φ
0(Reejk(t))
φ00(Reejk(t))R
e
ejk(t)
{r+
−γ[ak−w(t)ck]
2bek(t)[2b0k+(m
i
k−1)bik(t)−mikbek(t)]2φ
0(Reejk(t))
w(t)[4b20k+2(m
i
k−1)b0kbik(t)−mikbek(t)
2]2
} ∀j
b˙eejk (t) = −γbeejk (t) [φ(Reejk (t)) + φ(Rijek (t))] ∀j
Reejk (t) > 0 ∀jZ ∞
τ
{ [ak − w (t) ck]
2b0k[2b0k + (mik − 1)bik (t)−mikbek (t)]2
[4b20k + 2(m
i
k − 1)b0kbik (t)−mikbek (t)
2]2
− w (t) [dk+
+
mkX
j=1
Reejk (t)]}e−r(t−τ)dt ≥ 0
where only the condition about profits in period τ is relevant because profits
are increasing over time. The transversality condition is verified because
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lim
t→∞
n
pe,∗k (t)x
e,∗
k (t)− w (t)
h
le,∗k (t) +
Pmik
j=1R
e,∗
ejk (t)
io
<∞,
lim
t→∞
e−rt = 0, limt→∞ μ
e,∗
ejk (t) = 0 and
lim
t→∞
−γbeejk (t)
£
φ(Re,∗ejk (t)) + φ(R
e,∗
jek (t))
¤
= 0 ∀j.
Propositions 5-6 The utility maximization problem of the benevolent
planner is dynamic and can be written as
max
V
Z ∞
0
(
x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
"
ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)
2
xjk (t)
#
xik (t)
)
e−rtdt
subject to
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
lik (t) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxik (t) if xik (t) > 0
0 otherwise
∀t
l0 (t) = c0x0 (t) ∀t
l0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
"
lik (t) +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)
#
= 1 ∀t
b˙ijk (t) = −γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))] ∀i, k, t ∀j 6= i
x0 (t) > 0, l0 (t) ≥ 0, xik (t) ≥ 0, lik (t) ≥ 0 ∀i, k, t
Riik (t) = 0, Rijk (t) ≥ 0 ∀i, k, t ∀j 6= i
where V = {{x0 (t) , l0 (t) , {{xik (t) , lik (t) , {Rijk (t)}mkj=1}mki=1}Nk=1}t∈[0,∞)} is
the vector with the choice variables. We now determine the chosen quan-
tities and labour allocation for given values of bijk (t). In the second step we
examine the R&D choices.
Step 1 (Proposition 5): the choice of the optimal x0 (t), l0 (t), xik (t)
and lik (t) ∀i, k is static and does not depend on the dynamics of bijk (t). We
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assume x0 (t) > 0 and xik (t) > 0 ∀i, k, which imply l0 (t) > 0 and lik (t) > 0;38
the Lagrangian function is
L (t) = x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
[ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)
2
xjk (t)]xik (t)+
−
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
λ1ik (t) [lik (t)− dk − ckxik (t)]− λ2 (t) [l0 (t)− c0x0 (t)] +
− λ3 (t) {l0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
[lik (t) +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)]− 1}
where λ1ik (t) ∀i, k, λ2 (t) and λ3 (t) are Lagrangian multipliers for the dif-
ferentiated good and the homogenous good production functions and for the
full employment condition. The first order conditions are:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L(t)
∂x0(t)
= 1 + λ2 (t) c0 = 0
∂L(t)
∂l0(t)
= −λ2 (t)− λ3 (t) = 0
∂L(t)
∂xik(t)
= ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t) + λ1ik (t) ck = 0 ∀i, k
∂L(t)
∂lik(t)
= −λ1ik (t)− λ3 (t) = 0 ∀i, k
∂L(t)
∂λ1ik(t)
= lik (t)− dk − ckxik (t) = 0 ∀i, k
∂L(t)
∂λ2(t)
= l0 (t)− c0x0 (t) = 0
∂L(t)
∂λ3(t)
= l0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
[lik (t) +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)]− 1 = 0
x0 (t) > 0, l0 (t) > 0, xik (t) > 0, lik (t) > 0 ∀i, k.
38The case xik (t) = 0 is trivial because implies Rijk (t) = 0 ∀j. If x0 (t) > 0 and
xik (t) > 0 are true in the decentralized solution, they are also verified in the socially
optimal solution.
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The first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the unique global
maximum because the objective function is pseudoconcave and the con-
straints are quasiconcave.39
We assume a parameters structure such that bijk (t) = bilk (t) ∀i, k ∀j 6= i
∀l 6= i. The system of first order conditions implies
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λ1ik (t) = λ2 (t) = − 1c0 ∀i, k
λ3 (t) = 1c0
xik (t) =
ak−
ck
c0Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
∀i, k
lik (t) = dk +
ck(ak−
ck
c0
)Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
∀i, k
l0 (t) = 1−
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
[
ck(ak−
ck
c0
)Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
+ dk +
mkX
j=1
Rijk (t)]
x0 (t) = 1c0 −
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
[
ck(ak−
ck
c0
)
c0
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)
+ dkc0 +
Pmk
j=1Rijk(t)
c0
].
Step 2 (Proposition 6): The choice of the optimal value of the Rijk (t)
variables is a dynamic decision. The state variables are bijk (t) ∀i, k ∀j 6= i.
The concentrated Hamiltonian function, where xik (t), pik (t) and lik (t) are
at their optimal values (starred variables), is
H (t) = {x∗0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
[ak −
mkX
j=1
bijk (t)
2
x∗jk (t)]x
∗
ik (t)}e−rt+
−
NX
k=1
mkX
i=1
X
j 6=i
μijk (t) γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))]
39See de la Fuente (2000), p. 289, Theorem 1.14.
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where μijk (t) is the costate variable associated with bijk (t) ∀i, k ∀j 6= i. The
behaviour of the candidates for the optimal path of Rijk (t) ∀i, k ∀j 6= i is
described by the maximum principle conditions:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂H(t)
∂Rijk(t)
= −e−rtc0 − γμijk (t) bijk (t)φ
0
(Rijk (t)) = 0 ∀i, k ∀j 6= i
∂H(t)
∂bijk(t)
= −e−rtx∗ik (t)x∗jk (t) + μijk (t)
b˙ijk(t)
bijk(t)
= −μ˙ijk (t) ∀i, k ∀j 6= i
∂H(t)
∂μijk(t)
= −γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))] = b˙ijk (t) ∀i, k ∀j 6= i
Riik (t) = 0, Rijk (t) ≥ 0 ∀i, k ∀j 6= i
lim
t→∞
H (t) = 0 (trasversality condition).
We assume an initial parameters structure such that bijk (0) = bilk (0)
∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i; xik (t), pik (t) and lik (t) follow the analysis described in
Proposition 2.
The system of optimality conditions implies
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μijk (t) = − e
−rt
γc0bijk(t)φ0(Rijk(t))
∀i, k ∀j 6= i
R˙ijk(t)
Rijk(t)
= − φ
0(Rijk(t))
φ00(Rijk(t))Rijk(t)
{r − γ(ak−
ck
c0
)2bijk(t)φ0(Rijk(t))
c0[
Pmk
j=1 bijk(t)]
2 } ∀i, k ∀j 6= i
b˙ijk (t) = −γbijk (t) [φ (Rijk (t)) + φ (Rjik (t))] ∀i, k ∀j 6= i
Riik (t) = 0, Rijk (t) ≥ 0 ∀j 6= i.
The transversality condition is verified in the solution because
lim
t→∞
n
x∗0 (t) +
PN
k=1
Pmk
i=1
h
ak −
Pmk
j=1
bijk(t)
2
x∗jk (t)
i
x∗ik (t)
o
<∞,
lim
t→∞
e−rt = 0, limt→∞ μ∗ijk (t) = 0 and
lim
t→∞
−γbijk (t)
£
φ(R∗ijk (t)) + φ(R
∗
jik (t))
¤
= 0 ∀i, k ∀j 6= i.
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Proposition 7 The intertemporal utility maximization problem of the
benevolent planner, assuming φ (R) = R
1−η
1−η , can be written as
max
V
Z ∞
0
⎧
⎨
⎩x0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mk(t)X
i=1
⎡
⎣ak −
mk(t)X
j=1
bijk (t)
2
xjk (t)
⎤
⎦xik (t)
⎫
⎬
⎭ e
−rtdt
subject to
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
lik (t) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxik (t) if xik (t) > 0
0 otherwise
∀t
l0 (t) = c0x0 (t) ∀t
l0 (t) +
NX
k=1
mk(t)X
i=1
⎡
⎣lik (t) +
mk(t)X
j=1
Rijk (t)
⎤
⎦ = 1 ∀t
b˙ijk (t) = −
γbijk(t)[R1−ηijk (t)+R
1−η
jik (t)]
1−η ∀i, k, t ∀j 6= i
x0 (t) > 0, l0 (t) ≥ 0, xik (t) ≥ 0, lik (t) ≥ 0 ∀i, k, t
Riik (t) = 0, Rijk (t) ≥ 0 ∀i, k, t ∀j 6= i
mk (t) ≥ 2 and integer ∀k, t
where V = {{x0 (t) , l0 (t) , {xik (t) , lik (t) , {Rijk (t)}mk(t)j=1 }mk(t)i=1 ,mk (t)}Nk=1}t∈[0,∞)}
is the vector with the choice variables of the firm. The first order and max-
imum principle conditions for x0 (t), l0 (t), xik (t), lik (t) and Rijk (t) ∀i, k
∀j 6= i, determining the behaviour of the candidates to be optimal choices
of benevolent planner, can be obtained following the same procedure as in
Propositions 5 and 6; there are now one additional maximum principle condi-
tion regarding mk (t) and the constraint mk (t) ≥ 2. The relevant conditions
106
to obtain the result reported in the main text are
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L(t)
∂xik(t)
= ak − ckc0 −
mk(t)X
j=1
bijk (t)xjk (t) = 0 ∀i, k
∂H(t)
∂Rijk(t)
= −w (t) e−rt − γbijk (t) [μijk (t)R−ηijk (t) + μjik (t)R
−η
jik (t)] = 0
∀i, k ∀j 6= i
∂H(t)
∂mk(t)
= {[ak − ckc0 −
mk(t)X
j=1
bmjk (t)xjk (t)]xmk (t)− dkc0+
−2
Pmk(t)
j=1 Rmjk(t)
c0
}e−rt + 2
mk(t)X
j=1
μmjk (t) b˙mjk (t) = 0 ∀k
where the m index in the variables of the third condition is referred to the
marginal variety, which is either the last produced or the last abandoned.
Also in this case, the transversality condition lim
t→∞
H (t) = 0 is verified in the
solution because
lim
t→∞
n
x∗0 (t) +
PN
k=1
Pm∗k(t)
i=1
h
ak −
Pm∗k(t)
j=1
bijk(t)
2
x∗jk (t)
i
x∗ik (t)
o
<∞,
lim
t→∞
e−rt = 0, limt→∞ μ∗ijk (t) = 0 and
lim
t→∞
−γbijk (t)
£
φ(R∗ijk (t)) + φ(R
∗
jik (t))
¤
= 0 ∀i, k ∀j 6= i.
Proposition 8 Let us assume that the firm producing variety i of good
k deviates from the behaviour described in the main text and decides to
produce an older version (with index h) of its variety together with the
newest version in period t. We assume, moreover, that substitutability among
diﬀerent versions of the same variety is linear in h, where h has been defined
in Subsection 2.8.1.
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The deviation does not imply intertemporal elements and, therefore, we
consider the static current profits maximization problem. We neglect the
time index to simplify notation. The current profits maximization problem
of the deviating firm producing variety i of good k can be written as
max
V dik(h)
pnik (h)x
n
ik (h) + p
o
ik (h)x
o
ik (h)− w [lnik (h) + loik (h)]
subject to⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pnik (h) = ak −
mkX
j=1
bn,nijkx
n
jk (h)− b
o,n
iik (h)x
o
ik (h)
poik (h) = ak −
mkX
j=1
bo,nijk (h)x
n
jk (h)− b0kxoik (h)
lnik (h) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxnik (h) if x
n
ik (h) > 0
0 otherwise
loik (h) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxoik (h) if x
o
ik (h) > 0
0 otherwise
xnik (h) ≥ 0, xoik (h) ≥ 0, lnik (h) ≥ 0, loik (h) ≥ 0
where V dik (h) = {{prik (h) , xrik (h) , lrik (h)}r∈{o,n}} is the vector with the choice
variables of the deviating firm, the superscripts n and o discriminates between
variables of the the old and the new version of the variety, bo,nijk (h) is the
substitutability parameter between the older (with index h) version of variety
i and the newest version of variety j of the same good k and bn,nijk is the
substitutability parameter between the newest version of variety i and the
newest version of variety j. The current profits maximization problem of a
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nondeviating firm producing variety j of good k can be written as
max
V ndjk (h)
pnjk (h)x
n
jk (h)− wlnjk (h)
subject to⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pnjk (h) = ak −
mkX
l=1
bn,njlk x
n
lk (h)− b
o,n
ijk (h)x
o
ik (h)
lnjk (h) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dk + ckxnjk (h) if x
n
jk (h) > 0
0 otherwise
xnjk (h) ≥ 0, lnjk (h) ≥ 0
where V ndjk (h) = {pnjk (h) , xnjk (h) , lnjk (h)} is the vector with the choice vari-
ables of the nondeviating firm. We assume xnjk (h) > 0 ∀j, xnik (h) > 0 and
xoik (h) > 0, which imply l
n
jk (h) > 0, l
n
ik (h) > 0 and l
o
ik (h) > 0.
40 The
Lagrangian function for the deviating firm producing variety i of good k is
Ldik (h) = p
n
ik (h)x
n
ik (h) + p
o
ik (h)x
o
ik (h)− w [lnik (h) + loik (h)]+
− λn1ik (h) [pnik (h)− ak +
mkX
j=1
bn,nijkx
n
jk (h) + b
o,n
iik (h)x
o
ik (h)]+
− λo1ik (h) [poik (h)− ak +
mkX
j=1
bo,nijk (h)x
n
jk (h) + b0kx
o
ik (h)]+
− λn2ik (h) [lnik (h)− dk − ckxnik (h)]− λo2ik (h) [loik (h)− dk − ckxoik (h)]
40We are interested in equilibria where xoik (h) > 0, otherwise the model collapses to the
main text structure. This implies xnik (h) > 0, because the residual demand when only the
older version of the variety is produced has a lower intercept and the same slope as in the
situation where only the newest version is produced. Given these two conditions, the first
order conditions imply that xnjk (h) > 0.
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where λn1ik (h), λ
n
2ik (h), λ
o
1ik (h) and λ
o
2ik (h) are the Lagrangian multipliers
respectively associated with the inverse demand function and the production
function for the new version of the variety and with the inverse demand
function and the production function for the old version.
The optimal decisions regarding pnik (h), x
n
ik (h), l
n
ik (h), p
n
ik (h), x
n
ik (h) and
lnik (h) are functions of the choices of the nondeviating firms; they are deter-
mined by the first order conditions and by the condition that operating profits
in case of deviation are bigger than those in absence of deviation:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂Ldik(h)
∂prik(h)
= xrik (h)− λr1ik (h) = 0 ∀r ∈ {n, o}
∂Ldik(h)
∂xnik(h)
= pnik (h)− λn1ik (h) b0k − λo1ik (h) b
o,n
iik (h) + λ
n
2ik (h) ck = 0
∂Ldik(h)
∂xoik(h)
= poik (h)− λn1ik (h) b
o,n
iik (h)− λo1ik (h) b0k + λo2ik (h) ck = 0
∂Ldik(h)
∂lrik(h)
= −w − λr2ik (h) = 0 ∀r ∈ {n, o}
∂Ldik(h)
∂λn1ik(h)
= pnik (h)− ak +
mkX
j=1
bn,nijkx
n
jk (h) + b
o,n
iik (h)x
o
ik (h) = 0
∂Ldik(h)
∂λo1ik(h)
= poik (h)− ak +
mkX
j=1
bo,nijk (h)x
n
jk (h) + b0kx
o
ik (h) = 0
∂Ldik(h)
∂λr2ik(h)
= lrik (h)− dk − ckxrik (h) = 0 ∀r ∈ {n, o}
xnik (h) > 0, l
n
ik (h) > 0, x
n
ik (h) > 0, l
n
ik (h) > 0
pnik (h)x
n
ik (h) + p
o
ik (h)x
o
ik (h)− w [lnik (h) + loik (h)] ≥
(ak−wck)2b0k
(b0k+
Pmk
j=1 b
n,n
ijk )
2 − wdk.
The first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the unique global
maximum because the objective function is pseudoconcave and the con-
straints are quasiconcave.41
41See de la Fuente (2000), p. 289, Theorem 1.14.
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The Lagrangian function of this maximization problem for the nondevi-
ating firm producing variety j of good k is
Lndjk (h) = p
n
jk (h)x
n
jk (h)− wlnjk (h)− λn1jk (h) [pnjk (h)− ak+
+
mkX
l=1
bn,njlk x
n
lk (h) + b
o,n
ijk (h)x
o
ik (h)]− λn2jk (h)
£
lnjk (h)− dk − ckxnjk (h)
¤
where λn1jk (h) and λ
n
2jk (h) are the Lagrangian multipliers respectively asso-
ciated with the inverse demand function and the production function. The
optimal decisions regarding pnjk (h), x
n
jk (h) and l
n
jk (h) are functions of the
choices of the deviating firm and are determined by the first order conditions
and by the condition of nonnegative operating profits:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂Lndjk (h)
∂pnjk(h)
= xnjk (h)− λn1jk (h) = 0
∂Lndjk (h)
∂xnjk(h)
= pnjk (h)− λn1jk (h) b0k + λn2jk (h) ck = 0
∂Lndjk (h)
∂lndjk (h)
= −w − λn2jk (h) = 0
∂Lndjk (h)
∂λn1jk(h)
= pnjk (h)− ak +
mkX
l=1
bn,njlk x
n
lk (h) + b
o,n
ijk (h)x
o
ik (h) = 0
∂Lndjk (h)
∂λn2jk(h)
= lnjk (h)− dk − ckxnjk (h) = 0
xnjk (h) > 0, l
n
jk (h) > 0
pnjk (h)x
n
jk (h)− wlnjk (h) ≥ 0.
The first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the unique global
maximum because the objective function is pseudoconcave and the con-
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straints are quasiconcave.42
We assume a parameters structure such that bn,nijk = b
n,n
ilk ∀j 6= i ∀l 6= i;
moreover, we use the definition of bo,nijk (h) from equation (29) and, given
the assumption of linearity in h, the definition of bo,niik (h) from equation (28).
Last, we exploit simmetry between the substitutability coeﬃcients to simplify
notation and we call bnk = b
n,n
ijk ∀j 6= i. The two systems of conditions imply
the following optimal quantities:
xnik = λ
n
1ik =
(ak−wck)[2(mk+1)(2b0k−bnk)−3h(mk−1)(b0k−bnk)]
2bnk b0k[8(mk−2)−3h(mk−3)]−2b20k[h(mk+3)−16]+2(bnk)
2
[h(4mk−6)−4(mk−1)]
xoik = λ
o
1ik =
(ak−wck)(3−mk)(2b0k−bnk)
bnk b0k[8(mk−2)−3h(mk−3)]−b20k[h(mk+3)−16]+(bnk)
2
[h(4mk−6)−4(mk−1)]
xnjk = λ
n
1jk =
(ak−wck)[4(2b0k−bnk)−3h(b0k−bnk)]
bnk b0k[8(mk−2)−3h(mk−3)]−b20k[h(mk+3)−16]+(bnk)
2
[h(4mk−6)−4(mk−1)]
.
The condition xnik (h) > 0 implies that the denominators are always positive.
The condition xoik (h) > 0 is verified only if mk = 2; in this case, the overall
profits of the deviating firm are
πdik =
(ak − wck)2
©
9 [2 (2b0k − bnk)− h (b0k − bnk)]
2 + 4 (2b0k − bnk)
2ª
4{b20k (16− 5h) + 3bnkb0kh− 2 (bnk)2 (2− h)}2
− 2wdk.
Diﬀerentiating profits with respect to h yields
∂πdik
∂h
= (ak − wck)2 (2b0k − bnk)(b0k − bnk) ∗
∗ 4(2b0k − b
n
k)(7b0k + b
n
k)− 9b0k(b0k − bnk)h
[b20k(16− 5h)− 2 (bnk)
2 (2− h) + 3b0kbnkh]3
∀h ∈ [0, 1]
42See de la Fuente (2000), p. 289, Theorem 1.14.
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which is always greater than zero and therefore the optimal choice is h = 1;
the overall behaviour of the deviating firm in the case mk = 2 is described,
therefore, by
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
xnik = λ
n
1ik =
3(ak−wck)(3b0k−bnk )
22b20k+6b
n
k b0k−4(bnk )2
xoik = λ
o
1ik =
(ak−wck)(2b0k−bnk )
11b20k+3b
n
k b0k−2(bnk )2
pnik =
ak[11b20k−2b0kbnk−(bnk)
2
]+wck[11b20k+8b
n
k b0k−3(bnk)
2
]
22b20k+6b
n
k b0k−4(bnk )2
poik =
ak[17b20k+2b0kb
n
k−3(bnk)
2
]+wck[27b20k+10b
n
k b0k−5(bnk)
2
]
44b20k+12b
n
k b0k−8(bnk )2
lnik = dk +
3ck(ak−wck)(3b0k−bnk )
22b20k+6b
n
k b0k−4(bnk )2
loik = dk +
ck(ak−wck)(2b0k−bnk )
11b20k+3b
n
k b0k−2(bnk )2
xnjk = λ
n
1jk =
(ak−wck)(5b0k−bnk )
11b20k+3b
n
k b0k−2(bnk )2
pnjk =
akb0k(5b0k−bnk )+2wck[3b20k+2bnk b0k−(bnk )2]
11b20k+3b
n
k b0k−2(bnk )2
lnjk = dk +
ck(ak−wck)(5b0k−bnk )
11b20k+3b
n
k b0k−2(bnk )2
λn2ik = λ
o
2ik = λ
n
2jk = −w
h = 1
wdk <
9(ak−wck)2[8b20k−2(bnk )2−(b0k−bnk )(2b0k+bnk )]2
4[11b20k+3b
n
k b0k−2(bnk )2]2(2b0k+bnk )2
+
+
(ak−wck)2{[4b20k−(bnk )2](2b0k+bnk )−b0k[11b20k+3bnk b0k−2(bnk )2]2}
[11b20k+3b
n
k b0k−2(bnk )2]2(2b0k+bnk )2
.
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3 The evaluation of the incentives to firms
for innovation: the case of the Fund for
Technological Innovation in Italy.
3.1 Introduction and literature review
The implementation of policy measures to stimulate R&D and the evalua-
tion of their eﬀectiveness is another long-time debated topic in the economic
literature. This is because the private management of R&D may be socially
ineﬃcient: the external acquisition of knowledge is not always regulated by
market mechanisms and agents cannot prevent observation and interaction
from other agents, a phenomenon known as spillovers from knowledge in the
literature; the social returns from innovation are therefore usually greater
than the private ones and the resources allocated by agents to innovate are
smaller than the socially optimal amount. The main rationale for public in-
tervention is therefore that subsidies to firms stimulate innovation activities
reducing the gap between private and social returns.
Another reason to justify public policy is that financial constraints in
the borrowing market can lead to suboptimal investments by firms.43 R&D
investments are risky and subject to asymmetric information between firms
and lenders; a higher interest rate than that equating demand and supply
of credit can help lenders to discriminate between good and bad projects,
43A literature review of the topic is in Hall (2002).
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at the social cost of a suboptimal overall credit amount. Public intervention
through a concessional loan can loosen the financial constraints.
But the successful implementation of public policies to stimulate inno-
vation is not easy for many reasons, firstly asymmetric information. For
instance, project assessment is more diﬃcult for the policymaker than for
the firm proposing it: problems of adverse selection might arise. Moreover,
once the subsidy has been granted, firms have less incentives to exert ef-
fort and there can be moral hazard. Public intervention should therefore
ideally aim at stimulating only the projects not undertaken otherwise (ad-
ditionality), possibly with high social returns; but these requirements are
hard to observe and in particular the additionality can be verified only by
ex post econometric techniques: the evaluation of the eﬃcacy of the policy
is therefore necessary to understand if the design is good enough to achieve
its proposed goal of stimulating innovation and economic activity.
In the empirical literature, the general evidence about the eﬃcacy of R&D
subsidies is controversial. David, Hall and Toole (2000) critically discuss the
findings of forty years of international studies and conclude that there is no
definitive evidence on whether public and private R&D expenditures are sub-
stitutes or complements. In the analysis of the Small Business Innovation
Research program in the U.S., Wallsten (2000) finds that public grants dis-
place firm expenditures dollar for dollar. Lach (2002), on a panel of Israeli
firms, finds that subsidies have been eﬀective for small firms, while the policy
had a negative eﬀect on large firms. Gonzalez, Jaumandreu and Pazò (2005)
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in analysing Spanish data find that only a small subset of firms would not
have undertaken R&D activity in the absence of the subsidy, while there is
no evidence of crowding out among the innovation active firms. Gorg and
Strobl (2007), in analysing an Irish sample of firms, conclude that public
subsidies replace private R&D expenditure when the award is substantial.
Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and Fier (2007) find a positive eﬀect of coopera-
tion on the eﬀectiveness of subsidies in a panel of firms from Germany and
Finland.
In contrast with such a wide range of international empirical literature,
very few studies examine the eﬃcacy of Italian R&D policies, even if the
number of interventions and the amount of invested resources have been
relevant in the last decades. Merito, Giannangeli and Bonaccorsi (2008)
evaluate the eﬃcacy of the subsidies awarded in 2000 by the Special Fund
for Applied Research of the Ministry of University and Research, introduced
with the aim of supporting the research component of industrial R&D; they
find that four years after the award of the subsidy, the policy had had little
eﬀect on number of employees, sales, productivity, labour costs and patent
applications. Carboni (2008) examines the eﬃcacy of the main national R&D
incentives on a sample from the Capitalia/MCC survey of manufacturing
firms in 2001-2003 and does not find crowding out eﬀects.
This study evaluates the eﬀectiveness of the subsidies supplied by the
Fund for Technological Innovation (FTI), a financial tool created by the Ital-
ian Ministry of Economic Development (MED) to stimulate the innovation
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activity of firms; this study fills a hole in the literature, given the scarce
attention for the Italian policy measures and for several, worthy of note,
characteristics of the policy and of the evaluation exercise. An interesting
peculiarity is that this Fund, unlike most similar instruments studied in the
previous literature, focuses on the development stage of R&D activity. The
theoretical models on the topic (e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1996)) find that the
eﬀects of the incentives to the research and to the development components
of R&D are structurally diﬀerent; but case studies where the policy measures
mainly influence only one of the two components are quite unusual in the
empirical literature.
The FTI is composed of two sections: a general purpose one, where ap-
plications from any field of activity and geographical area were accepted and
evaluated one-by-one by merit following the chronological order of submis-
sion without a set deadline; a special purpose one, periodically issuing calls
for applications in specific fields of activity or geographical areas with a set
deadline, whose applications are ranked and whose subsidies are assigned to
the best projects up to the amount of resources available. For both sections,
the policy measures include a concessional loan and a non-refundable grant;
the overall amount of the subsidy is the maximum allowed by the European
Union regulations.
Another interesting feature of the study is in the identification procedure
used for the general section: the regular functioning of this section of the
Fund was unexpectedly interrupted after about five months due to shortage
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of funds; we use this exogenous shock to identify the eﬀect of the policy: we
compare the behaviour of the subsidized firms with that of the firms applying
to the Fund after the shortage of funds, whose application had been neither
assessed nor funded until five years later.
The data from the MED about the FTI are merged with the 1999-2007
balance sheets of the firms filed at the Centrale dei Bilanci archives. We
use two methodologies to evaluate the eﬃcacy of this section of the Fund:
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, complemented by a matching procedure
to increase the similarity between treated and controls, and a regression
discontinuity design approach, using the submission date of the application
as the forcing variable. In both cases, we are not able to detect signals
of eﬀectiveness of the policy on the investment behaviour of firms in the
considered treatment period 2001-2007. The same is true also for sales,
capital and employee figures, while there is a positive eﬀect on assets; the
additional liquidity from the subsidy seems probably to have been used to
finance the current expenditure of firms. Neither the profitability nor the
financial structure of the firm seem have been clearly aﬀected by the policy,
apart from a reduction in the share of long-term debts over assets, when
calculated net of the concessional loan from the subsidy, a result coherent
with the hypothesis of lack of eﬀectiveness of the policy.
We also evaluate the eﬃcacy of three calls for applications of the special
section of the FTI; we merged the application data with the balance sheets
from the Cerved archives for the years 2001-2007. We use the regression
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discontinuity design approach with a normalized ranking of the applying
firms as the forcing variable; the results are very similar to those from the
general section for the treatment period 2003-2007.
Several robustness checks are applied to the general section (alternative
methodologies — diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences with matching and caliper, unbal-
anced panel — are shown in the main text; an alternative balance sheet
dataset — Cerved — is shown in the appendix) and the results are very similar;
moreover, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the policy for some subsamples of
firms whose characteristics could improve the eﬀect of the policy (small and
medium firms, those with high average debt cost, those with a high ratio of
subsidy over net investments) and the hints of eﬀectiveness, even if slightly
stronger than for the full sample, are not consistent in these cases either.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes
the characteristics of the FTI policy intervention; in Section 3.3 we present
the datasets for both the general and the special purpose sections and discuss
the main empirical analysis, empirically examining the eﬀectiveness of the
FTI. For the general purpose section of the Fund, in Section 3.4 we check
the robustness of the results under variations in the used methodology, while
Section 3.5 examines whether the policy aﬀected investments in some relevant
subsamples of firms. Section 3.6 summarizes the results and conclusions are
reached.
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3.2 Description of the policy intervention
The Italian Ministry of Economic Development created the Fund for Tech-
nological Innovations with Law n. 46/1982; after almost twenty years of
activity, the Fund was reorganized in 2001 introducing a new selection mech-
anism and a more accurate definition of its aims. The purpose of the FTI is
the stimulation of innovations through subsidies to firms for R&D projects
with a prevailing share of development costs. This definition distinguishes
the field of activity of the FTI from that of the Fund for Support to Research
of the Ministry of University and Research, oriented to stimulate the research
component of R&D.
The FTI is organized in a general purpose section and in a special pur-
pose one. The former is not restricted to specific fields of economic activity
or geographical areas and its applications are evaluated one-by-one by merit
following the chronological order of presentation without a predetermined
deadline. The latter periodically issues calls for applications in specific fields
of activity or geographical areas by a predetermined deadline; firms’ appli-
cations are ranked and the subsidies are assigned to the best projects up to
the available amount of resources.
In both cases, the applications are preliminarily evaluated by the banks
charged with the procedure to verify the necessary requirements and the eco-
nomic, financial and technical profiles of the applicants and of the projects.
The report of this assessment is sent to the Ministry. If the research costs
prevail on the development costs, the application is sent to the Ministry
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of University and Research instead of to the Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment.44 The MED asks the opinion of a Technical Committee, which
considers the application and the preliminary reports and expresses a syn-
thetic judgment on the merit of the project. The MED bases its decision on
granting the subsidy on the Committee’s opinion. Should the application be
rejected, the reasons are explained.
The stated costs of the project for which subsidies are granted must be
explicitly imputed either to the research or to the development components
and might include expenditures for labour, machinery, consulting, general
and consumption costs, feasibility studies and research centre organization.
The overall amount of subsidy is the same for the two sections and is
equal to the upper bound allowed by the regulations of the European Union.
The basic share is 25 per cent of costs for the development component and
50 per cent for the research component. As the FTI requires that the de-
velopment costs must be at least half of the overall ones in the projects, the
basic share of subsidized costs is between 25 and 37.5 per cent. The subsidy
can be augmented up to an overall additional 25 per cent of costs in the
following cases: areas with problems of economic development (defined by
the Objectives 1 and 2 of the European Union regional policies for the pe-
riod 2000-2006), projects included in the objectives of the R&D framework
programs of the European Union, projects in cooperation with other firms
44The applications transferred to the Ministry of University and Research are not in-
cluded in our sample.
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or public research organizations, small and medium firms.45
The MED awards the selected firms a concessional loan at an interest rate
of one fifth of the market rate, covering 60 per cent of the costs of the project;
the remaining contribution is a grant. The financial plan of the loan has a
maximum duration of ten years, plus a grace period during the execution of
the project.
The financial plan of the subsidy may include up to five installments.
Payment is made 60 days after presentation of the fiscal documentation of
the R&D expenditures by the firm performing the project. The small and
medium firms could ask advance payment of the initial installments.
Projects for the general section of the Fund could begin between 12
months before and 6 months after submission of the application. The sub-
sidized R&D expenditure should have been completed between 18 and 48
months after the date of submission; the MED could allow an extension of
12 months in case of unexpected technical diﬃculties.
Regarding the special section, the calls for applications required firms to
submit a preliminary project with the application. After the rankings of
the projects were published, firms had to submit a final version within two
months; projects should have been concluded between 18 and 36 months after
the submission of the final project, plus eventually the 12-month extension.
45The MED used the following criteria to define the small and medium firms: in the last
fiscal year the number of employees must be less than 250, the firm must be independent
and either the overall annual sales revenue must be less than 40 millions of euros or the
overall assets must be less than 27 millions of euros.
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The timeline of the FTI policy measures is shown in Figure 3.1. After the
reorganization of the FTI in 2001, the general section of the Fund regularly
worked from 27/10/2001 to 17/03/2002. 879 applications submitted in this
period were positively evaluated and received the subsidy. The Fund lent
more than 1100 millions of euros as concessional loans and paid more than
500 millions as grants. The subsidized projects were performed between
01/01/2001 and 01/04/2006.
The number of submitted applications and the amount of financial re-
sources required by the Fund exceeded the expectations of the Ministry;
because of shortage of funds, the MED communicated on 07/05/2002 that
the assessment of the applications received after 17/03/2002 had been sus-
pended; applications were allowed to be submitted until 13/01/2003, when
became clear that the shortage of funds would not have been solved shortly.
The necessary financial resources to fund this second group of applicants were
recovered four years later and the assessment of these projects began only
after 11/12/2007.46 Theoretically these projects should have been performed
between 18/03/2001 and 13/01/2008.
The special section of the FTI was not used in the period of regular
operation of the general section. Many calls for applications have since been
issued. We will restrict our attention to the three first calls for application,
46The Ministry either funded the already completed project or allowed some modifica-
tions in the timing and the content of the projects to update it. Anyway, the assessment
of the projects of the control group began after the end of the timeline considered in this
work and therefore did not impact the behaviour of these firms.
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issued in 2003-2004. The length of the available data period for the calls
issued after 2004 is too short for the analysis. In the analysed calls, the
projects were performed between the second half of 2004 and the beginning
of 2009.
The first call, issued in 2003, was directed to projects developed by small
and medium firms in Lombardy on the subjects included in the fifth and
sixth R&D framework programs of the European Union (e.g. biotechnolo-
gies, information and communication technologies, robotics, space research,
food safety). The final ranking of the projects, published in June 2004, was
determined positively considering the cooperation with other firms, research
centres and universities, the location in areas with problems of economic de-
velopment and the industrial development of patented innovations. 455 ap-
plications were submitted and 39 grants were assigned. The overall amount
of subsidy paid to the selected firms was around 50 millions of euros.
The second call, issued in 2003, was directed to projects developed by
small and medium firms to apply information and communication technolo-
gies (ICT) to the production and organizational processes. The final ranking
of the projects, published in August 2004, was determined considering nov-
elty, feasibility and impact of the project and the cooperation with other
firms, research centres and universities. 530 applications were submitted and
112 grants were assigned. The overall amount of subsidy paid to the selected
firms was around 140 millions of euros.
The third call, issued in 2004, was directed to medium-high and high
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technology projects developed by small and medium firms in areas with
problems of economic development in Northern and Central Italy (Lombardy
excluded). The final ranking of the projects, published in December 2004,
was determined positively considering the novelty of the product innovations
developed, the industrial development of patented innovations and the coop-
eration with other firms, research centres and universities. 387 applications
were submitted and 40 grants were assigned. The overall amount of subsidy
paid to the selected firms was around 50 millions of euros.
3.3 Econometric analysis of the eﬀectiveness of the
FTI
3.3.1 The dataset
Information about submitted applications and their outcomes has been pro-
vided by the MED. About the general part of the FTI, data regarded all the
applications submitted by the 778 subsidized firms; moreover, we have infor-
mation about the 1083 firms whose projects were submitted after 17/3/2003,
whose assessment had been suspended.47
The MED did not release data on the firms whose applications were as-
sessed and rejected as the information was considered confidential. According
to the Ministry oﬃcers, the number of rejections was extremely low. Virtu-
ally all the projects passed the initial report of the banks on the economic
47Firms were allowed to submit multiple projects; 879 projects were subsidized and 1242
were submitted, but not assessed.
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and financial profile of the applicants; rejections were mainly due to tech-
nical deficiencies in the proposed project in the judgment of the Technical
Committee. This fact probably pushed firms to apply and may explain why
the number of applications was higher than expected. The dataset provided
by the MED included information about the firm (name, fiscal code, ad-
dress), the cost structure of the project (timeline, research and development
components), the awarded funding (loan and grant, timeline of the financial
plan).
Regarding the special section of the FTI, we know the basic data of the
firm, the overall cost of the project, the amount of the awarded subsidy
and the complete final rankings, with 191 grants assigned and 1151 rejected
projects in the three calls.
We recovered the balance sheets of the firms of interest matching our
data with the Cerved and Centrale dei Bilanci archives. The Cerved dataset
includes the balance sheets of almost all the Italian companies; the Centrale
dei Bilanci dataset has more detailed information about a subset including
the largest firms. Cerved final dataset does not include variables depending
on employees, as there were too many missing observations in this variable,
and gross investments; moreover data from this archive are slightly less reli-
able because balance sheets are not controlled for coherence. The Centrale
dei Bilanci dataset has a bias towards larger firms. This is not a problem as
the firms that invest in research are generally large ones.
We matched data from the FTI general section with the Centrale dei
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Bilanci dataset; we have been able to find around 75 per cent of the applying
firms in one or more years. We also replicated both the matching and the
analysis with the Cerved dataset, where have been able to find the 95 per
cent of the firms. The results are very similar. The Tables of the main
estimates with Cerved are given, without comments, in Tables a3.1 and a3.2
in the appendix. The data from the FTI special section were matched with
the Cerved dataset, because the smaller number of observations required
a better coverage of the sample, even if the price is a smaller number of
available variables.
We restricted our attention to manufacturing firms to ensure greater ho-
mogeneity (around 80 per cent of the matched sample). We removed the
outliers in the general section dataset excluding the observations whose per-
centage variation of investments, sales and employees was in the first and the
last percentile of the distributions of the variables separately for subsidized
and unsubsidized firms. In the special section dataset we excluded the first
and the last percentile of the levels of the same variables. The procedure we
used for the FTI special section is less eﬀective in the elimination of the out-
liers, but allows a more homogeneous sample to be constructed, improving
comparability in the absence of matching. Moreover, for both datasets we
do not include the observations with missing data in the variables of interest
in any considered year and the firms experiencing structural changes (such
as mergers and acquisitions).
For the FTI general section, the final dataset is a balanced panel of 387
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firms (171 treated) observed in the period 1999-2007. Year 2000 is the pre-
treatment year, in which no firm had already started the submitted projects;
they were started between 2001 and 2002 and concluded between 2003 and
2006. In 2007 all subsidized projects were concluded. Data for the year
1999 allowed the use of some predated variables to scale investments for di-
mension. The descriptive statistics in the pretreatment year for subsidized,
unsubsidized and all firms are shown in Table 3.1.
For the FTI special section, the final dataset with all the three calls for
applications includes 345 firms observed in the period 2001-2007. 129 were
from the Lombardy call (7 treated), 108 were from the ICT one (15 treated)
and 108 from the Central and Northern Italy one (16 treated). In this case
the pretreatment year is 2002, the projects were started between the second
half of 2004 and the first half of 2005 and they were concluded between the
beginning of 2006 and the beginning of 2009. At the end of the considered
period, therefore, some projects had not been concluded. The descriptive
statistics are shown in Table 3.2.
3.3.2 FTI general section
The evaluation of a policy aims to assess if the firm receiving the subsidy
(“treated”) behaved diﬀerently because of the public intervention. This sit-
uation is clearly counterfactual: we cannot simultaneously observe the be-
haviour of a firm under the hypotheses of receiving a subsidy and not re-
ceiving it. We econometrically solve the problem comparing the behaviour
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of the treated firms with that one of others (the “control” group) with sim-
ilar characteristics, but which did not receive the subsidy. All the standard
methodologies used in the evaluation of the incentives are essentially mean
comparisons.
Two main approaches are available. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method-
ology compare the variation of the behaviour of treated and controls between
a pre-policy period, t = 0, and a post-policy period, t = τ :
β = E
£
ytτ − yt0
¯¯
s = 1
¤
−E [ycτ − yc0| s = 0]
where y is the outcome variable used to measure the behaviour of firms, the
superscripts t and c are respectively for treated and controls, the subscripts
show the time period and s is equal to 1 if the firm received the subsidy.
After diﬀerencing to eliminate firm eﬀects, we can therefore estimate the
policy eﬀect by comparison between treated and controls. The diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach can also be implemented estimating over the pooled
sample of treated and controls in the diﬀerent periods a panel fixed eﬀects
regression function of the type
yit = αi + γt + βsit + εit
where the index i is the firm index, αi and γt are the firm and time fixed
eﬀects and the dummy variable sit is equal to 1 if firm i is treated and year
t is in the treatment period.
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Several hypotheses are assumed: one is that the introduction of the policy
does not modify the market prices and the number of firms in the market;
if this is not the case, the eﬀects on the global prices aﬀect the behaviour
of the control group and the empirical results are biased: for example, an
observed positive diﬀerence between treated and control firms could be due
to the fact that control firms invest less than in the absence of the policy.
Moreover, because the changes induced by the policy in the number of firms
in the market are not captured by a mean comparison, we are not able to
conclude anything about the aggregate expenditure in R&D.
The most critical assumption is that the two groups — treated and controls
— have to be similar enough to allow the use of the control group as a proxy for
the behaviour of the treated group in the absence of the policy intervention.
This is not necessarily verified, because there could be self-selection within
the two groups and therefore the observed results could be due to structural
diﬀerences between treated and controls and not to the direct eﬀect of the
policy (selection bias). To improve comparability between the two groups we
use a nearest-neighbour matching technique: for each treated firm we choose
a vector of characteristics X and we select (with replacement) the firm of the
control group whose characteristics minimize a distance objective function
from the characteristics of the treated. The objective function that we use
is the Mahalanobis distance, which is a sum of the squares and the cross-
products of the diﬀerences between characteristics, weighted using the inverse
of the covariance matrix of the distribution of X. This type of matching
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procedure weights the eﬀect of the policy on the outcome according to the
distribution of the treated; we estimate therefore the average treatment eﬀect
on the treated (ATT).
If the matching was exact and the vectorX was the same for each selected
couple of treated and control, we would assume that, for a given value of the
vector of characteristics X = x, treated and controls only diﬀer for fixed
(firm and time) eﬀects and that in particular the counterfactual behaviour
of the firm in the absence of the policy is the same for both groups:
E
£
ytτ − yt0
¯¯
s = 0,X = x
¤
−E [ycτ − yc0| s = 0,X = x] = 0 ∀x. (31)
In the literature two slightly stronger conditions are assumed to esti-
mate the ATT (strong ignorability conditions; Heckman, Ichimura and Todd,
1998):
assignment to treated or controls ⊥ yτ − y0| s = 0, X = x ∀x (32)
and
∃c > 0 : c < P (s = 1|X = x) < 1− c ∀x (33)
where the first one (conditional independence assumption between assign-
ment and outcome in absence of treatment) is the counterfactual assump-
tion, while the second one (common support between treated and controls)
is necessary to empirically allow comparability between treated and controls
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for a given x.
Given the continuous nature of the variables we use in the characteristics
vector, matching cannot be exact; in this case the estimator is biased and
must be corrected by including a term depending on the diﬀerence between
the matching variables of the matched observations, as shown by Abadie and
Imbens (2010). There is another issue: the loss of degrees of freedom due to
the replacement in the matching does not allow a correct estimation of the
variance of the estimator with the standard methods either in the regression
or in the mean diﬀerence formulations of the estimator. Abadie and Imbens
(2008; 2010) show that bootstrap estimation may be not consistent and pro-
pose an alternative variance estimator under regularity conditions. We will
use this estimator.
In our analysis the control group is the pool of firms whose applica-
tions were submitted after 17/03/2002 and whose projects were not assessed.
These applications are a particularly good control group, since the suspension
of the assessment was an exogenous event for firms.
We use as characteristics in the matching vector X a dimensional vari-
able (log of employees for Centrale dei Bilanci and log of sales for Cerved),
investments ratios (normalized by employees for Centrale dei Bilanci and by
sales for Cerved) and any other reported variable with a significant diﬀer-
ence in the not matched distributions. The characteristics vector is chosen
in the pretreatment year. The matching has been stratified per technological
sector (according to the classification from O.E.C.D. (2007)). The eﬀects of
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the matching procedure on the diﬀerences between treated and controls are
shown in Table 3.3.48 The subsidized firms in the prematching sample invest
significantly more than the control firms when normalizing for employees and
assets, they have a higher share of long-term debts and a higher average cost
of capital and their profitability is smaller in terms of ROE. They are larger
in size, but this is never significant. There are still similar diﬀerences after
the matching, except that now the unsubsidized firms are larger than the
subsidized ones, but no mean diﬀerence is significant.
There are two main relevant remaining diﬀerences between the pools of
treated and control firms. The first one is in the timing of the application
(subsidized firms applied earlier); we can expect the resulting bias to be pos-
itive for the subsidized firms, because, if a firm is faster in preparing the
application, it is probably better organized and more eﬀective when mak-
ing investments. The second is that the distribution of treated and control
firms is not symmetric because the control group includes firms whose project
may have been rejected after the assessment. The matching procedure should
allow us to select the most similar controls to the treated, minimizing the dis-
tortions between the two distributions. Any possible remaining bias from this
source should be positive too, because we can suppose that the potentially
rejected firms included in the control group are the worse ones. Because our
final result is that the subsidized firms did not invest more than the unsub-
48The corresponding results for the matching with the Cerved dataset are shown in the
appendix in Table a3.1.
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sidized ones, we can be suﬃciently confident that, in our case, the resulting
bias from both these sources is not relevant.
The alternative methodology is the regression discontinuity design, which
can be implemented in this case using the date of application as the forcing
variable; we compare the value of the outcome variable in a neighbourhood
of the cutoﬀ between treated and controls in the forcing variable. We as-
sume that in a suﬃciently small neighbourhood of the cutoﬀ the assignation
of the subsidy may be approximated by a random variable, not dependent
on the characteristics of the firms; because of randomness, the characteris-
tics of the treated and of the control groups are similar and their average
behaviour in the absence of the subsidy will be similar too. In formal terms,
the counterfactual hypothesis is that:
lim
Rti→R¯
E
¡
ytτ
¯¯
s = 0, Rti
¢
= lim
Rci→R¯
E (ycτ | s = 0, Rci) (34)
where R¯ is the value of the forcing variable at the cutoﬀ (in this case the
variable is the date of submission of the application) and Rti and Rci are the
value of the forcing variable for the firm i respectively of the treated and the
control groups. After ordering the observations according to the value of the
forcing variable, we estimate its relationship with the outcome separately for
treated and controls and we compare the two estimates at the cutoﬀ.
This approach gives us a local estimate of the eﬀect of the policy; it has
better internal validity than the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, which is
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a weighted average of the eﬀects for diﬀerent characteristics vectors, but it
relies on a smaller number of observations and therefore its properties are less
well approximated by those implied by the asymptotic theory. It tackles the
problem of the timing of the applications by construction (while exclusion
from the sample of the rejected firms is still an issue), but it has another
drawback in this specific evaluation exercise: the frequency distribution of
the application dates shows a discontinuity at the cutoﬀ; this fact, due to
the way the MED administrated the classification of the dates, could in any
case cast some doubts on the hypothesis of absence of ordering of the firms
in a neighbourhood of the cutoﬀ (Figure 3.2).
Even if both available methodologies are not perfect for this evaluation
exercise, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach is probably more reliable ex
post, because the expected bias from the possible sources of distortion does
not invalidate our results; we show in the following Subsections the results
using this methodology. The results with the regression discontinuity design
are presented in the appendix; the conclusions are very similar and this
is another comfortable signal that the final result is robust enough to the
highlighted problems.
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates We monitored several aspects of
firms’ activity: investments, sales, assets, number of employees, capital, fi-
nancial structure, average productivity, average labour cost and profitability.
Investments have been considered either in raw levels or scaled by a di-
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mensional variable (sales, assets, number of employees, capital) taken from
the balance sheet of two years before the start of the policy measure (pre-
pretreatment year; 1999) to ensure exogeneity. We considered gross and
net overall investments and net intangible investments.49 Net investments
are the sum of the variation of the (either overall or intangible) capital in
the year; they therefore include direct investment and disinvestment activ-
ity, net of depreciation in the year. This is a good proxy to determine the
additional amount of accumulated capital in the year, after substituting de-
preciated and sold physical capital. Gross investments are the sum of the
variation of the gross overall capital, without considering depreciation; they
are therefore an index of firms’ investments activity for both accumulating
additional capital and substituting old capital and are not influenced by any
discretionary policy of management of depreciation. The main stimulation
eﬀect of the subsidies should be captured by the investments variables for two
main reasons: Italian accounting rules require that the costs of projects with
a prevailing share of development costs must be capitalized and included in
investments;50 the eﬀect of the work-in-progress project will be therefore cap-
tured by them. Moreover, R&D projects subsidized by the FTI are already
in an applied step of their life; if the project is successful, the developed inno-
vation will be immediately available for inclusion in the production process.
49We only have the full details of the investment activity components for the sum of
tangible and intangible investments and therefore we have not been able to construct the
gross intangible investments variables.
50See for example Pisoni, Bava, Busso and Devalle (2009) as a reference of the Italian
accounting rules.
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The behaviour of investments therefore captures changes in the economic
activity of the firm not only for the development of the project, but also for
the immediate application of its results.
Another group of variables considered to check the policy eﬀects of stimu-
lation of the economic activity are those regarding the dimension of the firm;
when completed, a successful project should become an additional asset for
the firm, producing value and increasing sales, and may stimulate the em-
ployment of additional workers. We use here the logarithms of employees,
assets, sales and capital as dimensional indexes, to determine the eﬀects of
the policy in relative, and not absolute, terms, but the results both for the
matching and the program evaluation are qualitatively the same when we
use the raw value of the variables. Capital is determined as the sum of the
intangible and the tangible fixed assets as reported in the balance sheet.
The value added per employee is the average productivity of labour and
should be able to capture possible positive eﬀects of the R&D project on
the eﬃciency of the firm; the cost of labour per employee is a proxy for the
average value of the human capital of the firm and should show whether the
project modified the quality of the human capital used within the firm.
The financial variables are those regarding the debt structure of the firm;
this is because we should eventually detect signals of substitution of private
with public funding in these variables, in particular the long-term debt. They
have been calculated net of the policy: neither debts nor assets in this case
include the current value for each period of the borrowed amount of the loan
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associated with the subsidy.
Another possible eﬀect of the subsidy is in terms of reputation: lenders
could perceive as a positive signal of reliability the fact that the firm received
a public subsidy; this possible eﬀect should be shown by the average cost of
debt. We removed from the financial charges the component due to the
payments associated with the concessional loan of the subsidy, to isolate the
eﬀect of the policy on the cost of the unsubsidized debts.
We examine moreover two profitability indexes: the return on equity
(ROE), calculated as net income before taxes over equity, monitors variations
in the capability of the firm of producing income for the shareholders; the
return on assets (ROA), calculated as gross operating surplus over assets, is
an index of the general profitability of the firm’s assets.
We can see the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates and standard errors
for each year between 2001 and 2007 with respect to the pretreatment year
(2000) in Tables 3.4a and 3.4b.51
The 95 per cent confidence intervals of the estimated coeﬃcients, which
show the diﬀerences in the variation between treated and controls, do not
allow to exclude a null eﬀect for both gross and net investments, in raw levels
and for any dimensional normalization. We also considered the diﬀerences
in the net intangible investments to understand if there is a capitalization
of knowledge for future investments, but also in this case we are not able
51The corresponding results using the Cerved dataset are shown in the appendix in
Table a3.2.
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to exclude a null eﬀect. When we consider the dimensional variables, we
find a significant, increasing over time, positive diﬀerence in the amount
of the overall assets of the firm, while it does not happen for the number
of employees and the amount of sales and fixed capital. Subsidized firms
therefore probably used the subsidy to increase the share of current assets.
Moreover, we are not able to exclude a null eﬀect for labour productivity
and firms’ average labour cost. The same is true for the overall share of
debts, while the coeﬃcient is negative and becomes significant towards the
end of the period when we consider the long-term debts. These last two
results can be signals that the firm substituted its already existing long-term
debts with the concessional loan associated with the subsidy and increased
the amount of short-term debts. We find, moreover, no coherent diﬀerences
for the average cost of capital, even if there are some hints of reduction at the
end of the period. Lastly, the confidence intervals do not allow to exclude a
null eﬀect for the profitability indexes too.
Discussion of the results There can be several reasons explaining why
the detected signals of eﬃcacy of the policy are very weak.
The first one is clearly that the eﬀectiveness of the policy has been very
limited and that the Fund’s attempt to stimulate R&D investments substan-
tially failed; in this case public funding would have completely substituted
the already existing private one and no additional investment would have
been performed. The presence of a substitution eﬀect between private finan-
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cial resources and public ones is coherent with the negative coeﬃcient for the
share of long-term debts.
A second possibility is that the dimensions we are considering do not
capture the eﬀects of the policy. Given the current Italian laws, expenditures
for R&D projects with a prevailing share of development costs have to be
included in investments and therefore we should be suﬃciently confident
that this set of variables captures the additional expenditures due to the
subsidized project while it is in progress. Some doubts can be cast on the
capability of the monitored variables to capture the consequences after the
conclusion of the project: there could be a time lag before its results aﬀect
the performance and the characteristics of the firm, in terms of sales or even
of introduction of the innovation in the production structure of the firm;
the subsidized projects should aim at the industrial development of applied
projects and therefore their use within the firm should be carried out shortly,
but given the limited number of available years after the completion of the
projects we cannot completely rule out this case. Anyway, if there are no
hints of stimulation in the behaviour of the firm when the project is still in
progress, the monitoring of the behaviour of the firm after the conclusion of
the project becomes less relevant since the subsidy probably did not triggered
any additionality eﬀect.
Another possibility is that the precision of the estimates is too low to
allow a reliable estimate of the eﬀects. This could be the case in particular
for the FTI special section, where the number of observations is low, while
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for the general section this risk should be less relevant. Another source of low
precision in the estimates could come from the fact that the relevance of the
subsidized project for the firm is relatively small and therefore its impact on
the behaviour is hidden by the overall noise in the variation of the variables.
We checked this possibility in Section 3.5, where we restricted the sample
to the firms with the highest subsidy over overall net investments ratio; the
policy seems to be ineﬀective once again, suggesting that this should not be
the case.
Other reasons to explain the results could come from the required hy-
potheses for the unbiasedness of the estimates, in particular from the as-
sumption that the control group is not aﬀected by the policy. The subsidy
may indirectly aﬀect the activity of the control group because the unsub-
sidized firms indirectly benefit from the policy by means of spillovers from
the R&D activity of the subsidized firms. Spillovers require some already
acquired knowledge to be "spilled over"; moreover a reasonable amount of
time is usually required for knowledge to spread. For these two reasons,
this possibility should not be particularly relevant during the progress of the
project, while it could be after its conclusion.
3.3.3 FTI special section
To analyse the eﬀectiveness of the special section of the FTI we used a regres-
sion discontinuity design approach. The reason for the diﬀerent approach is
that in this case the natural control group is made up of the rejected firms
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and this group of firms can intrinsically diﬀer from the treated ones because
the ranking is a signal that they are worse. The regression discontinuity de-
sign approach allows us to tackle this problem, because we locally compare
the firms immediately before and after the cutoﬀ between subsidized and
unsubsidized firms, which are the most similar between the two groups.
As the rankings of the three calls for applications are not comparable,
we create a new variable Rˆij, which we call normalized ranking, giving the
relative distance of each firm from the last ranked subsidized firm:
Rˆij = 1−
Rij
R¯j
where RijR¯j is the ratio between the position of the firm in the raw ranking and
the ranking of the last subsidized firm. Therefore, all the subsidized firms
have a value of normalized ranking between 1 and 0; the last subsidized firm
has a value R˜j = 0 ∀j for all the call for applications. For the subsidized
firms of a specific call for application, the normalized ranking gives the share
of subsidized firms with a worse relative position. The normalized ranking
is negative for the rejected firms; the number of rejected firms included be-
tween 0 and -1 is the same as the number of subsidized firms. Given that
the overlapping in the timing of the calls for applications is strong and we
have few observations for each call, we estimated the eﬀects for the three
calls together, including fixed eﬀects to take into account the presence of
heterogeneity between calls. We order the firms according to the normalized
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ranking (which is our forcing variable in the terminology of the regression
discontinuity design) and we estimate the relationship between this variable
and the outcome separately for treated and controls.52
We cannot check the counterfactual hypothesis (34), but we can reason-
ably reject it in the case treated and controls around the cutoﬀ are diﬀerent
on average in the pretreatment period. We can see the results of this com-
parison in Table 3.5. In the first two columns there are the comparisons for
the full sample, while in the third and the fourth ones the sample of the
controls has been restricted to those with a normalized ranking of at least -1,
which implies that we considered approximately the same number of treated
and controls. Treated firms invest slightly more than controls in the pre-
treatment year, but the diﬀerence is not significant. Dimension, profitability
and long-term debts are very similar. One possible reason for this strong
similarity is that the main criteria of the rankings are novelty of the project
and cooperation with other firms and public research centers, which are not
directly related to the economic and financial structure of firms.
In Figure 3.3 are presented the semiparametric estimates and the 95 per
cent confidence intervals of the relationship between normalized ranking and
the outcome variables for the net overall investments variables, scaled by the
three dimensional variables.53 Table 3.6 shows the value of the jump between
52The ICT call for applications awarded subsidies to some low ranking firms because the
call reserved some funds to specific projects. We excluded these firms from the analysis.
53The graphs for the other variables are not shown for sake of brevity, but they are
available.
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the estimates for treated and controls at the cutoﬀ and the bootstrapped
standard errors of the eﬀect of the policy. In the estimation we used a
triangular kernel, which has good boundary properties, and added dummies
for call for applications, geographical area and technological sector. The
optimal bandwidth has been separately calculated for treated and controls
using the rule of thumb from Silverman (1986). The standard errors of the
jump have been calculated using a bootstrap procedure with 200 replications
stratified by technological level.
The outcome variable in the case of the investments variables is the cu-
mulated sum of (overall or intangible) net investments between 2003 and
2007, either in raw levels or scaled by a dimensional variable taken from
the balance sheet of two years before the start of the policy measure (pre-
pretreatment year; 2001); in the other cases, we used either the log of the
mean (for sales, assets and capital) or the ratio of the means (for ROA and
ROE) in the period 2003-2007. The financial variables have not been in-
cluded in the analysis because we do not know the amount of the awarded
loan and the time structure of the subsidy and therefore we cannot remove
the amount associated with the subsidy from the variables as we did for the
general section.
The confidence interval of the diﬀerence in the estimates for treated and
controls does not allow to exclude a null eﬀect and the coeﬃcients are often
negative for net investments, dimension and profitability. In the case of net
intangible investments, the diﬀerence becomes significant, but negative.
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In Table 3.7 we report the alternative estimates obtained using a para-
metric specification of the relationship between outcome and forcing variable.
In this case too we included dummy variables for call for applications, geo-
graphical area and technological sector. In each column we used a polynomial
of a diﬀerent degree; in the first column it is a zero-degree polynomial, which
is equivalent to a mean comparison, in the other columns the relationship is
respectively linear and quadratic. The reported number is the value of the
coeﬃcient of the treatment dummy variable, which is the diﬀerence in the
estimates at the cutoﬀ.
Similarly to the semiparametric methodology, the confidence intervals of
the coeﬃcients do not usually allow to exclude a null eﬀect and, in the few
cases where the coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from zero, they are
negative. We can conclude, therefore, that, whatever is the methodology
we use, we do not detect signals that the policy measures from the special
section of the FTI have been able to induce diﬀerences in the behaviour of
treated and controls.
The possible reasons and their discussion for the results may be the same
as for the general section; there is only one more caveat: given the smaller
number of observations the results for the special section are slightly less
robust.
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3.4 FTI general section: robustness checks
The results we presented in the last Section are quite robust to several checks.
In this Section we examine two modifications in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach for the FTI general section: in the first one we introduce a caliper
in the matching procedure and we just consider the most similar matched
couples, while in the second one we expand our sample including all firms
observed in at least both the pre-pretreatment and the pretreatment years
(1999 and 2000) and one year in the treatment period (2001-2007).
3.4.1 Matching and caliper with radius at the median of the dis-
tance
In the first additional check, we use a variation of the matching methodology
(matching with caliper). After matching the observations, we consider the
distribution of the distance between treated and control for each matched
couple and we include in our sample only the couples with a lesser distance
than the median of the distribution. On one hand, the selected couples of the
sample will be the most similar and therefore the diﬀerence in their behaviour
is a better proxy for the eﬃciency of the policy; on the other hand, we halve
the sample and therefore its properties are less well approximated by those
implied by the asymptotic theory.
The balancing properties of the sample matched with this methodology
are reported in the last two columns of Table 3.3. No mean diﬀerence is
significant and in most cases the p-value is higher than before.
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The results of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are reported in Table
3.8. For sake of brevity we just show the estimates for the overall investments,
but the conclusions are quite similar for the other variables too. We do not
find any substantial diﬀerence with the eﬀects reported in Table 3.4a: all the
confidence intervals do not allow to exclude a null eﬀect and sometimes the
coeﬃcients are negative.
3.4.2 Unbalanced panel
In the balanced panel we only included in the sample the firms with a com-
plete time series in all the considered years. We now relax this assumption
and include also firms with breaks in the time series or that left the panel
for any reason before the end of the considered period. We include, there-
fore, all the firms with at least two observations in the pre-pretreatment and
in the pretreatment years (1999 and 2000) and one observation during the
treatment period (2001-2007).The eﬀects of this change of sample are sev-
eral. Now we can use more observations and therefore the properties of the
sample are better approximated by those implied by the asymptotic theory.
Moreover, the sample now includes also the firms which ended their activity
before the end of the period; it is therefore more representative of the overall
impact of the policy. The most important negative consequence is that now
the panel changes its composition every year and the results are less stable.
The matching procedure has been repeated in each year and the pairing can
change over time.
147
The results for investments are reported in Table 3.9.54 We find some pos-
itive significant eﬀects at the beginning of the period for gross investments,
while for net investments the confidence intervals do not allow to exclude a
null eﬀect for the whole time period.
3.5 FTI general section: evaluation of the eﬀectiveness
in subsamples
We now examine whether the subsidies from the FTI general section have
been successful in stimulating the investments for some subsamples, where
we could expect a stronger eﬀect of the policy. For each of them, we calcu-
lated the eﬀect of the policy on net and gross investments ratios using the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach with matching. The mean diﬀerences in
the pretreatment year before and after the matching for the three considered
subsamples are reported in Tables a3.4, a3.5 and a3.6 in the appendix.
A first group we consider are small and medium firms; the rules of the
policy are somehow more favourable for them: the paid net overall subsidy
is at least 10 per cent higher; moreover, the criteria of selection are looser: a
direct contribution to R&D is not required and they can simply coordinate
an external R&D eﬀort; the benchmarks for the evaluation of the novelty
of the project, of its financial sustainability and of its economic impact are
slightly relaxed; big firms are also required to formally show additionality
54The balancing properties for the overall subsample of firms entering the estimation in
at least one year are shown in the appendix in Table a3.3.
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with respect to the customary R&D activity. This more favourable treatment
for small and medium firms is justified by the fundamental role that they have
in the Italian economy, by the scale economies existing in the organization of
the R&D activity and the appropriation of its results and by the more severe
constraints that small and medium firms usually experience in access to the
credit markets. The results for this subsample are reported in Table 3.10.
A second subsample includes the firms with a higher average debt cost
than the median of the distribution of this variable. These firms are more
likely to experience borrowing constraints, because the higher average debt
cost implies that lenders have perceived them as riskier. Moreover, even in
the absence of strict borrowing constraints, the cost of additional financial
resources in the market is probably higher for these firms; because the amount
of subsidy received through the concessional rate of the loan is calculated on
the market rate and not on the opportunity cost of capital of the firm, the
amount of subsidy actually received by these firms is higher than the figure
oﬃcially stated by the Ministry. Both these facts imply that the eﬀectiveness
of the policy for this group of firms can be stronger than for the other firms.
The results are reported in Table 3.11.
In the third subsample there are the firms whose subsidy over net invest-
ments ratio is higher than the median of the distribution of this variable.
This ratio should capture how relevant the subsidy is with respect to the
investment activity of the firm. A high ratio implies that a large share of the
overall investments plans is subsidized and therefore we can expect that the
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impact on the overall behaviour of the firm is more likely to be significant.
The results in this case are reported in Table 3.12.
The results are very similar for the three subsamples. We find positive
coeﬃcients and sometimes the confidence intervals allow us to exclude a null
impact, showing that the signals of eﬀectiveness of the policy are slightly
stronger than for the full sample. But these positive results are quite isolated:
we do not find any positive consistently significant temporal trend and even
in each year a significantly positive coeﬃcient is not confirmed by the other
considered variables. We cannot therefore conclude with certainty that the
policy had an overall positive eﬀect even for these subgroups of firms.
3.6 Conclusions
In this work we have analysed the eﬀectiveness of the Italian Fund for Tech-
nological Innovation development subsidies.
We separately examined the subsidies supplied by the general and the spe-
cial purpose sections of this Fund. For the former, we used both a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach and a regression discontinuity design one. We have
not been able to detect consistent signals of eﬀectiveness on gross, net and
intangible investments. When we checked the eﬀect on the other variables,
the confidence intervals do not allow to exclude null eﬀects on employment,
sales, capital, labour productivity, labour costs, financial structure and prof-
itability. We found a positive eﬀect on the overall value of assets; this result,
given that we cannot rule out a null eﬀect on investments and capital, sug-
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gests that the subsidy has been mainly used by firms to finance current assets.
The results are similar under several additional robustness checks.
When we consider three subsamples of firms where the policy could have
been more eﬀective (small and medium firms, those with high average debt
costs, those with a high subsidy over net investment ratio) we only find very
weak hints of eﬀectiveness. The results are the same also for the special
purpose section of the FTI: in this case we used a regression discontinuity
design approach and we have not been able to detect signals of eﬀects either
on investments or on any other considered variable.
151
3.7 Tables and Figures
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
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3.8.2 FTI general section: regression discontinuity design
We implement here the regression continuity design to the unmatched sample
of the FTI general section using the date of submission of the applications
as the forcing variable. We want to understand if the results are the same
when we compare firms applying immediately before and after the date of
suspension of the assessment of the applications.55
We focus our analysis in this appendix on investments, which are our
most important outcomes; the results for all the mean values of the other
considered variables (dimension, financial structure, etc.) in the treatment
period are not reported for sake of brevity, but they are very similar to those
reported in the main text and are available on request. The outcome variables
we use here are the cumulated sum of gross and net investments in the
treatment period (2001-2007), divided by a dimensional variable calculated
in the pre-pretreatment year (1999).
The estimates of the eﬀect of the policy and the bootstrapped standard
errors for investments when we use either a nonparametric or a semipara-
metric methodology are shown in Table a3.8. We use a triangular kernel
and, in the semiparametric case, we add geographical area and technological
55To ensure that the hypotheses of the regression discontinuity design were satisfied we
used here a diﬀerent procedure to polish data: instead of removing the first and the last
percentile of the variations, we eliminated the first and the last percentile of the levels of the
outcome variables in the pretreatment year and in the average of the treatment years. This
procedure is less eﬀective in the elimination of the outliers, but allows the construction
of a more homogeneous sample, improving comparability in absence of matching. The
balancing properties of the final sample are shown in Table a3.7, both for the full sample
and for the restricted local sample of firms applying between 90 days before and 90 days
after the cutoﬀ date.
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sector dummies. The bandwidth is separately determined for treated and
controls using the rule of thumb procedure suggested by Silverman (1986).
The standard errors of the jump are calculated using a bootstrap procedure
with 200 replications stratified per technological level. Once again, almost all
the estimates are not significant, with the exception of the semiparametric
estimates for the cumulated net investments over employees.
In Table a3.9 are reported the results for investments when we use a para-
metric specification of the relationship between outcome and forcing variable,
in a polynomial form. In the first three columns we respectively use polyno-
mials of degree zero, one and two. While there seems to be some significant
diﬀerences in the raw mean comparison in the first column, their significance
is not confirmed when we consider the linear or the quadratic specification.
In the forth column we include geographical area and technological sector
dummies in the linear specification; under our hypotheses there should be
no correlation between treatment assignment and the dummy variables in a
neighbourhood of the cutoﬀ and we expect therefore the results to be very
similar to the second column. The results are confirmed.
In the last column we consider a linear local polynomial regression re-
stricting the sample to the firms applying between 90 days before and after
the day of suspension of the assessment of the applications. This subsample
includes around one half of the applications. The estimated diﬀerences are
slightly bigger in this case and the coeﬃcients are weakly significant only
when the denominator is the number of employees.
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3.8.3 Tables for the regression discontinuity design
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4 Dynamics of R&D investments and the value
of the firm
4.1 Introduction
The economic literature has investigated the relationship between the value of
a firm and its knowledge capital stock since the pioneering work of Griliches
(1981). It defined the basic static framework of all the following research
on this subject. Many advances have been achieved in the field since then.
Almost all of them have been based on empirical studies, while the theoretical
framework is still only partially developed.
In this work, we examine some sectorial empirical evidence regarding the
relationship and we try to explain some puzzling results using a simple model
of firm choices where we introduce uncertainty in the results of R&D activity,
an element not fully taken into account in the previous studies.
In more detail, in the first half of our work, we derive some empirical
results about the relationship between the value of a firm and the knowledge
and physical capital assets, sector by sector, in the U.S. manufacturing in-
dustries for the period 1975-1995. We see that the theoretical assumptions
of the relationship used by many previous studies may have eﬀects in terms
of eﬃciency of the estimates. We find a high level of heterogeneity in the co-
eﬃcients of diﬀerent sectors, which could cast some doubts on the validity of
the results of the previous analyses usually postulating the same relationship
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in all sectors after controlling for fixed eﬀects. When separating the current
research eﬀort from the past one, often the eﬀect of current R&D is much
weaker than that one of past R&D and sometimes is negative.
The usual theoretical framework is not able to explain these results and
therefore we develop, in the second half of the chapter, a simple model where
there is uncertainty about the results of R&D investments. The fundamental
improvements of our model upon the previous theoretical framework are the
introduction of a risk of failure in R&D activity and the explicit consideration
of the time dimension. They are relevant because there is a lag between a
R&D investment and the achievement of its results on the knowledge asset. In
the meantime, the value of a firm will take into account not only the current
assets, but also the expected value of the potential ones. Moreover, since
research is a risky activity, there can be a diﬀerent valuation of the already
concretized assets and of those still at a work-in-progress stage. Risk-averse
investors can penalize the expected returns of the latter in the determination
of the market value of the firm. Therefore, when investors are risk averse
and managers maximize the long-run value of the firm, the risk associated
with work-in-progress R&D can reduce the short-run firm value even if its
expected value grows in the long run.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 examines the
past literature on the subject, highlighting and discussing the most relevant
results; Section 4.3 estimates and interprets our empirical results on the
relationship between firm value and its determinants; Section 4.4 develops
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the dynamic model and discusses its implications for firm value; Section 4.5
concludes and highlights the main results and further directions of research.
4.2 Literature review
The relationship between firm value and knowledge assets has been examined
in many empirical works over the last thirty years. In almost all cases, the
estimations consider U.S. firms during the 1970s and the 1980s.
The first attempt at this work is undertaken by Griliches (1981), who
delimits the framework of most of the following works. The starting point of
his analysis is the following static definition:
V = q (γA+K)
where V is the value of the firm, K and A are, respectively, the conventional
and the knowledge stock of assets and q is the current market valuation of
each unit of asset, reflecting market conditions and the firm’s position in the
market.
After some manipulations and approximations, we derive the estimated
equation:
ln (Q) = γ
A
K
+ d+ u
where Q = VK is the usual Tobin’s Q, d is a dummy vector capturing the
eﬀects due to the temporal and the cross-sectional dimensions of fixed eﬀects
and u is the error term.
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The number of patents and a weighted sum of current and past R&D
expenditure approximate the knowledge stock. The coeﬃcients of all these
variables are positive and significant. Including a lagged Q term results
in the past R&D coeﬃcients becoming much less significant and sometimes
negative. This fact has been interpreted by Griliches as a sign that changes
in the market valuation are due to the unanticipated component of current
R&D. Other regressions decomposing the R&D eﬀect in the predicted and
surprise components seem to confirm such an interpretation.
Griliches’ analysis leaves many unanswered questions and encourages sev-
eral extensions. One of the most interesting works in subsequent years is
Pakes (1985), which tries further to develop the relationships between firm
value, patents, anticipated and unanticipated R&D. Pakes’ first step is the
construction of a simple theoretical framework based upon the investment
theory of Lucas and Prescott (1971).
The research program of a firm may be modeled as a sequence of random
variables, which are the R&D investments in each future period. The man-
agement of the firm modifies the program in each period to maximize the
expected discounted value of profits derived from the program subject to the
previous R&D expenditures and any other currently available information.
Under the hypothesis of rational expectations, the impact on program
value caused by the update in the information set in each period is assumed
to be white noise. The same is true for the diﬀerence between the valuation
of the management and that of the market. The observed one period rate of
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return on the equity market will therefore be equal to the sum of the market
interest rate and these last two white noises.
A consequence of profit maximization is that the chosen level of R&D is
a function of the unexpected gains and losses in the value of the program.
To complete the model, the patent stock generating function is assumed to
depend on the eﬀective value of the research program and on the propensity
to patent (assumed once again to be white noise) in each previous period.
The three equations of the model are
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
qt = t + η1,t
rt = c (L) t
pt = d (L) t + b (L) η3,t
where qt is the portion of the rate of return in excess of the market rate, rt is
the logarithm of the expenditure in R&D, pt is the logarithm of the patent
stock, t, η1,t and η3,t are independent white noises associated respectively
with the innovation in the information set of the management, with the
diﬀerence of valuation between the market and the management and with
the propensity to patent in period t, L is the lag operator, the functions in
L are polinomials of the kind c (L) =
P∞
τ=0 cτL
τ . Pakes assumes b0 = 1.
After some manipulations, the three equations can be one-by-one recur-
sively estimated in the following constrained autoregressive formulation:
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⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
qt = f1 (L) qt−1 + f2 (L) rt−1 + f3 (L) pt−1 + η1,t
rt = c0
σ2
σ2q
qt + f4 (L) rt−1 + η2,t
pt = f5 (L) rt + f6 (L) pt−1 + η3,t
where η2,t can be expressed as a function of
σ2
σ2q
, t and η1,t and is uncorrelated
with both qt and the past values of all the variables; the polynomials fi (L)
∀i can be expressed as functions of b (L), c (L) and d (L). The results from
this estimation are compared with a similar non-recursive VAR model and
with an unrestricted model where all the current and past values of the
variables were included in all the equations. An initial result is that, while
the exclusion of zt from the rt and qt equations is confirmed, the same is
not true for ut in the rt equation. However, in general, the restricted model
seems to be coherent with the estimation results. We have a confirmation of
the link between positive changes in the firm value and those in R&D and in
the patent policies; the latter relationship is noisier, because changes in the
propensity to patent do not aﬀect the rt and qt equations.
A later work by Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1991) reinterprets and further
develops these results. The basic theory tested in the work is that, in the
framework of Pakes (1985), R&D activity is subject to the eﬀects of market
shocks (linked to demand and therefore associated with the ut term of Pakes
(1985)) and technological opportunities (linked to supply and therefore as-
sociated with the et term). If the patent stock generating process is not
influenced by demand factors, we can use it to discriminate between demand
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and supply shocks. Except for the pharmaceutical industry, the attempt
fails because of the noisiness in the patents data due to the changes in the
propensity to patent.
Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2005) use a citation weighted patents stock
as a proxy for the knowledge capital to explore the relationship between firm
value and knowledge stock using the framework from Griliches (1981). The
results are quite coherent with previous ones. R&D explains the changes in
firm value better than the patents stock, but the weighted patents stock is a
much better index than the simple one and it does not lose much significance
when both R&D and weighted patents stock are included.
An interpretational issue arises if the weighted patents stock and a func-
tion of past R&D expenditures either are or are not two equivalent proxies
of the knowledge stock. A good reason why the two can measure diﬀerent
aspects is that R&D expenditure is an input of the knowledge creation pro-
cess and therefore is an index of the initial eﬀort, while the patent stock is
the output and hence is nearer to a measure of the success of the process.
Apart from the works examined in these few pages, there are many other
studies worth noting. Just to cite some of them, Hall (1993) finds hints
of structural changes in the valuation of intangible R&D assets after 1985.
Johnson and Pazderka (1993) examine how the eﬀect of R&D onmarket value
changes in the presence of market power in the Canadian market. Blundell,
Griﬃth and Van Reenen (1999) find that firms with a larger market share
experiment more innovations and their market value benefits more from it.
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4.3 Some empirical results
We begin our investigation with an empirical microeconometric analysis of
the relationship between firm value and knowledge capital. We use observa-
tions at the firm level from the Compustat database in the period 1975-1995.
The Compustat dataset allows us to know the balance sheet data and
several other indexes of the U.S. firms since the 1950. We extract data about
a subset of firms that consistently did R&D activity in the considered period.
We deflate all the nominal variables using the U.S. GDP deflator, we clean
the datasets removing the duplicated observations and the firms experiencing
substantial mergers and acquisitions, erasing the first and last percentile of all
the used variables (except R&D, where we just removed the last percentile).
The final version of our dataset contains about 20000 observations re-
garding 1600 firms. A subset of observations had crucial missing variables
and therefore the available observations for estimation were about 14000.
We construct now the variables. The knowledge capital of the firm is
approximated using the cumulated overall R&D stock, constructed with the
perpetual inventory method. In each period, we add the current R&D ex-
penditure (proxy for the contribution to the knowledge capital in the current
period) to the discounted stock of past R&D, a proxy for the current value
of past ideas; we assume that past ideas become obsolete over time and lose
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15 per cent of their current value after each year:56
R&Dcumt = (1− δ)R&Dcumt−1 +R&Dt
= 0.85R&Dcumt−1 +R&Dt
=
∞X
i=0
(1− δ)iR&Dt−i.
The use of the same depreciation rate for all the economic sectors is
clearly a strong assumption and we will see in our analysis that it can be the
reason behind some results. Unfortunately, estimations of sector-by-sector
depreciation rates are not currently available and therefore we have to rely
on this simplifying assumption.
There is one more source of bias in the construction of the cumulated R&D
stock. We restricted the subset of observations to the firms with no missing
data on R&D in the period 1975-1995. In the construction of the cumulated
R&D stock, we also used the data for the period 1950-1975 to improve the
accuracy of our index. Unfortunately, the available data about this period
are not complete and there are firms beginning their activity before 1950.
Therefore, sometimes the stock slightly underestimates the eﬀective amount
of accumulated knowledge capital.
We construct two other variables. The value of the firm is the sum of
the total current value of the outstanding shares (end of the fiscal year value
of one share times the number of shares corrected to take into account the
56This value for the depreciation rate is common in the literature. See for example
Cockburn and Griliches (1988), Hall (1993), Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2000).
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preferred ones), of the total dividend paid to the shareholders and of the
long and short-term debt. The conventional capital stock is the sum of the
net book value of plants and equipment, of the inventory, of investments in
unconsolidated subsidiaries: it includes all the assets of the firm except that
of knowledge.
Following the previous empirical literature, we work on a linear version
of the relationship between the market value of the firm (Vt), the value of the
physical assets (Kt) and that one of the knowledge capital, approximated by
the discounted sum of past and current R&D (R&Dcumt)
Vt = a0 + a1Kt + a2R&Dcumt + η. (35)
This equation can also be seen as a linear approximation of the equation
(43) of the model derived in the next Section.
In equation (35) we neglect labour and other variable inputs because we
suppose they are always adjusted to their optimal value and, therefore, they
are a function of the other variables. This means that our coeﬃcients in the
empirical analysis will include the indirect eﬀect of the capital and knowledge
stocks through the adjustment of the employed variable inputs.
In a second stage of the analysis, we weaken the assumption that past and
current R&D have the same eﬀect. Therefore, we split the cumulated R&D
stock in two terms: current R&D and cumulated past R&D (R&Dpastt),
which is the overall cumulated R&D stock, calculated using the methodology
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we explained before, net of the current R&D contribution. We can write the
definition of the cumulated past R&D stock as
R&Dpastt = (1− δ) (R&Dpastt−1 +R&Dt−1)
=
∞X
i=1
(1− δ)iR&Dt−i.
The estimated equation in this case will be
Vt = a0 + a1Kt + a2R&Dpastt + a3R&Dt + η. (36)
Given the variables and the equations, we begin our analysis examining
the descriptive statistics. In Table 4.1, we see the overall descriptive statis-
tics. In general, we notice an extremely high level of dispersion, given by the
fact that for all the variables the standard deviation is at least three times
the average value. The distributions are extremely skewed towards the left,
with the mean after the 75th percentile.
The extremely high dispersion suggests that a sector-by-sector analysis
can allow us to take into account one of the most likely sources of hetero-
geneity and that therefore we can improve the quality of our analysis.
In Table 4.2, we see the disaggregation used in the analysis, based on
the ISIC code. In general, we use a two-digit codification, but in some cases
we have enough observations to consider a finer disaggregation to highlight
important sectors, which show a diﬀerent behaviour from the rest of the two
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digit classification parent sector.
Table 4.3 reports the descriptive statistics sector by sector. The ratio
between the standard deviation and the mean is now generally between 1.5
and 2 for all the variables, a sign that the between sectors component of the
heterogeneity is quite relevant. The analysis of the structure of percentiles
shows us that the diﬀerences between sectors are not only in the magnitude
of the means, but also in the shape of the distributions.
Almost all the sectors where internal heterogeneity is still particularly
relevant are those producing high technology output (computers, electrical
equipment, electronic components, precision instruments...). A possible rea-
son is that the technological innovation rate is particularly high in these
sectors and there is less standardization of the production system of firms.
These sectors will show a diﬀerent behaviour from the others in the rest of
the analysis, with an extremely significant positive impact of current R&D.
We examine now the estimates of the relationship between the value of
the firm and the accumulated assets in an econometric framework. We use
a panel model allowing sector specific fixed eﬀects, but with common slopes
among sectors for the R&D regressors. The structure of the error term is
therefore η =
P
di+ε, where di are sectorial dummies and ε is the orthogonal
error term. We see the results in Table 4.4.
In the second half of the Table, we use our linear specification of the rela-
tionship (equations (35) and (36) of the previous discussion). Regression (3)
of the Table uses as a proxy for the knowledge capital the overall cumulated
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R&D stock, while we split this regressor in current R&D and past cumu-
lated R&D in regression (4). All the variables have positive and strongly
significant coeﬃcients; the R2 is quite high.
It is clear comparing their coeﬃcients and from simple equality tests
that current and past R&D have strongly diﬀerent eﬀects on the market
value; therefore, the use of the overall cumulated R&D stock can be a wrong
approximation. Moreover, we see that the eﬀect of current R&D is stronger
than that of cumulated past R&D at this level of aggregation.
The traditional specification pioneered by Griliches (1981) and then used
in most of the following studies is estimated in the first half of Table 4.4 using
the final form ln (Q) = ln( VK ) = a0 + a1γ
A
K + η. The lower R
2 with respect
to our linear specification is partially due to the eﬀect of the dimension,
which is removed in Griliches’ version. However, in this case the estimation
results improve much more when decomposing the R&D stock, suggesting
that the restrictions induced by the approximation used to develop Griliches’
relationship should be carefully considered.
In Table 4.5, we estimate completely separate regressions for each sector
using our specification. We immediately see that the previous fixed eﬀects
model hardly explains the diﬀerences between sectors. Not only the constant
terms, but also the other coeﬃcients are strongly diﬀerent among sectors,
implying that the eﬀects of our independent variables are quite heteroge-
neous. The relevant increase of the R2 observed in many sectors confirms
this fact. Moreover, the restriction that the coeﬃcients are equal in all sectors
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is rejected when tested with equality tests.
We can find several reasons to explain this result.
First, we are using a linear approximation. If the returns from the ac-
cumulated assets are not linear in the quantity of the asset, sectors that, on
average, are more knowledge intensive or invest more in conventional capital
will show diﬀerent coeﬃcients from the others.
A second reason could be that sectors are extremely heterogeneous. In
this case, the previous studies based on the aggregate observations would be
just partially reliable.
Another result worthy of note regards the R&D coeﬃcients. In most
sectors we have a very small eﬀect of current R&D, while the eﬀect of past
R&D is more relevant. Sometimes the current R&D coeﬃcient is strongly
negative, a result in contrast with the hypothesis that the firm is maximizing
its profits: indeed, if the eﬀect on the value of a firm is negative the optimal
choice would be not to invest in research.
The most relevant exceptions to this behaviour are the pharmaceutical
sector (ISIC 2423) and the highly technological ones (ISIC 3000-3300), where
the technological cycle is faster than in the others. Strongly significant pos-
itive coeﬃcients of current R&D show the high value of innovations in these
sectors. The rate of depreciation is likely to be much larger than in the
other sectors and this fact explains why the contribution of past R&D to the
market value is usually near zero.57
57The large number of observations in the high tech sectors may be the reason why
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We try to explain why current R&D has small or negative eﬀect on the
market value in many sectors with a model that examines the choices of the
firm and its market value in presence of uncertainty about the results of R&D
activity.
4.4 Firm value, knowledge capital and R&D in a dy-
namic model
As we saw in Section 4.2, almost all the works concerning the relationship
between knowledge stock and firm value are based on the static definitional
model proposed by Griliches (1981).
In this Section we try to analyse the relationship in a slightly diﬀerent
framework: a simple dynamic theoretical scheme based on the maximizing
choices of a firm. It allows us to analyse the consequences of an R&D decision
during the diﬀerent stages of the process. The most important innovations
of this framework with respect to the static model of Griliches (1981) are
the time dimension and the presence of uncertainty in research activity; a
consequence is that we must take into account not only the accumulated
knowledge stock, but also the work-in-progress R&D eﬀort in determining
the value of the firm. We see that this fact can be particularly relevant to
explain our previous empirical results if the market is risk averse and therefore
penalizes the uncertainty of a R&D investment before its conclusion.
in the fixed eﬀects model with common slopes the dominant behaviour is a significantly
positive eﬀect of current R&D.
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Let us consider a profit maximizing firm producing one good; it sells its
product in a perfectly competitive market, where the market price of the
product is normalized to 1.
A continuously diﬀerentiable quasiconcave function describes production;
we suppose it shows increasing returns to scale for small quantities of product
and decreasing returns for large quantities:
Yt = AtF (Kt, Lt) (37)
where At is the accumulated knowledge asset, Kt is the net physical capital
and Lt is the labour, whose supply is infinitely elastic given the wage wt.58
We can formally state our assumption on the returns to scale of the
production function saying that ∃Q¯ ∈ R+ satisfying the following property:
— ∀K,L such that F (K,L) = Q < Q¯⇒ F (kK, kL) < kQ ∀k ∈ (0, 1)
— ∀K,L such that F (K,L) = Q > Q¯⇒ F (kK, kL) < kQ ∀k ∈ (1,+∞)
Capital is accumulated through investment, without any adjustment costs,
but with a constant depreciation rate δ:
Kt = δKt−1 + it. (38)
Therefore, physical investment has an immediate eﬀect on the capital
stock. We use this timing to simplify the analysis of the capital accumulation,
58This hypothesis about the production function is coherent with the perfect competition
assumption; moreover, it allows us to be sure that the solution of the maximization problem
implies a finite and strictly positive output at firm level.
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which is not our main aim in this work.
The firm can invest in R&D to increase its knowledge assets. The formal-
ization of the R&D process is the focal point of our analysis. We assume that
in each period the firm receives opportunities of investment in R&D, which
could yield an increase of the knowledge asset in the following period. Given
a research expense of R&Dt at time t, at the beginning of period t+1 (before
taking decisions regarding capital investments, R&D, etc.) the firm observes
the results of the investment. With probability π, it is successful and yields
an increase of the knowledge asset of ∆At+1 = γR&D
ρ
t with 0 < ρ < 1. With
probability 1− π, it fails and the knowledge asset remains the same value as
in period t.
Therefore, we consider two elements in the creation of knowledge asset
that make it diﬀerent from the physical asset accumulation. The first one
is uncertainty: there is a probability that the investment will be unfruitful.
The second is the presence of diminishing returns to R&D.
The last constraint states the equality between sources and uses of funds:
Yt = wtLt + it + dt +R&Dt. (39)
The returns from sales in each period t are employed to pay wages (wt)
and dividends (dt)and to finance investments in physical capital (it) and R&D
(R&Dt).
The value of the firm on the financial market, under the hypotheses that
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investors are risk neutral and that managers maximize the expected value of
profits, is given by the following Bellman equation:
Vt = max
ct
[dt + βEt (Vt+1)] (40)
where ct = {dt, Lt, it, R&Dt} is the vector with the choice variables of the
firm and β is the discount factor.
Proposition 9 Maximization of the value function (40) subject to the pro-
duction function (37), the capital accumulation equation (38), the resources
constraint (39) and the accumulation process of At implies the following
optimality conditions, which determine the optimal Kt, Lt and R&Dt:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
AtFK (Kt, Lt) = 1− βδ
AtFL (Kt, Lt) = wt
R&Dt =
"
γρ
∞P
j=1
βj
jP
i=1
¡j−1
i−1
¢
πi (1− π)j−i F
¡
K∗,it+j, L
∗,i
t+j
¢# 11−ρ (41)
where K∗,it+j and L
∗,i
t+j are the optimal values of K and L in period t + j in
case the R&D activity has been successful i times between t and t+ j; these
values are implicitly determined by the first order conditions of the following
periods.
Proof. From the first order conditions of the intertemporal profit maximiza-
tion problem.59
59The second order conditions are satisfied at the critical points given the hypothesis of
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If we assume wt to be constant (a reasonable hypothesis in a short-run
analysis) and complementarity between K and L, we see the following dy-
namics. The optimal quantities of physical capital and labour used in the
process are constant for a given At. If the R&D activity is successful, At
increases and therefore the optimal amounts of used capital and labour in-
crease too. R&Dt is an increasing function of the optimal values of K and L
in case of success and of the parameters β, π, γ and ρ. This means that the
chosen level of R&D is larger when the firm gives more value to the future,
when there is a larger probability of successful research and when the loss
of eﬃciency due to the diminishing returns to R&D is smaller. Moreover,
because the optimal values of K and L increase when research is successful,
the R&D level increases after each success.60
Let us now analyse the dynamics of the dividend and of the value function
following the investment in R&D. Once again, wages are supposed to be
constant.
To be able to observe the eﬀects of the investment in each period, we
consider, in this first step of the analysis, a firm that did not make R&D
investments in the past. In period t, the firm can exploit an unexpected
research opportunity, whose results will be observed in the following period
quasiconcavity of the production function.
60Larger firms have more incentives to invest in R&D, because the output taking ad-
vantage of a successful research is larger.
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t+ 1. In the periods up to t− 1 the dividend of the firm will be:
d1 = A1F (K1, L1)− wL1 − (1− δ)K1 (42)
where K1 and L1 are the optimal values of K and L given A1 and the other
parameters.
The value of the firm up to t− 1 will be
V1 = d1 + βd1 + β2d1 + . . . =
d1
1− β .
We can interpret the value V1 as the static value of the firm at time t−1, which
is the value produced by the already accumulated physical and knowledge
assets.
At time t there is a research opportunity where R&D > 0 is optimal in
our framework. Therefore, the firm decides to invest a positive quantity of
R&D. The dividend in this period is
d2 = d1 −R&D.
In the case in which R&D is unfruitful, the firm comes back to the previous
dividend d1 in all the periods after t. Hence, the value is again V1 from period
t+ 1.
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If the research investment is successful, the dividend in period t+ 1 is
d3 = (A1 + γR&Dρ)F (K2, L2)− wL2 −K2 + δK1
where K2 and L2 are the new optimal values of K and L given the increased
value of A. The value of the dividend in t+2 and in the following periods is
d4 = (A1 + γR&Dρ)F (K2, L2)− wL2 − (1− δ)K2.
In the case of success, the value of the firm is from period t+ 2
V4 = d4 + βd4 + β2d4 + . . . =
d4
1− β
while in period t+ 1 it is
V3 = d3 + βd4 + β2d4 + . . .
= d4 − δ (K2 −K1) + βd4 + β2d4 + . . .
= V4 − δ (K2 −K1) .
In period t, because of the uncertainty of the R&D investment, the value
function is
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V2 = d2 + β [πV3 + (1− π)V1] (43)
= (1− βπ)V1 + βπV3 −R&D
= V1 + βπ (V3 − V1)−R&D.
The value of the firm in this period is equal to the value due to the already
accumulated physical and knowledge assets (which is V1) plus the expected
discounted profits from the investment, net of the R&D expenditures.
Proposition 10 Given the dynamics of the optimal production implied by
the first order conditions previously examined, if the research investment de-
cision is optimal, then V3 > V2 ≥ V1.
Moreover, if we assume FKL (K,L) > 0 ∀K,L, that is an increase in the
use of one production factor increases the marginal productivity of the other
factor (complementarity), then V4 > V3.
Proof. In each stage the optimal choices of the previous stages are still
available under the constraints of the problem, but they are not chosen.
Therefore, the new strategies yield a weakly higher value function.
The strong inequality V3 > V2 derives from the fact that V2 is a weighted
average of V3 and V1, net of the amount of the R&D expenditures.
Moreover, the hypothesis FKL > 0 and the first order conditions (41)
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imply
(At + γR&D
ρ
t )FK (Kt+1, Lt+1) = AtFK (Kt, Lt)
⇒ FK (Kt+1, Lt+1) < FK (Kt, Lt)
⇒ Kt+1 > Kt.
This fact and V3 = V4 − δ (K2 −K1) imply V4 > V3.
We see the resulting dynamics of the firm value in both cases of success
and failure in Figure 4.1.
The value of the firm weakly increases at time t after the investment in
R&D, even if there has not been any growth in knowledge capital and the
future increase is not sure, because of the uncertainty of the investment. This
is because the value function incorporates the expected profit value of the
investment and therefore, in our simplified case, it is an average of the profits
on the success and failure paths, weighted according to the probability of the
two events, net of the research costs.
In period t + 1, the firm observes the results of the investment. In the
case of success, the market value increases again to include all the profits due
to the investment in R&D (after one period of physical capital adjustment).
In the case of failure, it decreases to the value before the R&D investment.
Proposition 11 Let us consider the full dynamics assuming that there are
R&D opportunities in each period and the firm optimizes its R&D invest-
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ments. If we assume that R&D has been successful in the last period, we can
write the firm value after s successes in R&D activity:
V (s) =
∞X
r=0
(βπ)r
©
d[s+r] − [1− β (1− π)] δ
¡
K[s+r] −K[s+r−1]
¢ª
[1− β (1− π)]r+1
(44)
where d[s+r] and K[r+s] are the optimal dividend and capital after r + s suc-
cesses in research activity.61 ,62
Proof. Let us consider the definition of the value function at time t after s
successes:
Vt(s) =
∞X
r=0
βrEt (dt+r| s)
=
∞X
r=0
βr
rX
g=0
{P
h
dt+r[s+g]
i
d[s+g] +
−P
h
dt+r[s+g], d
t+r−1
[s+g−1]
i
δ
¡
K[s+g] −K[s+g−1]
¢}
where P
h
dt+r[s+g]
i
is the probability of receiving the dividend yielded after
s + g successes at time t + r and P
h
dt+r[s+g], d
t+r−1
[s+g−1]
i
is the probability of
achieving the (s+ g)-th success at time t+ r. We substitute the value of the
probabilities and simplify the power series.
Each time R&D is successful, the value function in the following periods
61The formula can be trivially adapted to the case of failure in R&D activity in the last
period.
62Under the hypothesis of free exit from the market, the market value must be positive.
In our analysis we assume V (s) < +∞. We can rule out the case V (s) = +∞ in a more
general analysis, where we consider the full behaviour of the market; we do not extend the
analysis in this direction because it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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is shifted upwards (Figure 4.2). The firm will be evaluated in each period at
a weakly higher value than that one due to its current assets (this is implied
by the inequality V2 ≥ V1 of Proposition 10).
Let us consider now the consequences of weakening the hypothesis that
investors are risk neutral. If they are risk averse, their valuation equation
could be now, for example:
Vt = dt + βEt (Vt+1)− νV art (Vt+1) (45)
=
X
i
βiEt (dt+i)− νV art
¡
Σiβidt+i
¢
.
We added to the risk neutral valuation a negative correction proportional
to the variance of dividends in the following periods. Because in our model
the only stochastic element is the outcome of R&D activity, the main prac-
tical consequence of introducing risk aversion is a penalization of the market
valuation of R&D investments when the research outcome is still uncertain.
There are two possible behaviours of managers, depending on their ob-
jectives.
On one hand, if managers maximize the short-term valuation of the firm
on the market (which is Vt, calculated by equation (45)), they aim to maxi-
mize the same objective equation of investors, that is, they will include the
risk correction into equation (40). The dynamics of the model are almost
the same as before; the only diﬀerence is that the optimal quantity of R&D
invested in each period is reduced and therefore the productivity of the firm
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and the value of the firm grow less in the long run.
On the other hand, if managers maximize the long-run valuation of the
firm the conclusions change.
Proposition 12 If managers maximize the long-run market valuation of the
firm (or equivalently the expected value of profits), they will exactly follow
the same behaviour analysed in the previous pages. However, the market
now evaluates the firm according to equation (45) and the short-run market
valuation no longer reflects the valuation of the managers. The chosen R&D
level is higher than the level maximizing the valuation of investors and the
market valuation is lower than the expected value of the profits because there is
uncertainty about the investment results. If the market is risk averse enough,
in the short run investors can evaluate the firm less than its static value
without considering the work-in-progress investments in R&D. Anyway, in
the long run the firm grows more than in the previous case and after a certain
number of periods the market valuation is larger.
The considerations we made in this Section can be extended and deepened
in several directions. A first possibility is the use of other models of the
mechanism of knowledge stock creation. A first partial exploration seems
to show that the basic dynamic behaviour of the model presented here is
robust to many specification changes. It is qualitatively similar to that one
we would have if R&D had a probability of success for more than one period
or if we were using many degrees of eﬀectiveness (not just success or failure)
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in the R&D process. We have the same results if we do not consider research
to be a one-shot process, but we condition the quantity of created knowledge
capital in a case of success to a function of all past R&D expenditures.
Other interesting extensions go beyond the aims of this work, although
they are worthy of note as hints for further explorations, since they can shed
light on the long-run behaviour of firms.
We considered the behaviour of a single firm in a perfectly competitive
market under the hypothesis of constant wages. There may be interesting
results if we consider the market as a whole. Under the hypothesis of perfect
competition and no spillovers between firms, there is heterogeneity in the firm
structure, because of the diﬀerent outcomes of investments. The long-run
market equilibrium depends on the conditions of the entrant firms. If they
enter the market at the initial level of eﬃciency, after a while the technological
growth will create entry barriers because the new firms will not be able
to achieve positive profits. In the long run, firms already in the market
that have grown too little will leave the market and therefore there will be
concentration. A competitive market outcome could be re-established if we
allow spillovers or if the new firms enter the market at an increasing eﬃciency
level.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examined some econometric results about the relationship
between market value and assets of a firm; we tried to explain some puzzling
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evidence using an innovative simple model where we introduce uncertainty
about the R&D process and a risk-averse stock market.
We see in the empirical analysis that the usual positive correlation be-
tween the firm value and the physical and knowledge assets is confirmed at
an aggregate level in a panel model with fixed eﬀects. We notice a high level
of heterogeneity and try to explain part of it through the diﬀerences between
sectors. Equality tests and separate regressions in each industry seem to con-
firm that this source of heterogeneity is important because the coeﬃcients of
the regressors are significantly diﬀerent and the R2 of the separated OLS re-
gressions in most industries are consistently higher than the R2 of the single
regression with common slopes and fixed eﬀects. In the separate regressions,
we split the contributions of current and past R&D and report several very
small or even negative coeﬃcients for current R&D.
We try to explain this last fact in a theoretical framework where we
modify the usual basic static model including dynamic elements and where
R&D is an activity with uncertain results. This alternative approach to the
problem allows us to examine the consequences of R&D investments in their
various stages, highlighting the fact that research decisions have eﬀects on
the market value of the firm even before the conclusion of the R&D program.
Therefore, the market valuation of the firm not only depends on the
already accumulated assets, but also on the expected return of the work-in-
progress research.
Moreover, the uncertain nature of R&D investments can have other con-
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sequences. In the presence of risk aversion, the market penalizes the expected
value of an investment before knowing if it has been successful. If managers
aim to maximize the long-run value of the firm, this fact induces a diﬀer-
ence between the valuation of the management and that of the market: the
latter can negatively perceive long-run positive investments because of the
associated risk.
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5 Conclusions
This thesis examined some characteristics of the interaction between inno-
vation activity of firms, in particular research and development investments,
and economic system. We analysed some aspects of the relationships of R&D
activity with market structure, public incentives to development and market
value of firms.
In the chapter "R&D and market structure in a horizontal diﬀerentiation
framework" we studied how firms can influence market competition introduc-
ing innovative characteristics in their products. We analysed how innovation
and market structure endogenously interact over time. We considered a hor-
izontally diﬀerentiated framework where firms can invest in R&D to increase
diﬀerentiation among varieties of the same product. We thought of a prod-
uct as an instrument allowing us to satisfy some needs. In a diﬀerentiated
market, each variety had diﬀerent eﬀectiveness in satisfying each need. A
consumer chose the bundle of varieties giving him the highest level of overall
satisfaction. Firms were able to modify the characteristics of their variety
through investments in R&D; they aimed towards a more specialized pro-
file, increasing the level of horizontal diﬀerentiation and raising their market
power. The movement of a variety towards areas of specialization not well
fulfilled by other varieties raised the overall satisfaction of consumers. The
inclusion of our mechanism in a dynamic framework allowed us to deter-
mine not only the path of production and R&D, but also the evolution of
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the market structure over time. Our most important results were that in
this environment firms found incentives to invest in R&D to increase their
specialization; the quantity of invested resources in research was declining
over time, because the returns from further specialization decreased when
the firm is more specialized, while prices, output and short-run profits of the
firms increased. We compared the decentralized outcome and the socially
optimal solution and we found a suboptimal investment in R&D, because
the socially optimal production was larger than the decentralized one and
more output taking advantage of research implied more incentives to invest
in R&D; moreover, the firm did not internalize the benefits of reducing sub-
stitutability with the other varieties on the profits of the other producers.
We examined the empirical evidence on the subject using a panel of sectorial
data about European firms and the results of the empirical analysis were
coherent with the model.
In the chapter "The evaluation of the incentives to firms for innovation:
the case of the Fund for Technological Innovation in Italy" we empirically
studied the eﬀectiveness of the Fund for Technological Innovation, a policy
instrument created by the Italian Ministry of Economic Development to stim-
ulate private innovations by firms. This Fund focused on the development
stage of R&D activity and was composed of two sections: a general purpose
one, where applications from any field of activity and geographical area were
accepted and evaluated one-by-one by merit following the chronological or-
der of submission without a set deadline; a special purpose one, periodically
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issuing calls for applications in specific fields of activity or geographical ar-
eas with a set deadline, whose applications were ranked and whose subsidies
were assigned to the best projects up to the amount of available resources.
For both sections, the policy measures included a concessional loan and a
non-refundable grant. The regular functioning of the general section of the
Fund was unexpectedly interrupted after about five months due to shortage
of funds; we used this exogenous shock to identify the eﬀect of the policy:
we compared the behaviour of the subsidized firms with that of the firms ap-
plying to the Fund after the shortage of funds, whose application had been
neither assessed nor funded until five years later. The data from the Min-
istry about the Fund were merged with the 1999-2007 balance sheets of the
firms filed at the Centrale dei Bilanci archives. We used two methodologies
to evaluate the eﬃcacy of this section of the Fund: a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach, complemented by a matching procedure to increase the similarity
between treated and controls, and a regression discontinuity design approach,
using the submission date of the application as the forcing variable. In both
cases, we were not able to detect signals of eﬀectiveness of the policy on
the investment behaviour of firms in the considered treatment period 2001-
2007. The same was true also for sales, capital and employee figures, while
there was a positive eﬀect on assets; the additional liquidity from the sub-
sidy seemed probably to have been used to finance the current expenditure
of firms. Neither the profitability nor the financial structure of the firm seem
had been clearly aﬀected by the policy, apart from a reduction in the share
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of long-term debts over assets, when calculated net of the concessional loan
from the subsidy, a result coherent with the hypothesis of lack of eﬀectiveness
of the policy. We also evaluated the eﬃcacy of three calls for applications
of the special section of the Fund; we merged the application data with the
balance sheets from the Cerved archives for the years 2001-2007. We used
the regression discontinuity design approach with a normalized ranking of
the applying firms as the forcing variable; the results were very similar to
those from the general section for the treatment period 2003-2007.
In the chapter "Dynamics of R&D investments and the value of the firm"
we investigated the relationship between value of firms and their knowledge
and conventional capital stocks. Analysing this relationship in a panel of ob-
servations from Compustat regarding the U.S. manufacturing sectors for the
period 1975-1995, we saw that the theoretical assumptions of the relation-
ship used by many previous studies may have eﬀects in terms of eﬃciency of
the estimates. We found a high level of heterogeneity in the coeﬃcients of
diﬀerent sectors, which could undermine the results of the previous analyses
usually postulating the same relationship in all sectors after controlling for
fixed eﬀects. When separating the current research eﬀort from the past one,
often the eﬀect of current R&D was much weaker than that one of past R&D
and sometimes was negative. To explain this fact, we developed a simple
model where there was uncertainty about the results of R&D investments
and we explicitly considered the time dimension. These two aspects were
relevant because of the lag between a R&D investment and the achievement
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of its results on the knowledge asset. The value of a firm therefore took
into account not only the current assets, but also the expected value of the
potential ones. Moreover, since research is a risky activity, there could be
a diﬀerent valuation of the already concretized assets and of those still at
a work-in-progress stage. Risk-averse investors could penalize the expected
returns of the latter in the determination of the market value of the firm.
Therefore, when investors are risk averse and managers maximize the long-
run value of the firm, the risk associated with work-in-progress R&D could
reduce the short-run firm value even if its expected value grows in the long
run.
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